Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

62. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo,April 3, 1955—3 p.m.

1458. Eyes only for Secy and Amb. Contents this message will be better understood after receipt Top Secret letter to George Allen from me dated March 27² which should arrive Monday.³ In summary that letter records discussion with FonMin on March 26 in which he himself surprisingly indicated desire to discuss possibility of Arab-Israeli settlement. For reasons outlined in letter I felt it wise to be cautious this first conversation on subj, particularly with Fawzi. Discussion however seemed possibly be of such significance that I decided for purpose of secrecy to communicate to Dept by ltr. General nature of conversation given to Stevenson who as well reported by ltr. Am now reporting by cable as find Top Secret pouch too infrequent but hope greatest security precautions will be taken. In interval between conversation reported my March 26 [27] ltr and today’s conversation reported below,Fawzi indicated to me in aside at social gathering that Nasser and only Nasser would be informed our talks this subj. This of course significant and led Stevenson and me conclude I should at appropriate time explore matter further.

I called on Fawzi this morning to comply with Dept’s tel 1648.⁴ This discussion (reported separately)⁵ led naturally to exploration possibilities Alpha-type operation.

I asked Fawzi if he had considered further desirability more fundamental approach to Arab-Israeli problem. He stated that he had devoted considerable time this subj recently and had number talks with Nasser. He had cancelled his scheduled meetings with other Arab reps this morning, hoping we might explore matter further. He particularly interested my reactions and second thoughts following our earlier talk. I was faced with choice of backing away from subj or going ahead. I chose latter course.

In two-hour discussion which followed I presented our views along lines general approach that had been prepared for Eden and available to Dept.

Specifically, I said:

(1) Had been greatly encouraged by his earlier remarks re need for early comprehensive settlement.

(2) Secy had recently reached same conclusions as he re necessity for prompt action—and for much the same reasons as put forward by him. In discussions with EdenSecy found him very much of same mind.

(3) In view of above and staff work that had followed, I felt in position to talk with some assurance re views USG which I felt substantially shared by UK.

(4) Fawzi well aware dangers present situation which he himself had so well expressed. These elaborated upon briefly.

(5) Besides these dangers, this dispute preventing constructive development of Arab States and area generally. We wished to see strong and progressive Egypt. We admire Nasser’s efforts that direction and wished be of all possible assistance. The same was true of UK. Arab-Israeli dispute hampered us all greatly in assisting Egypt and in getting on with constructive efforts towards stability and strength of area.

(6) Because of Egypt’s position in ME and her realism US and UK had decided talk with her first. Egypt has taken positive attitude re Jordan valley proposals. This has raised her stature in eyes of world. Task of achieving wider settlement is great challenge of statesmanship to all of us.

(7) What we hoping, therefore, is that Nasser and Fawzi will be disposed accept practical realistic settlement and will help us to work for it.

(8) There were, we believed, special arguments of a tactical nature for selecting this time to make effort. US has been following tough policy of deflating Israel. We had refused arms and Israel’s attempts obtain defense agreements and special milit arrangements, including guarantees. Our financial assistance had fallen off. There many examples moves of this nature, taken under great difficulty by US. We believed net result was to inject realism into Israeli thinking. This policy had, however, made Israel feel frustrated and insecure.One must judge with great care how far it profitable carry such a course. Personally felt it extremely dangerous for all ME to attempt maintain this policy much longer even if we were in fact able to do so. All in all, this seemed best time to try for settlement.

(9) We must face realities and administration, while always faced with difficulties this subj, obviously freer now than later on in midst of campaign.

(10) Our view is that we should work out with Egypt a basic plan and then tactics. If this went well we could then determine manner in which Israel and other Arab States should be approached.

(11) In a general way what we had in mind was slightly smaller Israel. He must know that we did not believe practicable any radical frontier change along lines 1947UN resolution. If general settlement could be reached with more practical border believed security guarantee from Western nations might be possible on question of maintenance those borders. In conjunction general settlement this should have great calming effect upon whole area. We believe in adequate compensation plus resettlement of refugees. Arabs, of course, would have to abandon econ warfare. Problems of utilization of Jordan waters, Jerusalem, communications, ports, transit areas, etc would all have to be gone into. We were not seeking over-night direct relations between Arab States and Israel and would do all possible make settlement palatable Arab opinion. Nor were we striving for one comprehensive agreement neatly bound in pink ribbons. Elements of problem might be approached separately and quite differently. The UN for instance might be used to record in resolution agreements reached on matters such as refugees and Jerusalem. We felt most strongly, however, that end result all agreements and arrangements must be clear end to state of belligerency or pretensions such belligerency.

