Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

402. Memorandum of a Conversation, the Secretary’s Suite in the Waldorf Astoria, New York, September 18, 1957, 11 a.m.¹

New York, September 18, 1957, 11 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Reinhardt
• Lebanon
  • Mr. Charles Malik

SUBJECT

• Middle East

The Secretary said he wanted to talk about the Middle East. He referred to Dr. Malik’s conversations with Mr. Henderson which had been fully reported to Washington and referred as well to his message to Dr. Malik. He said that the United States was gravely concerned with the situation and was prepared to do anything reasonable to check or help the present trend of developments. It was important that there be no action by Israel and we are inclined to believe they share our view. Yet there was some danger that elements in Syria might succeed in provoking Israeli reaction in order to put the problem in the framework of the Arab-Israeli dispute instead of the Communist–Free World dispute. The Secretary believed the Israelis would exercise restraint if there were any prospect of the present movement being checked. If on the contrary, it looked as though this trend would go forward and that within a year or two they would be surrounded by highly armed and excited enemies, they would be inclined to do something. In short the Secretary thought that if there were hope the Israelis would be inclined to exercise restraint. It was also undesirable for any initiative to be taken by Turkey. Although he thought the Turks were not feared as much as Israel in the Near East, he judged that there was still strong anti-Turk feeling derived from the days of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey felt itself threatened by an encirclement which would sap its strength. What was desirable was for Syria’s Arab neighbors to take the initiative, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. (Dr. Malik interrupted to add the name of Saudi Arabia.)

. . . . . . .

Dr. Malik said he had asked King Saud² how he ran his country when he was absent, and had been told that the King was in constant contact by telephone and wireless. The Secretary recalled that in 1953 following a dinner in Rhyad with the old King there had been a party in the present King’s rose garden and on every table there was a telephone which the Arabs were constantly using as a sort of symbol of authority.

Jordan, the Secretary continued, was weak. There was danger that the 100,000 refugees could be whipped up into a state of riot…

With respect to Iraq the Secretary thought the Crown Prince was a pretty strong element, but the present Prime Minister not so. It would be better if Nuri were back. He had heard that Nuri was returning to Baghdad in a day or two but did not know whether he would be offered a government post. As far as Lebanon was concerned, the Secretary said Dr. Malik himself was the best judge of the situation.

The Secretary said we must devise some program of action…. It must be recognized that if there were any provocation the Turks would act. He referred to the recent Soviet note threatening Turkey and said he did not know what the answer would be. He had no doubt that the Turks were fully confident that any Soviet attack would bring NATO forces into play. The Soviets probably realized this and we do also.

The Secretary said that in his speech tomorrow he would refer to Communist techniques of indirect aggression and to the Essentials for Peace Resolution. He said that he might suggest the General Assembly recommend to the Security Council some investigation in Syria to see whether the resolution was being complied with. This was the best thing we could think of at the moment. The Secretary said he had to speak about the situation in the Near East, but didn’t regard this as any solution or substitute for our own efforts. He went on to say that as soon as we had the details the United States Government would make $2 million worth of light equipment available for the Lebanese Gendarmerie.

Dr. Malik said that Lebanon was in the very forefront of this matter. He had had many talks with Henderson who had also seen the President and Prime Minister at length. He was in constant contact and in fact he had just seen him before leaving Beirut. This present situation was the most serious thing that Lebanon had faced in at least a decade. The most important thing was the Communist capability for subversion. The Lebanon Government did not think there would be overt aggression for at least a year or two. Subversion was the immediate danger. The enemy was spending millions with agents all over the place. This had to be met with courage and horsesense. If the Communists got entrenched in Syria as they may if no action is taken, it will be disastrous. Once this Syrian regime felt itself fully entrenched then he, Dr. Malik, would give Jordan one month, Lebanon three, Iraq six and Saudi Arabia perhaps a year. This was a threat not merely to Lebanon but to the whole Middle East in fact to the peace of the world. Time was of the essence. Dr. Malik said he could not overemphasize this point. His people were getting scared. The psychology of border peoples was unstable and there was the danger of a sudden shift if they felt the wind coming from another quarter. He said the Secretary’s recent statement³ had had a soothing effect, but it was bad for waverers. Many people had gotten cold feet and thought the United States was drawing back.

