415. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and General Lauris Norstad, Department of State, Washington, October 28, 19571
General Norstad expressed himself rather critically … in relation to maneuvers near the Syrian border and also with respect to the movements in the Western Mediterranean of the Sixth Fleet and air lift to Jordan. He said that this was creating a bad impression with some of our NATO Allies. … I said that the matters he referred to related primarily not to NATO but to Middle East problems as to which probably and naturally he was not fully informed…. The vast shipment of Soviet arms into Syria and the promiscuous arming of the people created a danger that there might be armed aggression against Lebanon, Jordan or Iraq, where the governments were disposed to be pro-Western. There was already considerable unrest along these borders. If fighting broke out, for [Page 734] example, between Syria and Iraq, Turkey might be involved as a member of the Baghdad Pact. In any event the presence of Turkish forces near the Syrian border would tend to “cool off” Syrian hotheads. Furthermore, Turkey had a legitimate concern that the Soviet Union would not, in effect, establish a second border to the south of Turkey and thus put Turkey within a Soviet pincers.
The air movement of arms to Jordan had been done in that way not because the United States wished to be flamboyant but because that was the way in which the Government of Jordan wanted the arms delivered. The movement of the Sixth Fleet was done for a purpose just as earlier the movement of the Sixth Fleet had encouraged Hussein to withstand subversive movements. A show of strength was needed again. I urged General Norstad not to judge everything just from the standpoint of Western Europe…
I said that this was a time, when the Soviets were trying everywhere to give the impression that they were now the “top dog” and that the United States was intimidated and showing weakness, that we had to show strength. I particularly urged that strength be shown in relation to Berlin.
At this point we were joined by Ambassador Burgess and Mr. Timmons.2
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.↩
- After this conversation, Dulles telephoned General Twining at 6:45 p.m. According to the memorandum of telephone conversation by Bernau, at one point “The Sec said he talked with Norstad and he was upset re the ME—they agreed he does not know what he is talking about. The Sec told him it is a ME problem etc. rather than NATO. … He mentioned how the Baghdad Pact might come into the picture. T said Norstad got away before he could see him and he is sorry about it. … T thanked him for calling and he will take action. The Sec said it is a scare where 99 times out of 100 nothing happens.” (Ibid., General Telephone Conversations)↩