Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

637. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, December 5, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Evidence of UK-French-Israeli Collusion and Deception in Connection with Attacks on Egypt

There is attached a copy of a study on the above subject which has been prepared with the cooperation of policy offices of the Department and certain senior officers.² The study has been reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency … . A special intelligence supplement is also available separately.³

Because of the obvious sensitivity of the mere fact that the Department was making such a study, coordination with the military services has not, up to this point, been attempted, nor has the undertaking of such a study been made known to our missions abroad. Copies of the annexes will be made available only to those officers of the Department who would have had prior knowledge of their subject matter.

[Attachment]

RECORD OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE ISRAELI AND ANGLO-FRENCH ATTACKS ON EGYPT IN LATE OCTOBER 1956⁴

I. General Approach

This report attempts to sift the available and relevant evidence to ascertain the factors in the background to the Israeli attack on Egypt (October 29) and to the Franco-British attack on Egypt (October 31). The method employed is not strictly chronological, since the treatment subsumes under several main themes a large amount of material covering the period prior to July 26 and extending beyond the dates of the attacks. The report must be read as a whole to understand the relations of the individual sections. The documentation is necessarily selective, but it is fairly comprehensive and representative. The chief conclusions of the analysis are contained in Section VI.

The report does not engage in an elaborate exegesis of the meaning of the words “collusion” and “deception.” It assumes that the commonly accepted meaning of these words is understood and is not likely to be obscured by the adduced evidence. The report does seek to indicate degrees of collusion among the three major principals who acted against Egypt. In the end, the analysis supports the view that collusion and deception did exist and that it was directed not only against Egypt but also the US Government.

II. Israeli Fear of Egyptian Attack

Israeli fear of Arab attacks grew in intensity with the series of Arab anti-Israeli actions and statements beginning with the conclusion of the Egyptian-Soviet arms deal in September 1955.

By March 1956 the Israelis had a fairly accurate idea of the size and scope of the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal and were greatly alarmed in particular by the quantities of Soviet aircraft passing into Nasir’s hands. (Memorandum of conversation, March 21, 1956, Secret.)⁵ By early May the Israelis had also learned of the 23 million dollar Syrian-Czech arms deal, completed in February 1956. (Memorandum of conversation, Paris, May 4, 1956, Secret.)⁶

The extreme vulnerability of Israel to air attack led the Israelis to put heavy pressure on the United States to approve the release to Israel of fighter aircraft from France, Italy, and Canada.

Israeli apprehension at Arab arming was increased by the growing influence of Nasir in Syria and Jordan, as evidenced by the conclusion of the Egyptian-Syrian and Egyptian-Saudi mutual defense pacts in October 1955. Israeli concern was heightened further by the quick growth of Egyptian influence in Jordan that culminated in the dismissal of General Glubb in March 1956. This was followed in April by a wave of fedayeen activity from both Egypt and Jordan… .

In a series of conversations between February and May 1956 with Departmental officials Israeli Ambassador Eban and Chief of Intelligence Shiloah reiterated the Israeli Government’s conviction that Nasir intended to attack in June. (Memoranda of conversation dated May 5, April 8, and May 4, 1956, Secret.)⁷ His ambition to gain hegemony over the Arab world was also repeatedly stressed. In a conversation with Department officials on March 21, Eban and Shiloah emphasized that the Israeli government would fall if its attempts to secure arms failed, and Eban stated that he possessed a letter from Prime Minister Ben Gurion to the President on this subject.

By June 1956 it seems clear that the Israeli Government had given up any hopes of relying on the UN to halt Arab raids into Israel. Hammarskjold’s attempts to secure a cessation of border incidents had broken down. Israel evinced little disposition to cooperate with Hammarskjold’s plans to stabilize the existing situation. Israeli relations with the UN were further complicated by the apparent mutual dislike existing between Ben Gurion and the Secretary-General.

Israel was also not convinced of the effectiveness of any measures which the United States might take to stop Arab attacks and by June had practically given up hope of obtaining aircraft through US auspices. (Memorandum of conversation, June 14, 1956, Confidential.)⁸ Hence the Israeli cabinet shift of June 17, in which Moshe Sharret was replaced by Ben Gurion’s protege, Golda Meir, as Foreign Minister, undoubtedly represented a decision to break loose from a policy of cooperation with the US. It also represented a victory for the increasingly influential military and civilian elements who were demanding military action against Egypt before it was too late.

III. French Support of Israel

The veering of France toward Israel began well before Nasir’s coup against the Suez Canal Company. Although France was one of the guarantors of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and was pledged to restrict the sale of arms to either the Arabs or Jews and to notify the NEACC concerning such sales, it observed the rising number and intensity of Arab-Israeli border clashes, the unfavorable results of the Czech arms deals with Egypt and Syria, and the evidence of Egyptian complicity in the Algerian rebellion. All these developments, particularly the last, seriously disturbed French policy-makers and persuaded them to re-evaluate French relations with Israel.

At least from mid-June, the French seemed disposed to encourage the military build-up of Israel. (See the memorandum of conversation, dated June 20, 1956, between the Italian Counselor of Embassy in Washington and officials of the Department.)⁹ There is also some indication that the French believed that the US was not inclined to oppose a French effort to correct the arms imbalance as between Israel and Egypt. The Israelis themselves indicated on June 18 that they were receiving significant amounts of new weapons. (D–131, Tel Aviv, September 4, 1956, Secret.)¹⁰ The French may even then have been the chief suppliers. The available evidence does not permit exact corroboration of the scale and kind of this traffic, but it appears reasonably certain that France and Israel were engaged early in arms dealings which contravened both the spirit and letter of the NEACC directives.