Fawzi said he was in complete agreement re general approach and timing. He particularly agreed timing. Stated he believed “iron was now hot”. He felt that with delay, events and dispositions might change in unfavorable fashion. He said 1955 held greatest possibilities for success; if things were left to drift until next year he himself had little hope of averting disaster in ME.

Re UK, he agreed that US,UK and Egypt must work together for day when meeting of minds achieved in complete secrecy among Cairo, London, Washington and Tel Aviv. Suggested that he and I both should let Stevenson know we working in exploratory way on this subj.

Fawzi made point that solution must be found which both sides can advertise as a victory but that secretly both sides would consider equally unsatisfactory. This best that could be hoped for. Criticism and emotions would be raised against us all and Egypt would certainly receive her share but we must proceed with determination and conviction that we are working in best interests of all concerned. If plan carried through we could at least feel that for future generations we had ended misery million people and had eased most dangerous problem of insecurity. Crucial of course would be Israel reaction when time agreed for them be approached.

Fawzi then reiterated Egyptians’ views on refugees and territorial adjustments as given me previously and reported by letter. I told him, altho from practical viewpoint Negev relatively worthless territory, could not conceive of Israel agreeing any territorial concession there beyond minimum necessary for practical connecting ground link for Egypt with Jordan.Fawzi recognized this but felt that old strictly corridor approach would not be enough for Egypt. He realized GOE idea of larger link might present US with impossible problem but did not want it ruled out of discussion.

Fawzi stated we embarking task in which those working on problem should first be convinced themselves of both wisdom and possibility of going forward. With this in mind he suggested it would be profitable for me to develop matter in similar fashion with Nasser when I see him alone on Monday night. After that he felt we should wait until after Bandung.

I asked how he felt future conversations should be carried on. This was large undertaking. Could he himself devote the necessary time to serve as technician on the many complicated aspects of the problem? He replied after Bandung we should try to reach a meeting of the minds as to whole general approach. If this should prove possible, we could then consider necessity using a minimum of carefully selected experts to develop some of the more technical aspects.

This terminated discussion this subj.

Plan to discuss subj generally along with other matters with Nasser on Monday night. This may give us far better clue as to what possibilities are and will withhold further comment until after that meeting. In meantime, Dept again cautioned (as in letter) we unable as yet to weigh significance of what appears on surface to be extremely encouraging development.

Have let Stevenson read this cable. In view length and detail told him I would recommend Emb London do likewise at appropriate level FonOff.⁶

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–355. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha. Received at 10:03 p.m. Repeated to London.
2. Document 58.
3. April 4.
4. The Department on March 31 informed Byroade and Lawson that it wished to use the U.N. Security Council resolutions on Gaza “as points departure for determined effort arrest growing chain incidents Israel border particularly vicinity Gaza strip.” It instructed Byroade and Lawson to approach Fawzi and Sharett and, “using firm language”, make “clear it inconceivable to US that either side would permit situation get out of hand.” They were to emphasize that “events flowing from Gaza attack demonstrate conclusively fallacy doctrine retaliation as means bringing about improvement Arab-Israel situation”; that both sides were responsible for failing to take adequate measures to control local elements in the Gaza area; and that the “ominousness of situation requires that top officials both governments devote personal attention to problem.” (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–3155)
5. Byroade informed the Department on April 3 that he had “strongly presented Department’s views this morning supplemented by points from various cables from Tel Aviv re danger of provoking Israeli in their emotional state following SC action”, and that Fawzi had expressed his appreciation for the “concern of US Government”, “hoped every effort would … be made by both sides to strengthen armistice machinery”, and “said GOE ready discuss and cooperate on ‘practical system’ whereby the armistice machinery can be strengthened.” (Telegram 1461 from Cairo;ibid., 674.84A/4–355)
6. The Embassy in London reported that Shuckburgh had seen the contents of this telegram and “was favorably impressed both by Byroade’s presentation and by Fawzi’s reaction which Shuckburgh thought was as good as could be expected.” (Telegram 4388 from London, April 5;ibid., 684A.86/4–555)