Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

358. Memorandum of a Conversation, British Embassy, Paris, October 26, 1955, 10 a.m.¹

USDel/MC/5

Paris, October 26, 1955, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
• The Secretary
• Mr. Merchant
• Mr. MacArthur
• Ambassador Aldrich
• Ambassador Byroade
• Ambassador Lawson
• Mr. Russell
• United Kingdom
• Mr. Macmillan
• Sir Harold Caccia
• Mr. Shuckburgh
• Mr. Hancock

SUBJECT

• Israeli Request for Arms Credit and Security Guarantee

The Secretary opened the discussion by saying that Israel Prime Minister Sharett had given us a preview of the position he intended to take in his discussions later that day with Mr.Macmillan and the Secretary² by making a television recording for release in the United States at the very time he would be seeing the Secretary. We had received information that he would be saying on television that the Israel Government placed its principal reliance on the United States because Great Britain was already involved with Jordan and the French were preoccupied with Morocco. He would be saying that Israel wants: (1) long-term credit for arms sufficient to balance the Soviet arms to Egypt; (2) a security guarantee; and (3) pressure on the Soviet Union to desist from providing arms to the Arabs. Mr.Sharett indicated that if Israel is not given the first two it may have to strike first. The Secretary said that it would not be easy for the United States to give him nothing and still keep Israel quiet. The Israeli Government may gamble that regardless of what the Secretary may say, Jewish influence would be a deterrent to United States action against Israel. Also, Israel would have the support of those in the United States who want to take a tough line against the Soviet Union. Mr.Macmillan commented that Israel might start a preventive action, counting on the International Community calling it off after a while. The Secretary said that it was difficult to see how there was anything decisive about any preventive action which Israel could take.

Mr.Macmillan said that he thought he would take the following line with Sharett: (1) he would listen sympathetically to anything Sharett said; (2) Britain could give no unconditional guarantee beyond that contained in the 1950 Declaration; (3) Britain could not embark upon a policy of equating to Israel arms in whatever amount the Soviets might make available to the Arabs, but it would continue to permit shipments of some arms to Israel; (4) there is no future for Israel in the long run unless it makes peace with the Arabs. If the present situation continues only the Soviets will benefit. There must be concessions from both sides. A settlement is more important than village lands here or there. Israel should make concessions in the Negev in the form of border triangles or even relinquishing Elath.

The Secretary said that he believed that might be a good line. Before he left Washington he had had a talk with the Iraqi Ambassador,³ who had said that he was convinced that the Arabs would have to make a settlement with Israel but that each year that passed it would become harder. The Iraq Ambassador had suggested that discussions might start on the basis of the 1947UN Resolutions. The Secretary said that he had pointed out that they gave part of the Galilee to the Arabs but gave the Negev to Israel. The Iraq Ambassador said there could be an exchange of part of the Negev to Jordan or Egypt for a retention of Galilee territory by Israel. The Secretary said the Israelis would probably not start negotiations on the assumption they would have to make large concessions but they are in a bad way. It is becoming apparent that there is the same psychology there that there is in Korea and Formosa, a belief that their only hope lies in a global war since they cannot themselves alone defeat the Arabs conclusively. The influence of world Jewry to support developments in that direction would be considerable. We should not minimize the pressures that would come from: (1) pro-Israel elements and (2) the group that favors generally an early showdown with the Soviets.

Mr.Macmillan said there was a similar situation in Great Britain except that there the extremists included those who opposed the policy of turning over the Suez Base to Egypt. The only way to meet that pressure is to develop a line of support for our friends, that is the Iraqis and the rest of the Northern Tier. We can exercise little weight in Egypt today but we can in Iraq. Mr.Macmillan asked whether it would not be possible to make a reaffirmation of the 1950 Declaration which would in fact be a guarantee of peace and might deter any contemplated preventive action. Such a reaffirmation would not be what the Israel Government is asking for but it might be something just short of it.

The Secretary said that the 1950 commitment already goes somewhat beyond what is authorized under our Constitution. He believed however that we can say that it is our present policy to seek to deter a country that sends troops beyond its borders, to seek peace and to support UN action. We can say that that is our present policy but the Secretary believed that the Executive Branch of the Government in the United States could not make a commitment that we would take armed action in the future. He said he was extremely dubious of any willingness on the part of the Senate to give a security guarantee. In a discussion that he had with Senator George, just before leaving Washington, the Senator had expressed his doubt that the Senate would take such action.⁴ It must be remembered that it required a two-thirds’ vote. There might be a better chance of getting a joint resolution which only requires a majority in both houses. As next year’s elections draw nearer, the pressure for a joint resolution would grow.