In August additional French Mystéres not cleared through the NEACC appear to have arrived in Israel. Ben Gurion stated on August 31 that “there are some very great things now in motion, but the time has not yet come to speak of them publicly.” It was also noted that the once urgent Israeli stress on the need for more arms in order to survive was gradually being abandoned, a probable indication that Israel was actually receiving arms satisfactorily, in quality and quantity.

… Two highly rated reports of early September … indicate that by this time close Franco-Israeli cooperation already existed regarding military plans against Nasir… . The tenor of these reports in September is further supported by the fact that Menahem Begin, leader of the ultra-rightist, expansionist, and activist Herut Party of Israel, visited Paris, September 9-24. He seems to have had an official status and the general backing of Ben Gurion. He was reported by the Israeli press to have established “bonds of friendship” with a number of high French civilian government officials. He is said to have assured members of the French Assembly that a Franco-British military operation against Egypt would be over within 24 hours if Israel joined in. Furthermore, Begin allegedly dismissed the possibility of military support to Egypt from either Egypt’s Arab allies or the USSR. (Jerusalem Post, September 28, 1956.) A high official of the Quai d’Orsay (unidentified) is reported to have assured Begin that the UK would permit an attack on Egypt if Israel left Jordan alone… .

On September 27 Henri Roux, then Director of Near Eastern Affairs in the French Foreign Office, told the US Embassy that he had no knowledge of a decision to transfer 24 additional Mystère IV A’s to Israel, although he knew Israel had been pressing for more Mystéres and that the French Defense Ministry favored granting the request. Roux also disclaimed any knowledge of Begin’s activities. (T–1488, Paris, September 28, 1956. Secret.)¹¹ … A UK source reported that on September 28 twenty French AMX tanks and an unknown number of French 75 mm guns arrived at Haifa on a French ship. (USARMA, CX–346, Tel Aviv, October 18, 1956, Secret.)¹²

Mme. Vered, Assistant Press Attaché of the Israeli Embassy in Paris, told an Embassy official that if the French had not sent the Israelis great quantities of arms in the past weeks the Israeli action in the Sinai would have been impossible. (T–2133, Paris, November 2, 1956, Confidential.)¹³

By mid-October French expressions of sympathy with Israel were open and unreserved. A Foreign Office official, Jean Daridan, Director General of Political and Economic Affairs, in reaction to a UK warning to Israel not to attack Jordan, expressed the view that pro-Israeli sentiment in the French Assembly and among the public was so strong that the government would probably be obliged to stand behind Israel if hostilities should break out. (T–1761, Paris, October 15, 1956. Secret.)¹⁴

The French also expressed sympathy with Israeli fears concerning the movement of Iraqi troops into Jordan. They warned that the strong reaction of Israel should not be taken lightly. They also indicated that the movement of Iraqi troops into Jordan might presage an all-out British move to extend the Baghdad Pact to which the French were opposed. They hinted that the Iraqi move might have been prompted by the British to accomplish this purpose. This indication of French views concerning the British was given on October 18. (T–1917, Paris, October 18, 1956, Confidential.)¹⁵ By that time the Anglo-French strategy against Egypt had been decided, the French concern about the British was later admitted to be “primarily a smoke-screen” to cover the real intent of the Anglo-French agreement.

On October 15 Ben Gurion had delivered a major foreign policy speech to the Knesset following a week-long cabinet meeting. He indicated that Israel was not so defenseless “as we were at the beginning of the year.” The UN, he said, was helpless to stop Arab attacks or to force Nasir to let Israel through the Suez Canal. He stated Israel has taken steps to strengthen its ties with several states and that, while some of these measures have been extremely beneficial, he could not at this time give more details. He also intimated that Israel might soon be facing fateful decisions and events. This hint of possible pending action was not only consistent with French aid to Israel, but also with the almost agreed UK-French plan to act when Israel attacked Egypt.

Israeli fears were further heightened by the victory of the pro-Egyptian element in the Jordanian elections of October 21 and the ratification of the Egyptian-Jordanian-Syrian military pact a few days later. These events also increased apprehensions in London and Paris. French hostility toward Nasir was further aggravated by their seizure, about October 18, of the Athos which, they asserted, was carrying arms to the Algerian rebels from Egypt.

On October 22 the French Foreign Office advised that exports from France to Egypt of all categories which included trucks, jeeps, spare parts, and other quasi-military goods were suspended. Specific applications for radar and radio equipment were rejected. (T–1868, Paris, October 22, 1956, Secret.)¹⁶

About two weeks later, the Embassy in Paris reported (T–2125, November 1, 1956, Secret)¹⁷ that the Air Attaché had reason to suspect that additional Mystéres had been made available by France to Israel, by sale, loan, or the stationing of units in Israel. This was confirmed by a US service attaché report of October 30 that 20 Mystéres with marking believed to be French were seen at Lydda and that 18 French jet pilots had arrived at the same Israeli airfield. (USARMA, CX–393, Tel Aviv, Joint Sitrep No. 2, October 30, 1956, Secret.) Subsequent reports indicate that French ground crews and technicians, in addition to pilots, arrived in Israel just prior to the attack on Egypt and that 2000 tons of jet fuel arrived in Haifa secretly from France on October 24. (Tel Aviv 641, November 21, 1956, Secret.)¹⁸ There is no firm evidence, however, that French pilots actually participated in the Sinai offensive… .

IV. Increasing Estrangement of Israel, France, and the United Kingdom From the United States

The confused period between Nasir’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on July 26, 1956 and the critical turning point in US relations with Israel, France, and the UK sometime in October passed through several phases.

