413. Editorial Note
In New York on October 29, Lodge met with Dixon, Cornut-Gentille and Hammarskjöld at 4:30 p.m. to discuss the Israeli attack on Egypt. At the meeting, Hammarskjöld stated his belief that the only sensible move was to have an immediate meeting of the Security Council which would call upon Israeli troops to withdraw to their own boundaries. The Secretary-General noted press reports that Israel was occupying a position within Egyptian territory and commented that if this were true, it constituted aggression. He also showed to the others a report from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem indicating that the United Nations military observer in the El Auja area had under threat of force been expelled by Israeli authorities. The Secretary-General suggested that the Security Council should meet on October 30 at the latest whether or not the Egyptians filed a complaint. Lodge commented in his report to the Department of State that Dixon and [Page 841] Cornut-Gentille reacted in a hesitant and lukewarm manner to Hammarskjöld’s concern. Cornut-Gentille, according to Lodge, particularly showed great reluctance to take immediate steps to deal with the situation, and even argued with Hammarskjöld about the latter’s interpretation that the Israeli action was more serious than usual. The British and French Representatives both stated that it would be impossible to obtain instructions before a morning meeting; and Dixon suggested that the matter be taken up during the afternoon meeting on October 30, which had been scheduled to discuss the Israeli-Jordanian situation. Hammarskjöld opposed this suggestion and pointed out that the United Nations must rob Egypt of any cause for counterattack. Lodge stated that the United States was prepared to meet that evening if the French and British agreed. The meeting then discussed a press statement to be issued by the President of the Security Council. The text to which they finally agreed indicated that the President of the Security Council had declared that the Israeli-Egyptian situation could be brought up at the Council meeting fixed for October 30. (During October 1956, the French Representative served as President of the Security Council.)
At 6 p.m. Hammarskjöld telephoned Lodge to inform him that Burns had agreed to issue immediately a request for a cease-fire on his own authority and that Israeli forces reportedly had penetrated 100 kilometers into Egypt without any response from Egypt. (Telegram 433 from USUN, October 29; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2956)
Later that evening Hoover telephoned the Mission in New York and instructed it to seek an urgent meeting of the Security Council for the morning of October 30. When informed of the U.S. request, Hammarskjöld agreed to it at once, suggested that the meeting begin at 10 a.m. the following day, and assured the Americans that the U.S. item would have priority over any others. (Telegram 443 from USUN, October 30; ibid., 684A.86/10–3056)
Lodge then informed Dixon of the U.S. request for a Security Council meeting and of the President’s statement made earlier that day. Later, during a telephone conversation with Secretary Dulles, Lodge described his conversation with Dixon. According to Bernau’s transcript, Lodge said that “it was one of the most disagreeable and unpleasant experiences that he had ever had. He said that Dixon until now had always been amiable but at this conference the mask fell off and he was virtually snarling. When Lodge spoke of living up to the Tripartite Declaration Dixon said, ‘Don’t be silly and moralistic. We have got to be practical.’ Dixon said that the British would never go along with any move against Israel in the Security Council.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation, October 29, 10 p.m.; [Page 842] Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)
According to Lodge’s report to the Department of State, Dixon also said that he had heard that the Department of State intended to introduce a “fantastic” resolution, calling for economic sanctions if Israeli forces were not withdrawn. Dixon maintained that the United Kingdom would not have anything to do with it and “that he simply could not understand what the United States was thinking of.” (Telegram 443 from USUN, October 30; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–3056)
Lodge then spoke with Hammarskjöld and Cornut-Gentille at the latter’s apartment. The French Representative’s immediate reaction was to object to not having been consulted while acknowledging that as President of the Security Council he would of course cooperate in arranging the meeting. French Deputy Representative Ordonneau, however, did make clear that France would not go along with the United States action. Following this meeting, Lodge forwarded to Hammarskjöld a letter requesting the meeting, which the Department of State had previously transmitted to Lodge. He then telephoned each member of the Security Council and explained the U.S. initiative in general terms. Lodge received a positive reception from the Representatives of Peru, Cuba, Iran, and China and a noncommital one from the Representatives of Yugoslavia, Belgium, and the Soviet Union. (Telegram 443 from USUN, October 30; ibid.)
The Department of State transmitted to USUN the text of a proposed letter from Lodge to the President of the Security Council in telegram 220, October 29. (Ibid.) For text of the final version of that letter, submitted to the President of the Security Council on October 30, see footnote 2, Document 423.