Mr.Macmillan asked about the feasibility of a policy of: (1) reaffirming the 1950 Declaration, possibly followed later by a joint resolution in the United States and (2) the United States acceding to the Baghdad Pact. These would balance off as between Israel and the Arab states. The Secretary said that if we should be forced into giving a new guarantee to Israel it probably could be balanced by the United States joining the Baghdad Pact. The latter would also however require Congressional action. There could be no treaty unless the Executive took the initiative, although there can be a joint resolution on Congressional initiative. Both an Israel security measure and a Baghdad Pact could be done by joint resolution. Mr.Macmillan noted that if the United States should give a security guarantee to Israel and not adhere to the Baghdad Pact, it would have the effect of splitting the United States and the United Kingdom in the area, which would be a tremendous gain for the Soviets. Mr.Dulles said that Sharett, in trying to split the United States and the UK, was helping the Soviets to achieve that end.

The Secretary said that he might summarize the position which he intended to take with Sharett: (1) we are strongly opposed to any move toward a preventive war; (2) emphasize that our policy, in accordance with the 1950 Declaration, is to oppose both aggression and an arms race; (3) urge that Israel make a settlement with the Arab states as the only permanent solution and that it consider seriously what concessions it can make toward that end. With respect to general policy in the area the Secretary said he believed the Northern Tier as a basic concept is and was sound. There may be some differences between the United States and the UK because of conflicting views of the military people of the two countries in the area. The Secretary said that neither he nor the President are concerned over the question of U.S. versus British equipment in the area although our military people object to using U.S. funds for offshore procurement of British equipment for other countries since,if the funds are used to send obsolescent U.S. equipment abroad, the proceeds can be used to purchase new equipment for the U.S. military. Mr.Macmillan said that the whole line of supply in the Middle East now is British equipment. It is very small in any event but he believed that it was impractical to mix it up. He felt that there might be, however, an agreement to divide up the types of equipment which each of the two countries might provide. It was a matter of considerable importance to Britain that the tanks for the area be British, but on other things there could be a division with respect to the line of supply. The Secretary said that the United States would have political and military observers at the November 20 meeting in Baghdad and suggested that this might be one of the things to be discussed there. He said that he had told the Iraq Ambassador last week that we would look sympathetically on Iraq’s effort to build up strength. The Secretary referred to previous discussions between Prime Minister Eden and the President about U.S. offshore procurement of Centurion tanks. He said that we had only had funds to purchase ten Centurions at the present time but that, in accordance with his previous undertaking to Macmillan, we intended to ask Congress for funds to buy more Centurions under offshore procurement in the coming year. Mr.Macmillan inquired whether it would be possible for the U.S. to tell Nuri that. Mr.Dulles replied that he doubted if we could be specific on that score but he would see what we could do.

The Secretary said that he was seriously concerned about the situation in Syria. It was the nearest of all the Arab states to becoming a Soviet puppet. The other Arab states feel that they can keep their independence. Ambassador Malik of Lebanon has been pressing us for a year to take action to prevent Syria from becoming a Soviet puppet. It is doubtful that Nasser could or would do anything to stop this trend. As a result of the Egyptian-Syrian Pact⁵ there will be a flow of Soviet arms into Syria with the result that Israel will be newly threatened both from the north and the south. It is not clear just how Iraq intends to act with respect to Syria, whether by coup or attack. It would be hard for us to be benevolent about the latter. Mr.Macmillan said that Syria had been acting most badly in the way it was hiking its charges on the pipeline and threatening to hold up the passage of oil. Such a stoppage would be most serious for Britain and Western Europe generally; it would be a major blow to Iraq since it would cut Iraq’s income in half. Up to now he had been discouraging Nuri with respect to taking action in Syria largely because it would put Iraq on the Israel border. But if Syria is going to become a Soviet puppet, Israel might prefer to have Iraq as its neighbor.