The first of these phases was marked by a common Western sense of shock and disapproval consequent upon Nasir’s action. From the outset, a sharp difference of opinion among the United Kingdom, France, and the United States was evident concerning the most appropriate method of dealing with Nasir. The British and French instinct was to use force, immediately and jointly, even though they were not militarily prepared to do so. This largely visceral impulse was an accurate reflection of British and French feelings at the time and, the evidence now confirms, of their ultimate intentions, if every other means failed to bring Nasir to “reason.” Nevertheless, they were persuaded—practically “bludgeoned,” in their eyes—into discussions of the Suez situation, which were agreed upon by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom on August 2. The first London conference on Suez resulted in the 18 Power agreement (August 23) as the basis of an approach to Egypt in the hope of securing Nasir’s acceptance of some formula of international control and operation of the Canal. This phase ended with the failure of the Menzies Mission to Cairo (September 3-9) to obtain Nasir’s compliance with the 18 Power agreement, which he had rejected, in effect, before the mission began its discussion with him.

The second phase was initiated by the US-UK-French agreement, even more reluctantly assented to by the British and French, to hold another conference in London on September 19 of the major users of the Canal to consider and approve the US-sponsored plan for a Suez Canal Users Association. The conference completed its work in three days and steps were then taken to carry out the plan, involving an immense amount of technical preparation and consultation among the three principal Western governments. Although the British and French governments accepted the SCUA principle and expressed a willingness to cooperate in its implementation, they do not appear ever to have regarded it with the optimism evinced by the United States. Simultaneous with attempts to put SCUA on a working basis, the UK and France had informed the UN Security Council (September 12) of the aggravation of the international situation by Egypt’s rejection of the 18 Power agreement “which if allowed to continue would constitute a manifest danger to peace and security.” Although they pressed their case in the Security Council on September 23 and subsequently, the original UK-French resolution against Egypt was shelved. On October 14, by a 9 to 2 vote, the Security Council approved the 18 Power proposals. Some progress was reported in private Anglo-French-Egyptian negotiations. Anglo-French reference of the Suez affair to the UN was mainly but by no means exclusively in the nature of “clearing the lines” against any moral or political odium attaching to the possibility of sterner UK-French measures against Nasir. Neither country had foresworn such measures and, in fact, [both?] since early August had repeatedly indicated they would use force as a last resort.

The third phase unfolded in the first two weeks of October when US-UK-French differences over SCUA came to a head, chiefly over the question of the payment of any dues to Egypt and the enforcement of SCUA authority in the face of a recalcitrant and defiant Nasir, now strongly backed by Soviet diplomacy. In this period effective communication among the three Western principals appears to be breaking down. Franco-Israeli and Anglo-French ties were becoming increasingly more intimate and exclusive. The United States was obviously not included within the developing scope of these understandings. In Israel, France, and the UK at official levels there was a decline in contacts and mutual confidence in dealings with US officials.

In all of these phases, especially the last two, the Anglo-French build-up of military strength in the Eastern Mediterranean continued with increasing emphasis on political and strategic cooperation. French units began to arrive in Cyprus on August 30 and were reenforced thereafter.

A brief review of the pertinent evidence for each country, Israel, France, and the United Kingdom, will make clearer the extent and the meaning of their growing estrangement from the United States.

1. Israel. The nature and scope of the Franco-Israeli tie-up, summarized above in II, indicate that Israel had no confidence in any negotiations with Nasir and had decided early to prepare for a “preventive” attack on Egypt. Israel took this decision knowing that it would alienate the US and the UN, both of which it regarded as unwilling or unable to assist it in containing Arab aggressions. In the Israeli view, the US appeared more interested in keeping the peace than in assuring “justice” for Israel. The UN was ineffectual, most Israelis believed, and the UN truce machinery had been discredited. Although Israel was concerned with free transit of the Suez Canal, it despaired of Egypt’s allowing Israel to use it and had little faith in either UN or US interventions to make Egypt assent to Israeli use of the Canal. Given the siege-mentality of the Israelis and the Israeli belief that US desires to preserve a peaceful status quo in the Near East favored a policy of “appeasement” of Nasir, Israel shifted rapidly away from the US in basic policy aims and tactics. France supported this Israeli readjustment and largely made it possible by supplying Israel with aircraft and arms.

2. France. The French estrangement from the United States was cumulative but steady, punctuated by moods of professed cooperation in handling the Suez crisis and of black pessimism and disillusionment over the results. Fundamentally, the French attitude toward Nasir was one of unrelenting hostility and fear. The French never believed the West could do business with an “apprentice dictator,” as Mollet called Nasir. He stressed early the serious dangers which existed in not reacting vigorously to Nasir’s action and said, with Algeria uppermost in his thinking, that there was a real danger of a Moslem bloc extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific united against European nations and the United States if Nasir were not checked. (T–532, Paris, July 31, 1956, Confidential.)¹⁹ Subsequent events tended to harden this French view, behind which Mollet had a generally united country. He believed, as did Pineau, that from the beginning the seizure of the Canal was a much more serious matter than the US appeared to regard it. (T–2123, Paris, November 1, 1956, Secret, for Pineau’s views.)²⁰

Although the French leaders and public were inclined to accept the 18 Power agreement as a major achievement for the anti-Nasir forces, they did not try to conceal their dissatisfaction with the “inertia of the Western powers” and with an apparent US reserve concerning the use of strong measures against Nasir. The failure of the Menzies Mission, according to later testimony by both Mollet and Pineau, was a turning point in French thinking and greatly strengthened the pre-disposition to use force. Despite initial expressions of satisfaction that the SCUA proposals had had beneficial effects on Nasir, French dissatisfaction with the outcome of the SCUA conference developed quickly, reflecting “disillusionment and discouragement” and much criticism of the US. (T–1362, Paris, September 21, 1956, Confidential, and also T–1379, Paris, September 22, 1956, Secret,²¹ where the French indicated to an Embassy official that they were determined to reserve their full “liberty of action” and not to cooperate in measures which they judged to be incompatible with the 18 Power agreement.)

