256. Memorandum From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Cambodia (Hartshorn) to the Ambassador in Cambodia (Strom)1

1.
I am returning herewith the excerpts from Mr. Young’s paper2 which you asked me to check for content and factual data. I am also [Page 565] attaching the slightly revised section on military assistance incorporating my suggested changes, which, for the most part, are minor variations in totals from those shown in our programming data.
2.
The third sentence in the 2nd paragraph of Mr. Young’s paper states that “The U.S. has informed the Cambodian Government that … “.3 I have deleted this part of the sentence because MAAG has never informed the Cambodian Government of the level of aid for any of its annual programs. This same sentence states that MDA Aid for FY ‘57 will be $9.2 million. Our figure is $1.6 million. I am curious to know how Mr. Young could have arrived at a figure that is almost six times as large as the amount we have programmed for FY ’57.
3.
In his third paragraph, Mr. Young speaks of a reduction in forces from 48,000 to 31,000 members. I cannot explain the higher figure. At one time, a figure of 45,000 was used for planning purposes, but the highest strength the FARK has ever had was slightly in excess of 38,000, and that is the figure which we have always used as the highwater mark of FARK strength.
E.S. Hartshorn, Jr.
Brigadier General

[Attachment]

1. Military Assistance

Pursuant to this policy of the US, economic aid was continued on the basis of previously existing agreements between the Cambodian and American Governments; and on May 16, 1955 an MDA Agreement was signed at Phnom Penh formalizing the provision of military assistance to Cambodia and providing for the establishment of a Military Assistance Advisory Group. Thus, despite its pronounced attitude of strict neutrality in the cold war, Cambodia became the only neutralist nation in Asia to accept an American MAAG.

MDA assistance for Cambodia in FY ‘55 totaled $32.75 million, plus $29 million for consumables and construction, or a total of $61.75 million. In FY ‘56, the MDA contribution dropped to $10.1 million and construction and consumable programs to $29.17 million, making a total of $39.27 million. The program level of aid in FY ‘57 was MDA $1.82 million and construction and consumable items $20.7, or a total of $22.52 million for the fiscal year. It is estimated that by fiscal 1960, the total contribution will slip to $20.05 million.

[Page 566]

This steadily declining curve of military assistance for Cambodia was accomplished by a reduction in forces from 38,000 to 31,000. At the same time with the increasing influence of MAAG, there was a notable gain in the efficiency of the Cambodian Armed Forces, and, with improved coordination between MAAG and the French Military Training Mission, the capability of the Khmer Armed Forces to maintain internal security within the Kingdom and to provide a deterrent against external guerrilla aggression had notably improved. As a result of the American Aid Program, and of the devoted and intelligent operations of MAAG, the Cambodian Armed Forces at the present time constitute a corps of pro-American, conservative and loyal elements, basically anti-communist in outlook, although by Western military standards still far from optimum efficiency.

  1. Source: Department of State, Phnom Penh Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 30, 500 Country Team. Secret.
  2. Reference is to an excerpt from the study prepared by McClintock and the Policy Planning Staff and submitted to Bowie by McClintock under cover of the memorandum supra. The study is not printed.
  3. Ellipsis in the source text.