Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

404. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices¹

Washington, September 25, 1957—4:50 p.m.

278. Joint State-USIA message.

1. To seek to counteract unfavorable repercussions in ME area of Syrian developments and to achieve greater appreciation of gravity of Syrian situation State and USIA have decided that stepped up psychological campaign should be launched immediately. This campaign should receive support from all elements of Embassy.

US recognizes that it faces three major psychological handicaps with respect to events in Syria, namely a) while Soviet threat has made little impact on Arab mind, there is a ready audience for contentions that US is hostile to Arab nationalism and unity; b) US is identified in Arab eyes with support for Israel while Soviet Union has sided openly with Arabs; c) bulk of Arab people, preoccupied with Israel and target of intense and skillful Soviet propaganda, fail to apprehend gravity of Syrian situation. Reluctance of friendly Arab leaders to reveal publicly concern they express to us privately about Syrian situation is further obstacle; to extent US policies appear to succeed leaders may be willing take more open position.

2. Following lines suggested for use as appropriate in rebutting theme of US opposition to Arab nationalism (1a above): a) US favors principle of Arab unity and freedom; b) Arab nationalism working with West brought about freedom and independence of Arab states; c) US has consistently supported genuine nationalism within last decade and contributed realization independence of Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan; d) Arab freedom, independence and unity are jeopardized by Syrian policy which currently playing into hands of Soviet imperialists; e) Soviet policy has consistently been to make satellites of countries coming under its influence; f) no country has maintained as close relations with USSR as Syria now does and remained free; g) US would not support efforts by one Arab state to dominate others; h) US opposition to aggression from any quarter and concern with maintenance integrity all Arab states demonstrated by position during Suez crisis.

3. Following are illustrative of lines which may be used as appropriate in dealing with item 1(b) above: a) stress firm US opposition to Israeli expansion at expense its neighbors, emphasizing fact that US assurances of assistance against aggression apply to attack from any quarter (cite US statement of April 24 re: Jordan;² US action against Israel in Sinai campaign; US statement of April 9, 1956³); b) give publicity to US arms already sent and still going to friendly Arab states; c) make discreet mention any complaints from Israeli or pro-Israeli sources about US military and economic aid to Arab states; d) present Soviet support Arab states as purely tactical and motivated by desire increase influence in ME. Point out that Soviet Bloc supported establishment Israel and partition Palestine, furnished arms to Israel during Palestine war, and switched views only recently in hope establishing beachhead in ME.

4. Implementation of 1(c) above particularly difficult. It important that every effort be made impress following points on Arab peoples and those countries which presently uncertain or vacillating in their estimation gravity Syrian situation: a) portray Syrian regime as introducing communism, the enemy of religion, into Near East with gravest dangers to Syrian people and Syria’s neighbors; b) demonstrate that Syrian regime is destroying Arab unity and betraying true Arab nationalism; c) place onus for threatening peace of Near East on Syrian regime and its supporters, the Soviet Bloc and Egypt; d) exploit indications that Syria has openly hostile intentions towards Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon and, together with Egypt, is engaged in subversion in neighboring countries; e) show that Syrian ruling clique is characterized by irresponsibility, opportunism, personal ambitions and naiveté; f) if considered appropriate in individual countries, make reference to US determination to oppose, if requested, Soviet Bloc aggressive activities in Near East. Cite ME Resolution⁴ and Secretary’s statement from White House on September 7, 1957.⁵

5. All suggested themes paras 2, 3 and 4 may be used as local conditions warrant in official, attributable output. We aware that aspects this program difficult to implement immediately. However it important that recipient posts use every resource available pursue this program. State and USIA will provide continuing materials but must rely on field posts to generate indigenous editorials, comment, stories for cross play. Advise USIA re themes, research and background required.

6. It important to bear in mind USG objective is to obtain to extent possible area wide recognition that a) pro-Soviet regime in Syria does not have support of Syrian people; b) opposition to present Syrian regime is led by “free” Arab countries who see their hard-won independence and their security threatened by traitors to nationalist cause, betraying Arabs to new foreign (Soviet) imperialism; c) “free” Arab countries do not compromise their position with respect to Israel by cooperation with Free World.

7. Within limits set forth herein, posts are requested devote to this program maximum available initiative, imagination and talent, giving top priority to project until further notice.⁶

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/9–2557. Secret. Drafted by officials in NEA and USIA; cleared with officials in USIA, NEA, and PA. Approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Sent to the Embassies in Jordan, Turkey, Greece, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Sudan, the United Kingdom, Morocco, Israel, Libya, Tunis, and Iran; and pouched to the Embassies in Ghana, Ethiopia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Spain, Liberia, India, France, and Italy, and to the consulate general in Jerusalem.

   USIA Director Larson informed President Eisenhower of the contents of circular telegram 278 in a memorandum of September 28. Eisenhower initialed the memorandum. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, USIA)

2. See footnote 3, Document 395.
3. Printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 592–593.
4. Reference is to the Joint Resolution of the Congress of March 5, 1957.
5. See footnote 5, Document 388.

6. For responses to this instruction from recipient posts, see Department of State, Central File 783.00.

   On October 1, U.S. and British representatives met in Washington to discuss, among other matters, the implementation of circular telegram 278. As a result of these meetings, it was agreed that an ad hoc committee consisting of Department of State–USIA–British Embassy representatives would meet in Washington on approximately a weekly basis to discuss coordination of output, to exchange policy guidances and research documents, and to assess the psychological implications of current or planned policies. Certain Middle Eastern, African, and European missions were informed of this meeting and offered additional guidance in Joint State–USIA Circular, CA–980, October 17, 1957. (Ibid., 783.00/10–1757)

   Within the U.S. Government a small interagency group, headed by Ambassador Moose and including representatives from the CIA, Departments of Defense and State, and USIA, was formed to study the reasons why the U.S. psychological warfare program in the Middle East had not achieved a satisfactory degree of success and to make recommendations for a new approach. For documentation concerning the group’s activities during November 1957, see Washington National Records Center, USIA/IAN Files: FRC 63 A 190, Lot 61 D 233, Moose Committee 1957.