The Secretary said no one was as surprised as he at the interpretation put on that statement by the press. He had said he did not think United States forces would be required in the area. The press had picked it up. Unfortunately, there was no middle ground for the press. They presented everything as being either black or white. Dr. Malik said this was not the moment to strengthen the wavering and hesitating forces in the area. A measure of Communist penetration was the wide spread existence of these elements. Dr. Malik said he was happy to hear the Secretary speak of positive action and that we must put our heads together…. Iraq must be brought in. Nuri was a fine man but showed no inclination to help Syria. Ali Jawdat was also a fine man but he didn’t grasp the situation. Nuri should be encouraged by the United States and the United Kingdom. Heath had told him that we were working together…

Dr. Malik asked rhetorically what Lebanon could say at this moment. The Secretary’s speech would be a great and good thing and he hoped the Secretary would give it punch. We may live to regret every moment wasted. Dr. Malik said he could be frank with the Secretary but he did not know whether he could make a speech.

Dr. Malik said the Russians were exceedingly interested in this problem and that when he called on Gromyko it was clear he had no other subject on his mind. They were apparently in it up to their necks. He was amazed at the depth of Gromyko’s feeling and was convinced, judging by Gromyko, that the Russians were thinking about this all the time. It was a curious situation wherein the two greats were coming head on in Syria.

The Lebanese Government, he said, was prepared to do everything it could. The Syrians had many agents in his country and there was a Syrian opposition but it had been kept in parliament down to 15%. The country was unfortunately already a little softened up and time was of the essence. Lebanon was willing to put its resources at the disposition of a common effort…. Already two weeks ago an official of the Vatican had told him that the Vatican felt the United States was then two weeks too late. The Secretary said the United States would not try to hold back any such effort …. The United States would give assurances under the Eisenhower Doctrine. There was no unwillingness to take risks even that of global war. This had been fully discussed but we could not undertake to launch armed attack on Syria. This would violate all our principles and would not be supported by the Congress. There must be initiative in the area …. The Iraqi Government was not incisive and he did not know whether Nuri would come back. The Secretary felt that tactically it was a long way to the Syrian border. Iraq had more of an advantageous approach through Jordan. He agreed that the matter was urgent. That when things are urgent you can’t do complicated things. Dr. Malik observed that planning could be done to which the Secretary replied it was being done.

The Secretary believed Nasser was encouraging these developments in Syria. He was a complicated person full of moods and difficult to judge. But the Secretary believed he was under the illusion, which others had shared before, that you can encourage the Soviets to come in and work with them and still maintain some respectability. We had seen this phenomenon in Czechoslovakia in 1948 where Benes and Masaryk had thought they could work closely with the Russians and maintain their independence. He thought Nasser was under the same illusion. The Russians had built up his vanity and the Secretary recalled the chapter in Nasser’s book entitled “The Situation in Need of a Hero”. He thought the Russians could build him up in this sense.

Dr. Malik said Nasser thought that he had received assurances in 1953 that the United States would give him a free hand in the Middle East. Now he was bitter. Malik asked whether it was true that the Secretary had told him that United States policy was to work through him with the Arab world. The Secretary replied that he would have to check memoranda of conversation to find out exactly what he had said to Nasser. It was possible that he had said we recognized that he had a position of leadership in the Arab world, but if Nasser thought we had given him any so farreaching assurances, he was crazy.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Top Secret. Drafted by Reinhardt. The source text is marked “draft”, but contains handwritten corrections. The text printed here is the corrected version.
2. King Saud had stopped in Beirut on September 7 en route to West Germany for medical treatment. Malik later spoke with Heath concerning Saud’s conversations with Lebanese officials and Heath conveyed a report to the Department of State. (Telegram 670 from Beirut, September 8; ibid.)
3. Reference is presumably to remarks made by Dulles during a press conference on September 10. In response to questions, Dulles stated that the United States had not yet made a determination that Syria was dominated by international communism within the meaning of the Middle East resolution, the situation in Syria was still in the “borderline-gray area,” and the situation “will probably work out.” For a transcript, see Department of State Bulletin, September 30, 1957, pp. 526–532.
4. The Department of State’s Executive Secretariat subsequently examined the 1953 records.