237. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State1
1509. We have read with great care Ambassador Bishop’s thought-provoking analysis as set out in Bangkok 3158 to Department.2 Our colleagues in Bangkok recommend “massive inoculation” of militant anti-Communist spirit in free countries of Asia in order to counter neutralism and to revitalize SEATO. We also have submitted an essay on Asiatic neutralism in despatch 365 May 3.3
I do not question validity of conclusions as far as Thailand is concerned but believe attempt at such inoculation would not achieve desired results in Cambodia where just about only thing that might drive country closer to Communists is belief that West is opposed to neutrality policy.
Ambassador Bishop seems to equate all neutralism in Asia as being automatically pro-Communist since his telegram never refers to neutral countries without adjective “pro-Communist”. I believe, at [Page 519] least so far as Cambodia is concerned, such an appellation is not justified by facts.
Except in loose sense that neutrality policy is more favorable to Communists than formal alignment with West, Cambodia’s foreign policy is not pro-Communist. Cambodians are monarchists and there is no monarchy compatible with Communism. Cambodian Government shares none of Communist foreign policy objectives except that it is pleased to see its neutralism accepted and lauded by Communist countries and distressed at what it considers opposition to its neutrality policy by Western countries. Secretary’s statesmanlike letter to Cambodian Foreign Minister of April 17 has done much to redress this latter feeling and has shown that United States understands position of so-called neutral countries even though we continue to believe collective security arrangements are a more certain instrument against Communist aggression.
As far as Communist threat inside Cambodia is concerned, Department’s intelligence report 7197 on Communist subversion in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos4 comes to conclusion that “in Cambodia Communist strength is virtually non-existent although a small insignificant political party may exist” and adds “Communist prospects for developing a subversive potential in Cambodia are poor.” With these judgments we have no cause to differ.
I do not know how these considerations apply elsewhere among neutralist countries of Asia, but it seems to me we must accept as a political reality that Cambodia and certain other Asian countries intend at this time to remain neutral as between Western and Communist blocs.
If we protest too loudly and demand black and white decisions or seek to give “massive inoculations” of anti-Communist serum, at least in Cambodia reaction will be counter-productive. These people will feel they are being coerced by United States and that they are being pushed unwillingly to accept a disguised protectorate with additional risk that they are on an exposed frontier with Communists almost across their border.
Unfortunately, Communist psychological warfare experts seem at last to have realized this fact and in our opinion one of most dangerous recent developments has been “sweetness and light” tone of Radio Hanoi. As long as Communists were practicing “massive inoculations” of anti-Westernism here our task was relatively easy.
It would seem to me that more subtle approach to problem is to utilize popular fervor in favor of a policy of neutrality as an active defense against Communist danger. In Cambodia we have been consistent in saying that our policy is to assist this kingdom to remain [Page 520] independent. If we succeed in this endeavor Cambodia will be preserved from Communist penetration and thus our strategic objective of denying the Mekong Basin to Communist infiltration will be achieved.
It seems to me therefore that a more rewarding policy is to recognize negative virtues of neutralism and to enlist this doctrine as a deterrent to Communist penetration. The greatest blow Communists have recently suffered in their policy toward Cambodia has been Secretary’s statement that we respect its decision to be neutral. Cambodia desires nothing more than to be independent of all foreign domination and Cambodians have no illusions as to dangers of Communist aggression which were manifested by Vietminh in recent war and of which, they believe, they had recurring episode only last year.
Accordingly, if we respect their neutrality as a starting point and proceed with tact and patience we have capability of leading Cambodia increasingly to a more militant attitude toward Asiatic communism.
Thus, without doing disservice to our own policy of reliance on collective security, let us walk quietly and turn the inert force of Asiatic neutralism against its ultimate enemy which is communism. This may be making a virtue of necessity but there is no harm in using the shield before we use the sword.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/5–1156. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Karachi, New Delhi, Manila, Taipei, Rangoon, Djakarta, Bangkok, Saigon, Wellington, Canberra, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vientiane.↩
- In telegram 3158 from Bangkok, May 4, Bishop assessed the problem of what he perceived as “pro-communist neutralism” and, using Thailand as an example, argued that the countries of Southeast Asia could maintain their independence and integrity only if they received a “‘massive inoculation’ of militant anti-communist spirit.” (Ibid., 611.90/5–456)↩
- In despatch 365 from Phnom Penh, McClintock observed that Cambodia was moving away from a “silent and implied reliance on SEATO” toward a policy of balancing East and West, in accordance with the traditional Cambodian policy of playing powerful forces against each other. (Ibid., 751H.00/5–1156)↩
- Not printed.↩