The clandestine French broadcasts in Arabic, which began operations on July 28, contained repeated and violent attacks on the US from the time the Menzies Mission was formed (August 22) and on the Secretary’s statement that in agreeing to receive the mission Nasir had contributed to the cause of peace. On August 29 the station introduced the theme that the US was trying to replace the UK and France in the Near East. Anti-American propaganda was absent between September 11 and 22 following the agreement to organize SCUA, but on September 22 after the second London conference and French charges that SCUA had been watered down, the station denounced US “treachery.” Violent vituperation against the US continued thereafter, the main theme being that the US was seeking to replace France and the UK in the Arab world. (A clandestine British station, which began operating in late August or early September, attacked Nasir, but not the US.) Throughout the Suez crisis, according to public opinion polls, anti-Nasir and anti-US French sentiment ran very high and the US tended increasingly to become the focus of bitter criticisms and attacks.

Although the French disposition to use force against Nasir varied with the circumstances, it appears to have been far more steady and strong over a long period than in the UK. Embassy Paris observed in early September that although some reservations existed in the French cabinet no one really opposed the use of force in certain circumstances. The final decision rested with three men— Coty, the President who opposed resort to force, and Premier Mollet and Defense Minister Bourgès-Manoury who favored its use. Coty could not veto substantive measures of the government. (T–1145, Paris, September 7, 1956, Secret.)²²

Despite developing adverse French attitudes toward progress on a settlement of the Suez crisis, seven regional PAOs reported on September 19 that little enthusiasm existed in the country for the use of force and that its advocacy was largely limited to the Paris press and certain political elements. (T–1313, Paris, Confidential.)²³ Embassy Paris itself did not then believe force was likely. This consensus was shaken in the next few days by rapidly growing French criticism of the SCUA conference results and Nasir’s negative attitude. Nasir’s position was strengthened by the arrival on September 17 at Suez of 15 Soviet pilots to begin training for Canal operations.

Mollet made a major foreign policy speech on August 31 in which he stressed that “it will not be possible to resolve the Suez crisis by half measures, designed only to maintain the peace. We have to accept putting all our weight and force in support of what we believe to be the solution in conformity with the principles of justice and international law. On the eve of the debates of the Security Council it is not inappropriate to recall that the spirit of the UN Charter is not one of capitulation. The persistent search for a peaceful solution cannot signify the acceptance, but failing to act, of the accomplished fact.” (T–1525, Paris, October 1, 1956, Confidential.)²⁴ Mollet’s remarks considered in conjunction with the tightening Franco-Israeli connections, French preoccupation with the Algerian situation, and growing criticism of the US, have an ominous and prophetic ring.

3. United Kingdom. The alienation of the UK government from the US over Suez policy was gradual, reluctant, and divided. The chief British actors do not appear to have possessed the same unanimity and determination that seized the small core of French activists. For one reason, Eden despite his intense personal preoccupation with the Suez problem was up to a point both more responsive to and fearful of public opposition than Mollet. At first, the Labor Party appeared disposed to give Eden carte blanche in dealing with Egypt, although it subsequently denied that that had ever been its position. Given the disposition of the government and the temper of the country, Labor could not politically take the line that force might not have to be used in certain circumstances. During the summer, however, Labor persisted in its demand that the government refrain from any military course until it had exhausted every available diplomatic course, including an appeal to the UN. When Labor virtually forced Eden to carry his case to the UN in early September and the case in effect failed, Labor continued to oppose military action against Egypt by the UK and France.

Nevertheless, Eden was as determined as Mollet not to accept a situation of diplomatic drift and inaction which he apparently believed by early October had been largely confirmed by events. Eden had his way in the cabinet, not because it was internally united— there is reason to doubt that—but because under British parliamentary practice the cabinet must act as a unit or fall. None of his opponents within the cabinet was able to prevent Eden from adopting the course he decided upon. The custom of Cabinet unanimity aided Eden and weakened the anti-force moderates. Eden had never disavowed the use of force in certain circumstances, as he reminded Parliament as early as August 2 when Parliament recessed for the summer. He reiterated that position to a receptive Conservative Party audience at its annual conference in October. His estimate of Nasir … was in most essentials identical with that of the French.

Both British and French newspapers had given wide attention to President Eisenhower’s comment during a press conference on September 11 that the US recognized the right of France and the UK to employ force in certain circumstances. The British press was far more scrupulous than the French, in reporting the President’s remarks, to give due weight to his condition that the use of force could only be justified after all peaceful means to settle a conflict had been exhausted and that Egypt (in this instance) must clearly appear to be in the position of an aggressor. The French press lightly passed over these qualifications. In both the UK and France the remarks of the Secretary at his press conference on September 13 that the US would not be party to shooting its way through the Canal appeared to nullify the effect of the President’s observations.

Eden, Lloyd, Pineau, and Mollet met in Paris on September 27 to conduct a broad survey of the British and French positions which events were forcing closer together. By this time, the French were in a fire-eating mood. The day before (September 26) Pineau had told the North Africa French Foreign Affairs Committee on Suez that the UK and France had “trumps in reserve” and would see how to use them. In the ensuing conversations the British seemed to have been a restraining influence. According to what British Ambassador Jebb told Ambassador Dillon (T–1488, Paris, September 27, 1956, Secret)²⁵ the use of force against Egypt was ruled out, unless Canal traffic was totally interrupted or there were serious riots or other similar actions in Egypt which would convince British public opinion of the necessity for military action. Deference to public opinion at home and abroad was still a lively concern of Eden. It troubled Pineau and Mollet less because they had a fairly united people behind a strong policy. The evidence that Nasir was aiding and abetting the rebels in Algeria tended to dissolve lines of party opposition to such a policy. Almost certainly, while the British were “restraining” the French, the latter were also extending the scope of their aid and understanding with the Israelis.

The first week of October did not open well for Anglo-American relations. The British, like the French, were disappointed by the unwillingness of the US to support a strongly worded UK-French resolution against Nasir in the Security Council and they believed that their case there had largely aborted because of US opposition. Then, Secretary Dulles’ remarks on October 2 at a press conference concerning “colonialism” brought a sharp reaction from the British and French.

