277. Memorandum of a Conversation, Vientiane, February 27, 19551
PARTICIPANTS
- His Royal Highness Prince Savang
- The Secretary of State
- Mr. McCardle
- Mr. Robertson
- Mr. MacArthur
- Minister Yost
After the usual greetings, the Crown Prince launched into a description of the difficult situation in which Laos now finds itself. He said that Laos had been at war first with the Japanese and later with the Vietminh over a period of many years and that it had successfully preserved its independence in spite of the enemy having come within a few miles of Luang Prabang and that it had been fully prepared to continue the struggle when Geneva had intervened. In the close of the Geneva Conference he had given instructions to the Laos Delegation that they should not agree to any provision of the ceasefire which would preclude Laos from allying itself with friendly powers or which would give recognition and status to the Pathet Lao. However, at the last minute the Lao Delegation had yielded to Great Power pressure and had accepted these clauses. The Pathet Lao, the Prince said, are purely inventions of the Chinese Communists and Vietminh and have no indigenous support. The families of most of their leaders are held as hostages in China and their younger military officers have been sent to China for training and replaced in Laos by Vietminh officers. They could be wiped out very easily if the government had a free hand. Laos, however, is in a very exposed position, having long frontiers with China and North Vietnam and it has not felt it could risk action against the Pathet Lao which might provoke armed counter attacks with the Vietminh.
At this point the Secretary expressed his view that, in dealing with the internal danger as it felt needful to do, the Lao Government need have no fear of massive overt external attack. He pointed out that the Manila Pact is a firm guarantee to Laos and other nations within the treaty area against external aggression. While there are [Page 611] not Manila Pact forces visible to the Crown Prince in this immediate neighborhood, the Manila Pact Powers and particularly the United States possess immense forces, particularly in the air and on the sea. These forces would be used against any nation responsible for an external aggression against Laos. The Chinese Communists and the Vietminh are fully aware of the overwhelming strength of these forces and of the fact that they would be used in the case of aggression. The Secretary therefore considered it excluded the possibility that there would be massive overt aggression against Laos. Small scale infiltration there undoubtedly would be, but the Lao Government would have to deal with that.
As to the internal problem, the Secretary continued, that was for the Lao Government to meet. The United States is supplying certain assistance but the responsibility and action required must lie with the Lao Government. The people of the United States are assuming very great responsibilities for preserving the independence and liberty of many countries all over the world, including some such as Laos which are far distant and of which they know little. They are doing so on the assumption that those people have an equal determination to defend their independence against internal or external attack. In the United States, while there are many internal political differences of opinion, there are no differences of opinion on the basic issue of resistance to Communism. The fact that the Manila Pact was ratified by the United States Senate by a bipartisan vote of 86 to 1 is a clear demonstration of this fact. The United States expects other liberty-loving countries to demonstrate the same unity and resolution. It was not his wish to advise the Lao Government how to deal with their internal problems but he felt he could assure them, for the reasons he had just explained, that they might feel safe to deal with them without fear of external aggression.
The Crown Prince expressed his appreciation of the sentiments which the Secretary had expressed. He said that his views and those of the Lao people are completely firm on the question of resistance to Communism and maintenance of Lao independence. There had been the question, which had caused divergences within the Government, as to how far the Government could go in reestablishing its authority in Sam Neua and Phong Saly without provoking a massive counterattack with which they could not deal. These doubts have been aggravated, first, by the attitude of the International Commission and, second, by mistrust of the efficacy of French support and French military tactics. In this connection the Prince referred bitterly to the stupidity of French tactics at Dien Bien Phu and to the loss of five Laotian battalions which had been prevented from participating in the battle when they might have been useful but which had been wiped out by the Vietminh at their leisure after the fall of the fortress. [Page 612] The Crown Prince continued, in light of the affirmation which the Secretary had just given him of the firm support of the Manila Pact Powers backed by the great strength of the United States, he saw no reason for further hesitation and believed that the Government should now proceed promptly to reestablish its authority in the two provinces. If some members of the Government would not agree with this policy there would have to be a change in the Government. Action furthermore must be taken promptly. The Secretary inquired when the rainy season began. The Crown Prince replied in July, though he indicated that the commencement of the rainy season would not necessarily stop operations.
The Secretary expressed regret that the terms of the Geneva Accords prevented the United States from having a military mission in Laos and felt that it might be possible to give Laotian officers proper training in other countries such as Thailand. The Crown Prince replied that the Laotian Government had already decided to utilize this method. He emphasized the necessity of close relations with Thailand, pointing out Laos is a bulwark between Thailand and Communism and, if the former wishes to preserve this bulwark and avoid having a common frontier with the Communists, it must give its full support to Laos.
The conversation closed with an expression by the Crown Prince of the feeling that the conversation had provided him with precisely the sort of assurance he needed to act, as the Crown and the great mass of Laotian people always wished to act, in vigorous defense of their liberties.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751].00/2–2755. Secret. Drafted by MacArthur. After the conclusion of the SEATO Council meetings at Bangkok, Dulles made brief visits to Rangoon and Vientiane on February 27, Phnom Penh on February 28, and Saigon from February 28 to March 1. Briefing material for the Secretary’s visit to Laos is ibid., FE Files: Lot 56 D 679, Bangkok Conference, Visits. The Legation suggested in telegram 374 from Vientiane, February 21, that Dulles meet with the principal Lao political figures alone, because “due to peculiarities of local political situation, each of above figures will talk much more frankly and substantively alone than he would in company of any of the others.” (Ibid., Central Files, 110.11–DU/2–2155)↩