415. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
1145. Hour’s talk with Crown Prince a.m. produced little on which base RLG–PL deal. It did, however, confirm that they have not been swamped into acceptance without examination consequences and consideration of safeguards. In marked contrast to our last talk December 7 (Embtel 9012) Savang avoided dogmatic predictions. At same time depth his conviction re Communist and hence inimical nature PL never more evident. After amenities, I said I would admit to him I had been shocked by communiqué of December 28. Crown Prince indicated his agreement saying however that in such situation it necessary await inevitable reactions on part members of government and Assembly. While Souvanna had received prior support of Cabinet and many deputies for this type of deal, yet key Ministers had been absent. Savang had been kept informed daily basis of progress reactions and on doubts which had arisen. I was not to think Lao leaders unaware of faults in communiqué which were numerous.
In view this last remark, I did not, as I had previously intended, set forth our specific criticisms of text but merely said that all other faults aside, I had been curious about constitutionality procedures which Souvanna envisaged. Savang seized on this to indicate constitutionality [Page 881] one of principal defects and then evinced doubt as to whether Souvanna could get 3/4 vote needed (actually 2/3 of members other than Ministers). Generalizing, he went on to say patience needed, also constancy. More than ever essential Lao leaders to feel sure of US support. One should now make allowance for frailties of character and not be too severe in face irregularities (a reference to import license problem) which regrettably natural. I referred back to November 13 letter recalling re-evaluation US policy required in event coalition, dilution of ANL with Communists, or acceptance Communist bloc aid or aid missions. November two agreement which Bong and Radio Hanoi had recently publicized also serious threat to US-Lao relations. US wished continue aid but if re-evaluation necessary, could not predict outcome. Capacity as opposed desire to help would be in doubt. Re bloc aid Savang said that in this or that capital he himself had received aid offers from bloc countries but had parried them. So long as Laos not Communist, it would never accept aid from Communist countries.
Crown Prince came back to coalition time and again emphasizing this above all was Communist objective. They did not care about elections as they knew PL would win very few seats, especially in north where as he had again personally confirmed, they were hated. Instead, every possible means being used to get into government where they could work on weak Ministers including Souvanna. This was gravest danger.
Savang remarked nature of PL more and more understood. For instance, pursuant cease fire, RLG–PL mixed teams had gone up north and PL field commanders had proved uncooperative even to point of refusing see PL representatives from Vientiane. We should remember also Communist effort has been diverted to Laos and Cambodia because of Diem’s success which even went so far as cause insecurity in North Vietnam. In Cambodia vulnerability due Sihanouk’s excessive “idealism”; here causes were facts of geography and Geneva. Character and life of Lao people such that they would not knowingly or willingly come under Communists. Danger was letting Communists into inside positions whence could control. They had even asked him if he would accept PL representatives in royal entourage. He had replied he had no need there of representatives any political group but he now considered this reply to have been an error on his part and a serious lack of finesse. PL now knew that he was against them and could thus spread word that Crown was both worried and partisan which was not posture Crown should maintain. I remarked PL could not have been in any doubt of Crown’s attitude towards Communism as royalty everywhere necessarily against them.
Savang went on say whatever American position, he and other Lao would continue struggle against Communists. If it were no [Page 882] longer possible on national plane, struggle would continue on personal plane as “resistance.” Shifting to positive aspects US support in present situation, I said that … we would try continue, also civic action programs, also, so far as we could, …. Savang repeated that … present danger was coalition.
During talk, I took occasion mention return of Ourot on consultation and outlined Assistant Secretary Robertson’s remarks to him as set forth Deptel 849.3 I said that I had told no one else but if coalition should go through, I would be recalled on consultation to participate reevaluation. This Savang said was perfectly normal and to be expected. I then reminded him of Secretary’s statements to Katay (Deptel 7154) as further evidence our will to support Laos. In this context I said I wanted him know that ridiculous story of agreement President and Nehru on division spheres of influence in Far East between Communist China and India and consequent US withdrawal from Laos was completely devoid of foundation and malicious. Savang assured me had not credited this story but said with smile Indians certainly not disinterested here.
Concluding conversation, Savang said he did not know whether today, tomorrow or just when there would be break in current situation but he hoped we could be patient. He assured me struggle would be continued and while victory not assured, it would, so far as he was concerned, go on.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/–1857. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, and Ottawa.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 403.↩
- Not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–1257)↩
- Telegram 715, December 11, summarized the conversation between Katay and the Secretary in Washington on December 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.00/12–1156) See Document 401.↩