More important than this incident, an acute US-UK-French deadlock over the issue of payment of dues under the SCUA plan developed. The differences concerned matters of substance as well as procedure. The French took the position that the differences were absolute and irreconcilable. (T–1529, Paris, October 1, 1956, Secret,²⁶ for this view. It was really evident much earlier. See T–1408, Paris, September 24, 1956, Secret.)²⁷ The British insisted on October 8 that no dues be paid to the Egyptian government. This demand amounted to a reversal of a previously stated British and French willingness to accept the US offer to pay dues to SCUA (see T–1485, September 27, 1956, Secret)²⁸ not excluding some share of these payments to Egypt for expenses entailed in the upkeep and maintenance of the Canal.

The British and French desired the United States to use its maximum effort to persuade US-controlled shipping under foreign registry to abide by practices to be prescribed for shipping under US registry. Apparently, neither the British nor the French were satisfied that the US had made this effort effectively or would make it. Nevertheless, the British position on the payment of dues issue at this date (October 8) and subsequently amounted to a deliberate misrepresentation of an earlier US-UK understanding on the payments problem. The inference is inescapable that the UK and France by early October had concluded that SCUA, as then developing, was an unworkable, undesirable, and unacceptable basis for dealing with Nasir and the Canal issue. They were inclined to blame the US for this situation, but it went much deeper than the immediate conflict over methods of payment of dues.

The British and French, it may again be noted, seemed not to have fully accepted the SCUA arrangements as more than a temporary US-sponsored device, despite their initial formal acceptance of its principles. They appeared not to believe in SCUA, except as a means of mobilizing world opinion against Egypt and of forcing Egypt, by other means, to acquiesce to the basic principles of the 18 Power Agreement. Although SCUA was admittedly not in itself a basis for negotiation and had no generally recognized negotiating powers, the British tended to think that this was the role the US was casting SCUA to perform. From being a provisional arrangement, as they viewed it, the British and French assumed that the US was coming to regard SCUA as a scheme of almost indefinite duration which in the circumstances might become permanent and would never succeed in bringing Nasir to terms.

The situation was not entirely redeemed, in British and French eyes, although it was improved, by Egyptian compliance with the Six Points voted by the UN on October 12. The UK and France regarded the Six Points as a step forward but as practically ineffective as a means of breaking what they had come to regard as an intolerable stalemate. Frustration and a desire to act together were reaching a point of extreme urgency in British and French thinking.

The period from October 8 to 15 was probably the critical one in US-UK-French relations. Mutual confidence fell off markedly at high working levels within the three governments. On the other hand, Anglo-French relations were marked by ostentatious professions of “solidarity” and a sharp upturn of criticism of the US in the pro-government British and French press.

In these circumstances it would probably be a mistake to view the British role in subsequent events as passive and merely acquiescent to stronger French demands for action on a military front. There is not much doubt that Eden and Lloyd never regarded themselves as being carried along by the French. They had weighty and independent reasons, as they viewed the Suez problem, for acting outside the channels of US-UK cooperation and against Egypt. The French set the mise-en-scène, but the British did not need to walk onto the stage unless they had wanted to do so. The fact is that Eden and Lloyd had determined to move on stage front and center, in company with the French. In some respects, the conjuncture of British and French interests in Suez and the Middle East generally was abnormal and artificial. Their interests were not identical, either historically or in the existing situation. They had more often been rivals than partners in this region. Their stakes differed in getting rid of Nasir, who happened to be the focus of their major difficulties and preoccupations. Both believed that their national prestige was deeply affronted by the act of nationalization and that Nasir must be “cut down to size.” The British were primarily concerned with restoring the Canal to “secure” hands and with preventing the development of further political threats to their remaining positions in the Near East proper. The French held no positions of consequence in the Near East, and broadly speaking, had almost nothing to lose or reclaim. They had opposed the formation of the Baghdad Pact. French interest in establishing international control over the Canal was real enough, but their overriding concern was to scotch the Egyptian center of conspiracy which was making the subjection of the Algerian rebels a bloody and expensive business. In many ways, therefore, the Anglo-French entente, which was on the eve of momentous decisions, was a product of emergency crisis conditions rather than deep organic political ties and sympathies. British Conservatives had often spoken privately in disparagement of the French ability to govern themselves and others and did not regard highly the reliability of French policy in Europe. Eden appears to have had a rather dim view of Pineau, although he seems to have respected Mollet.

V. The British Join the Plan Against Egypt

Strictly guarded Anglo-French talks in Paris on October 16 sealed the agreement and the time-table of joint action by the two powers in the event of an Israeli attack on Egypt. The fact of this agreement is substantially corroborated by the statement made by Pineau to a high US official on November 16. Pineau said that when he arrived back in Paris from New York after the UN meeting on the Suez Canal (October 14), he was approached the next day by Israeli representatives. “They told him that Israel had definite proof that Egypt was preparing to move against them and that they could not wait much longer. They were therefore determined to attack Egypt; that they would do it alone if necessary but do it they would. On October 16, Eden had come over from London and the plan had been worked out among the three of them and that was that. He, in effect, apologized for not having kept us informed but said that under the circumstances it seemed to serve no useful purpose to do so.” (Memorandum of Conversation, November 17, 1956, Secret.)²⁹

This testimony is also supported by the report from Paris of a long conversation between Pineau and Ambassador Dillon on November 1. (T–2123, Paris, November 1, 1956, Secret.)³⁰ Pineau told Dillon substantially what he told the US official cited above, with a few additional points. The Israelis, Pineau said, told the French that they had reached the conclusion that the US had in effect decided to side with Nasir and to allow the annihilation of Israel. In view of the rapid increase of Egyptian military capability due to the receipt of increasing quantities of Soviet arms, the Israelis stated, the fate of Israel would be sealed in a few months time. Pineau then told Dillon that “the matter was taken up with the United Kingdom and general agreement on the present course of action was reached. The final decisions were taken during the course of the Eden–Lloyd visit to Paris and the decision was taken jointly by the UK and French not to inform the United States. Both governments felt convinced that the United States was in error regarding its evaluation of the danger of Nasir and considered prior consultation with the US on this subject would serve no useful purpose.” Also on this occasion, in reply to a question of Dillon as to how the question of the entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan figured in this affair, Pineau said that “the discussions on that subject were primarily a smoke screen to divert attention from the decision to undertake a joint operation against Egypt.”

