Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

254. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, June 12, 1957—7:41 p.m.

558. Deptel 526,² Tunis 687.³ Re advice to Bourguiba:

FYI. At present we know neither how long French suspension aid may continue, particularly in light firm stand Bourguiba on Algeria and uncertainties re attitudes next French government nor how far political pressures generated by frontier incidents and other factors will carry GOT in breaking economic ties with France. Evident economic and political relations seriously shaken by recent Franco-Tunisian interchanges and long-range prospects Franco-Tunisian collaboration do not appear favorable. However for time being our own present and foreseeable budgetary limitations would permit us supply only small part normal French contribution even if it were politically desirable supply more. We must also bear in mind possible repercussions in Morocco any French or US action Tunisia, especially in light current negotiations for preservation vital strategic interests US and West. Thus we have every interest in encouraging Franco-Tunisian rapprochement even though we recognize difficulties in achieving any permanent modus vivendi. End FYI. Department therefore approves your initiative in conveying realities of economic situation to GOT and commends line you have taken. In present fluid situation any advice we may render may appear hollow in light intervening events. Following is therefore intended as general guidance to be drawn upon in conversations with Bourguiba as you deem appropriate.

1) Inherent in US recognition of and support for Tunisian independence that we wish see country strong and stable economically as well as politically.

2) Tunisian economy over long period of years has developed in close relationship with that of France and now apparent that trade, balance of payments and other economic and financial patterns cannot be basically altered without danger of doing violence to Tunisia’s stability and welfare.

3) Foregoing not to say we are insensitive to Tunisian concern re extent to which its economic relationships with France may in its judgment be inconsistent with Tunisia’s sovereignty and independence. US has long stood for free, equal and mutually advantageous economic relationships among members of world community and certainly feel this principle applies to Tunisia as to other countries. At same time we recognize that emerging pattern within free world makes complete political or economic sovereignty impossible for anyone and opens new vistas for economic cooperation for mutual benefit. Such accommodations towards this end do not represent any diminution of sovereignty but actually constitute its effective exercise.

4) It has always been our hope and direction our policy both in France and Tunisia to see emergence of such mutually beneficial relationship between France and Tunisia. We would gather from Bourguiba’s past statements that he would agree. Whatever obstacles and setbacks which may be encountered, we hope Tunisia will agree re validity of objective and will not despair of its achievement, despite current difficulties with French military which we hope are only temporary.

5) For our part, we are willing assist in every appropriate and feasible way. Bourguiba will understand that quite aside from foregoing considerations, there are problems of fund availabilities and legal restrictions, which necessarily limit what we can do. Nevertheless we have given evidence our willingness help as we can through our aid programs and such exceptional measures as that authorized by Deptel 526.

6) In long run and for reasons outlined above, however, such assistance on our part likely assume characteristics of palliatives and not be effective substitute for healthy and mutually advantageous relationship between Tunisia and France. It is in direction encouraging such relationship that we feel we can make best contribution Tunisia’s future. We regret in this connection French decision suspend aid and are doing what we can encourage French resume it under conditions consonant Tunisian sovereignty and dignity. We have been somewhat encouraged by French attitude toward approaches we have made on financial situation and had reason believe that French government would try find means of interim financial assistance before formation of new government and we will continue encourage new government take further remedial measures.

7) We recognize central importance Algeria to this and related problems Franco-Tunisian relationship. We have already pointed out to Bourguiba considerations which guide us in our attitudes toward that problem (Deptel 515)⁴ and which we continue believe are important to interests Tunisia, North Africa and free world. In this connection we regard as definitely helpful and constructive Bourguiba’s efforts persuade Algerian leaders accept free elections. We hope such efforts will continue and will do our best assure they are met with understanding on French side. Our efforts this respect will be greatly facilitated by moderate Tunisian approach to problem.

8) We have noted Bourguiba shares our horror recent massacre Melouza.⁵ We have of course no way knowing all circumstances involved this matter. We must however condemn atrocities either side and hope Bourguiba will use his influence with Algerian leaders to make clear that excesses on their part can only stiffen French public opinion and render more difficult political concessions from Paris. We recognize reverse similarly true.

9) Regarding queries received by us from other countries re Mediterranean conference we do not believe US in position favor or oppose idea but have felt constrained point out it likely be tactically counterproductive so far as French concerned. We have however taken occasion underline constructive nature of Bourguiba’s efforts with Algerian leaders along lines paragraph seven above.

10) We have emphasized our concern to French re recent incident involving tragic wounding Hajeri and are continuing efforts with French to do everything possible minimize possibility clashes such as those June 7. We concerned potentially explosive nature situation and count on Tunisia do everything possible keep temperature down.

11) Whatever rights and wrongs in Algerian situation we hope Bourguiba will realize French cannot remain insensitive to arms traffic.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 872.10/6–1257. Secret. Repeated to Paris and by pouch to Rabat.
2. Telegram 526, May 30, indicated that the Department and ICA had examined various ways to relieve Tunisia’s financial difficulty and reported on one of the possibilities being considered. (Ibid., 872.10/5–2457)
3. Telegram 687, May 28, stated that French Ambassador Gorse was hopeful that Bourguiba’s comments of May 27 might assure resumption of aid once a new French Government was installed. (Ibid., 872.10/5–2857)
4. Telegram 515, May 24, reported that Vimont of the French Embassy had informed the Department on May 23 that French aid to Tunisia had been suspended and that France hoped such assistance could be reinstated once Tunisia adopted a more “natural” stance in regard to the Algerian conflict. The Department told Vimont that the French action would only complicate an already critical Tunisian economic situation. (Ibid., 772.5–MSP 5–2457)
5. This was one of the more brutal incidents in the Algerian insurgency. See Documents 85–86.