The Secretary said that the same pattern had been observed in Egypt . . . and Syria with respect to requests to purchase U.S. arms from the United States. They secretly negotiated a deal with the Soviets, then came to us asking about possible arms purchases, told us conditions were unacceptable (although they had not objected to them before and they provided only for no resale, no use for aggressive purposes and not giving away secrets relating to them) and then proceeded to announce a deal with the Soviets. Mr.Macmillan observed that the Arabs are paying the Soviets for the arms with our money: oil revenues, unblocked sterling or economic assistance. The Secretary said that Nasser is toying with forces far greater than he knows anything about. In the face of Communist methods of penetration he is a babe in the woods. The Secretary does not doubt his sincerity but does doubt his capacity to control the situation he is getting into. In purpose at least Nasser does not intend to allow Egypt to be taken over by the Communists. He would like to emulate Yugoslavia and get the best of both worlds. The difference, however, is that Yugoslavia knows the score, and is unlikely to fall again into the jaws of Moscow. Tito is a past master at dealing with the Kremlin.Nasser is completely unversed. The question is can we capitalize on his intention not to let the Communists take over. This leads to the question of the Aswan Dam. Mr.Macmillan said that he thought it was important to differentiate between Nasser and his arms deal and the people of Egypt and their genuine long-term interests. Arms are ephemeral. The dam will last for generations and be an outstanding symbol of benefit to the people. If we build it, it will help our position. Otherwise, the Kremlin will capitalize on it. The Secretary said that it would not be possible to commence construction on the dam until there was agreement between the Sudan and Egypt on a division of water and with respect to the land which would be covered by the reservoir. Mr.Macmillan said that he expected the Sudan Parliament to pass a resolution asking Britain and Egypt as the codomini to grant Sudanese independence. Britain will say that it approves. If there is a delay in independence it is certain that Egypt will spend money in an effort to interfere in any Sudanese election. Moreover, Sudan will not agree on the water until there is independence. Mr.Macmillan asked whether it would not be wise to make a package for Nasser on the Sudan: (1) Sudanese independence and (2) agreement on the Nile waters.

Mr.Dulles read two telegrams which had just been received from Acting Secretary Hoover in connection with the Aswan Dam.⁶ The Secretary said that he believes Egypt really would prefer to have the IBRD in on the building of the dam, and not to have it done by the Soviets, if it appears that it could be done expeditiously. Mr.Macmillan said that the reason for the entry of the British-German-French consortium was to keep the Soviets out. If the IBRD can handle the allotting of the construction contracts on a semi-political basis so that the Soviets would not be in on the construction and getting IBRD and Western funds, he would have no objection to going ahead through the IBRD. The Secretary said that he thought it ought to be possible to exclude the Soviets from IBRD contracts. The IBRD could build the dam with less cost to Egypt since the financial risk on the part of contractors would be much less. Mr.Macmillan said that he would immediately inform the Foreign Office that he wished to have discussions on the dam go forward in Washington as Mr.Hoover had suggested.

Mr.Macmillan said that he had been having trouble over the Sultan of Muscat. . . . He said that the British Prime Minister was making an announcement in Parliament that day which he hoped would help keep the Arabs from making outrageous claims. The Secretary said that unfortunately it looked as though U.S. and British aims are likely to conflict in Saudi Arabia. Our airbase concession is coming up for renegotiation next year and we have large oil interests there. The King of Saudi Arabia had told us that he expects us to support him in his efforts against the British in the south.

Mr.Macmillan said that with respect to arms for the Middle East the British plan to go ahead using NEACC. They do not intend to supply Centurions to Israel but would supply small stuff. Mr.Shuckburgh raised the question as to the utility of the NEACC in view of the entry of the Soviets into the Middle East arms picture. The Secretary and Mr.Macmillan agreed that Shuckburgh and Mr.Russell should hold discussions in London the following week on the future of NEACC. Mr.Macmillan suggested that the NEACC might be used for the exchange of information but not be expected to exercise controls.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Russell on November 2. The time of the meeting is from Secretary Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. Seeinfra.
3. According to Secretary Dulles’ Appointment Book,Dulles and the Iraqi Ambassador, Moussa Al–Shabandar, met at 4 p.m., October 20. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) The memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 64 D 199.
4. According to a memorandum of conversation by Dulles of a conversation with Senator George on October 21,Dulles asked the Senator whether he thought the Senate would approve a security treaty with Israel that would guarantee the present armistice lines once the Arab States and Israel had negotiated an agreed settlement; Senator George expressed doubt that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the full Senate would approve a security treaty under these circumstances. (Memorandum of Conversation, by Dulles, October 21; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, “Sen Walter George”)
5. On October 20, Egypt and Syria signed a mutual defense pact which provided for a unified military command.
6. Documents 354 and 355.