Between October 16 and the launching of the Israeli attack on Egypt on October 29 effective communication among Washington, Paris, and London on Suez almost ceased. Working level contacts between NEA and the British and French Embassies in Washington virtually stopped. Pineau has since explained why (see above). No similar revelation of attitude or commitment is available from the British side. Both Ambassadors Aldrich and Dillon had indicated that their personal and official relations with high British and French officials on matters relating to the Middle East were not entirely satisfactory. Neither could put his finger at the time on the precise cause of the Anglo-French attitude of withdrawal. It is now apparent that they were being circumvented and misled by the Anglo-French collaborators. Both at home and abroad the extent and kind of Anglo-French commitment was a closely held secret. British and French Foreign Office officials, except for a very few, were kept in the dark. No British or French ambassador in the Near East or Washington appears to have been informed. The High Commissioners of the Commonwealth in London were not consulted or informed.

In retrospect, Pineau’s long summary of the Suez situation before the French Assembly on October 16 was more than a report to the nation. It now seems to have reflected the culmination of an agreement between the French and Israelis, many weeks in preparation, and between the French and the British, about to be concluded that evening. Pineau placed great stress on the solidarity of the British and French in all matters pertaining to the Near East and Suez. He reminded the Assembly that “we still have considerable trumps” and that “we are determined to carry out our solution.”

British Minister of Defense, Sir Walter Monckton, resigned on October 18, mainly on grounds of ill health. (T–2152, London, October 19, 1956, Confidential.)³¹ It had long been known that he wished to be relieved of high governmental responsibilities because of age and health. No satisfactory evidence is available that Monckton’s action was influenced by his knowledge and disapproval of possible Anglo-French armed intervention against Egypt. If he was informed, he may have indicated that he would not be a party to it. Some press speculation points to that possibility. His cooperation would be crucial in such an event. His opposite number in Paris, Bourgès-Maunoury, was obviously privy to the Anglo-French plan, which accorded with his own predisposition. The timing of Monckton’s resignation is therefore remarkably coincidental, at the very least, with the Anglo-French talks in Paris on October 16, but it proves nothing.

It is now certain that British willingness to join the French in the plan to “exploit” an Israeli attack on Egypt came as a great relief to the chief French actors in the developing plot. Long since, the tone of French diplomacy had tended to assume an air of near desperation arising from the realization that there was no legal justification for the use of force against Egypt. A report prepared for the French Foreign Affairs Committee by the Mendesist Radical Lipkowski had indicated that legally Nasir’s action in nationalizing the Canal appeared within the limits of his authority under the right of eminent domain. Lipkowski had further concluded that the entire subject of the 1888 Treaty was also very arguable and it was far from certain that France would have a tenable case at the International Court of Justice. The Lipkowski report, thorough and objective in tone, only added to the sense of French frustration. (T–1863, Paris, October 22, 1956, Confidential.)³²

Almost certainly, Eden, Lloyd, and a considerable number of other ranking Conservatives shared this view. If legal action against Nasir was stopped, if Nasir was to be allowed to consolidate his grip on the Canal and strengthen his anti-British political position elsewhere in the Near East and if the negotiations along the line proposed by the US were to prove futile as both the British and French governments were convinced they would, then something must be done. Moreover, it is not incredible that the British and French decided to act because they feared that negotiations might succeed. One way or another, they were not prepared to accept the result. Selwyn Lloyd, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs later explained to Ambassador Lodge the motivations behind this last ditch mentality that gripped the British and French governments. What these governments decided on October 16 was to take the law into their own hands.

VI. Concerted Deception of the United States

Considering the whole record of Franco-Israeli and Anglo-French planning that ended in the armed attacks against Egypt by these countries in late October, the following conclusions seem tenable—

1. France was largely instrumental in completing two main circles of collusion and deception, directed not only against Egypt but also against the United States. For a considerable time these circles merely intersected, but after mid-October they almost precisely overlapped and were nearly indistinguishable, at least as the French viewed them. It is important not to exaggerate the French role. They did not invent the Arab-Israeli conflict nor force the British to side with them. Israel was willing and so finally were the British. The French gave both the Israelis and the British a big push, at the right time and place.

2. France was engaged from an early period, probably June, in building up the military potential of Israel and thereby in encouraging Israel to attack Egypt, perhaps other Arab states. It is not material that this encouragement should have been a French idea, although it was subsequently claimed that it was. French aid coincided with mounting Israeli fears and a determination to move against Egypt when Israel was equipped to do so. France was made aware of the Israeli intention, approved it, and it was later accepted by the British as an integral part of the Anglo-French agreement to act.

3. In this respect, it is also not material whether the British knew of the Israeli intention far in advance. The British accepted a situation in which the Israelis were to play the part of deus ex machina in the plot. They became accessories both before and after the fact. This amounted to constructive collusion on the British part. It is therefore disingenuous to believe that the British were unwitting tools of the French and Israeli principals and that they stumbled onto the scene at a late date without knowing what they were doing. Eden and Lloyd knew what they were getting themselves into, although they have not fully admitted it. Pineau has spoken for them and his evidence is conclusive.

4. On a pure technicality a case can be made for the fact that Anglo-Israeli collusion was not direct and immediate up to the very moment of the Israeli attack on Egypt. That, of course, is the position maintained by the UK. Although the French must have informed the British of the probable consequences of the Israeli mobilization initiated actively on October 25—Pineau made a hurried trip to London on October 24³³—the British were not necessarily “committed” by that knowledge, even after the British had reached their agreement with the French on October 16. But they were informed of the Franco-Israeli plan of action by October 18, probably two days earlier, … and were thus compromised by the knowledge of the Israeli intentions, because the French almost certainly knew of these intentions and undoubtedly told the British. The fiction that the French were acting in one way in relation to Israel and the British were acting in another quite different way in relation to the French is simply not supportable. The separate paths converged in Paris on October 16.

5. Although Pineau has admitted that the October 16 Eden-Mollet talks sealed the agreement of the UK to act with France when Israel attacked Egypt, one of the most interesting parts of this situation is that each of the other principals, Israel and the UK, has taken pains to assert that its role against Egypt was not a consequence of an inexorable chain of commitments. The Israeli Counselor of Embassy in Paris, Bendor, for example, told an Embassy officer that Israel acted independently of the UK and France, although he admitted that the latter “took advantage of the situation.” His argument was that Israel had to act for various reasons, including the belief that an Egyptian attack was imminent. Once Egypt, the main target, was eliminated, he stated, Jordan was no problem, except that Israel would be concerned who grabbed it. (T–2228, Paris, November 6, 1956, Secret.)³⁴

The British, on their side, have vehemently denied that because they acted with the French they can be assumed to have connived with the Israelis beforehand. Again, these ex post facto justifications are almost meaningless, or at least very difficult to understand. The evidence is persuasive that the British did not connive directly with the Israelis, but is conclusive that the French did. The British agreed to go along with the French in certain contingencies, of which the Israeli action against Egypt was the operative one. The French knew the Israelis would move. The British knew that the French knew. It makes very little difference in the end whether the Israelis or the British said they acted independently. In the circumstances, neither acted independently and both knew that, too. The possibility cannot be excluded that the British and French reached an understanding that the British would refrain from direct contact with the Israelis. The three principals also agreed—all of them—to shut out the US from any knowledge of their actions after October 16, the French and Israelis long before that date.

6. Up to the moment of the Israeli attack on Egypt, however, Israeli, French and British officials denied to the US that the Israeli mobilization had any hostile intent. An Israeli statement to the Security Council as late as October 25 had affirmed that Israel would never start a war with its Arab neighbors. Of course, the war had never ended. Only an uneasy truce remained to be broken. On October 28 both Ben Gurion and a senior Israeli defense official reiterated the claim that Israel would not provoke a war and that the Israeli mobilization was purely defensive and precautionary… . This pretense was an obvious act of deception. The French understood it so, and probably the British.

7. Yet, Jean Daridan, French Foreign Office official, indicated on October 27 and again on October 29 that the Quai d’Orsay had no indication that Israel was contemplating any military action at that time. (T–2003, Paris, October 27, 1956, Secret.)³⁵ The assertion about the Quai d’Orsay may have been correct at Daridan’s level. The Embassy commented two days later that “it seems probable to us that the French are making no effort to restrain the Israelis …”³⁶ (T–2097, Paris, October 29, 1956, Secret)³⁷—a patent understatement of the facts. On October 29 Pierre Maillard, Deputy Director of Near Eastern Affairs in the French Foreign Office, also supported the Israeli claim concerning the defensive character of its mobilization, but the next evening he told an Embassy officer that, although he was not informed concerning current French government thinking (again, he may not have been informed, although it is hardly credible by this date), the “possibility of Franco-British armed intervention” should not be excluded. He also said France could not now support the Tripartite Agreement of 1950. (T–2076, Paris, October 30, 1956, Secret.)³⁸ Maillard expressed “regret” that the US and France took opposing positions on Suez and that in the last 24 hours a frank exchange of ideas had been impossible. Maillard’s point of reference regarding the 1950 declaration is obviously to Egypt. Neither the UK nor France regarded the 1950 declaration as strictly invalid in its application to Israeli relations with Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. At least, this appears true for the UK, it is less certain for France. Eden stated to the British House of Commons on October 30 that the position of Egypt was not the same as other countries, since Egypt had taken a stand that she would not accept the implications of the Tripartite Declaration. Much earlier, on September 13, Eden in the House of Commons had reaffirmed British obligations under this agreement. There is no doubt whatever that both France and the UK regarded the declaration as a “scrap of paper” as far as Egypt was concerned.

8. On the occasion of the ceremony connected with General Gruenther’s farewell Premier Mollet, referring to Suez, had stated that France “intended to raise the lesson stemming from Suez developments (that is, the importance of Western unity) in the NAC as well as to discuss it directly with the US and the UK.” (T–1903, Paris, October 23, 1956, Confidential.)³⁹ He also said on October 30 in a speech to the French Assembly that France and the UK have kept the US fully informed concerning “their preoccupations and their decisions (sic)”.⁴⁰

9. A ranking but unidentified British official disclaimed to a senior US official in London any knowledge that France might be prodding Israel to action against Egypt, but indicated that the French could support Israeli action without telling the UK… . Such statements were almost certainly calculated to deceive, but they again reflect a British desire to pretend that the conspiracy in which they were involved was really not of their choice, but upon which they had to put the best possible face. The statements are almost unbelievable. So, too, is the one on October 31, by William Clark, personal adviser to Eden, who denied any collusion between Israel and the UK. Clark resigned shortly thereafter. The point is, of course, that direct Anglo-Israeli collusion does not need to be assumed. Some British officials who denied such collusion probably spoke in good faith. They simply did not know the big picture; they had been shut out of it. Yet, the evidence is convincing that both Israel and the UK were involved in a situation of collusion from which neither could separate themselves. The French have not tried to do so.

[Tab A]

CIA ANNEX⁴¹

The conclusions expressed in Section VI of the basic paper can be summarized as follows:

The French, and through the French, the British had prior knowledge of an impending Israeli attack against Egypt, and by mid-October the British and French had decided to exploit this occasion by military action of their own against Egypt. Whether prior to mid-October the French knew of the Israeli intention of attacking Egypt, or whether they had encouraged the Israeli to do so, is not a decisive consideration in reaching this conclusion. It is likewise regarded as immaterial whether the British knew of the Israeli intention prior to mid-October. It is a subsidiary conclusion of the basic paper that the evidence is not persuasive that the British did in fact connive directly with Israel, but is conclusive that the French did, certainly to the extent of undertaking the military build-up of Israel.

The conversation between the Director of Central Intelligence and the French Foreign Minister, 16 November, quoted at length on Page 19 of the basic paper,⁴² supports the view that the French and British on or about October 16 did reach an understanding regarding the operation which was based on Israeli action.

Although indications … give some insight into the developing state of mind of the British, they do not, of course, establish direct collusion with either the Israeli or the French prior to mid-October. At most they serve to indicate possible or probable courses of British action in the event that UK “estrangement” from the United States reached serious proportions, and indicate the degree of receptivity the British brought to the mid-October consultation with the French. In the days immediately following the mission to Washington of Patrick Dean and other British officials, i.e. during the Security Council meetings of 3–14 October, CIA representatives concluded that estrangement was becoming decidedly acute and so orally informed Department officials.

Other special materials available strongly support the conclusion of direct French-Israeli consultation, particularly during the days immediately preceding the Israeli attack on Egypt. They do not, however, provide any material insight into British complicity.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 487, Egypt. Secret; Sensitive.
2. On November 27, Armstrong forwarded an earlier draft of the study to Hoover, Murphy, Henderson, MacArthur, Phleger, Rountree, Elbrick, Bowie, and Wilcox under cover of a memorandum indicating that while at Walter Reed Hospital, Dulles had expressed an interest in having an analysis prepared of the extent and interrelationship of Israeli, British, and French “collusion and deception” against the United States. In this memorandum, Armstrong had also requested each addressee, in the interest of completeness and accuracy, to examine the draft in light of his own experience and knowledge of the event. Documentation indicates that Rountree, Bowie, and Howe supplied Armstrong with comments and additional information, while MacArthur and Wilcox offered no comments. Elbrick, in a memorandum to Armstrong dated November 30, criticized the report for not taking adequate notice of various indications (such as statements made in Parliamentary debates and Eden’s letter to Eisenhower of September 6) that the British were considering the use of force. Elbrick also asked that a sentence be added which would indicate that the French were encouraged by the United States to try to correct the arms imbalance between Israel and Egypt that reportedly existed at the time. (Ibid., INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Middle East Crisis 1956 (Arab-Israeli Crisis))
3. Not found in Department of State files.
4. According to the foreword to this study, ‘The following report is a coordinated summary of information available to the Department of State in early December 1956. It is based on materials in the Departmental files which have been received from Officers in Washington and US Diplomatic Missions abroad, and on materials made available by other intelligence services. Senior Departmental officials have had an opportunity to review and contribute to the basic report. Appropriate suggestions for changes have been incorporated. The Central Intelligence Agency has also reviewed it in detail.”
5. Reference is to a memorandum of conversation among Eban, Assistant Secretary Allen, and others, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.86/3–2156)
6. Reference is to a memorandum of conversation among Shiloah, Rountree, and Burdett, not printed. (Ibid., 784A.5622/5–456)
7. The May 5 memorandum of conversation is printed in vol. XV, p. 614. The last two are not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.85A/4–856 and 784A.5622/5–456, respectively)
8. Reference is to a memorandum of conversation among Eban, Murphy, and others, not printed. (Ibid., 780.00/6–1456)
9. For text, see vol. XV, p. 737.
10. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.86/9–456) All documents referred to in this report with the prefix “D” are Department of State despatches.
11. Not printed. (Ibid., 784A.56/9–2856) All documents referred in this report with the prefix “T” are Department of State telegrams.
12. No copy of this report from the Army Attaché in Tel Aviv has been found in Department of State files. The Department of State did not systematically retain copies of intelligence reports received from military attachés abroad.
13. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–256)
14. Not printed. (Ibid., 684A.85/10–1556)
15. The reference is in error. It should be telegram 1817 from Paris, October 18, not printed. (Ibid., 684A.85/10–1856)
16. Not printed. (Ibid., 474.518/10–2256)
17. Not printed. (Ibid., 784A.56/11–156)
18. Not printed. (Ibid., 684A.86/11–2156)
19. Not printed. (Ibid., 974.7301/7–3156)
20. Document 459.
21. Neither printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/9–2156 and 974.7301/9–2256, respectively)
22. Not printed. (Ibid., 97A.7301/9–756)
23. Not printed. (Ibid., 974.7301/9–1956)
24. Not printed. (Ibid., 974.7301/10–156)
25. The reference is in error. It should be telegram 1485 from Paris, September 27; see footnote 4, Document 278.
26. See footnote 7, Document 290.
27. See footnote 5, Document 261.
28. See footnote 4, Document 278.
29. See the memorandum by Allen Dulles, Document 579.
30. Document 459.
31. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 741.13/10–1956)
32. Not printed. (Ibid., 974.7301/10–2256)
33. Pineau visited London October 23; see Document 373.
34. Not printed. (Ibid., 684A.86/11–656)
35. Not printed. (Ibid., 674.84A/10–2756)
36. Ellipsis in the source text.
37. Reference is to telegram 2027, Document 404.
38. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 651.74A/10–3056)
39. See footnote 5, Document 374.
40. As on the source text.
41. Top Secret.
42. See footnote 29 above.