Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

392. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

Washington, September 10, 1957—9:59 p.m.

754. Deptel 752.² Following decisions re Syrian crisis have been reached at highest level US Government. We desire you after reading reftel convey them orally to Menderes immediately emphasizing pressing need to maintain absolute secrecy.

1. US has been gratified by close and valuable consultations with GOT in connection with grave danger to security of ME represented by current events in Syria. US has now reached at highest level certain conclusions concerning this problem and in spirit community of interest which exists between our two countries desires to convey these conclusions to GOT. Certain of these conclusions are also being conveyed to Governments of Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon.

2. Nations are confronted at periods in history with need to take decisions fundamentally affecting their own destinies. US believes such momentous decisions may be taken only by nation concerned. Holding to this belief, US does not consider it can assume responsibility of urging Turkey to follow any specific course of action or inaction. US is making following views known to Turkey in thought that Turkey is entitled to have available all relevant information regarding US attitude in formulating Turkish policy regarding Syrian situation.

3. The United States judges that Syria has become, or is about to become, a base for military and subversive activities in the Near East designed to destroy the independence of those countries and to subject them to Soviet Communist domination.

4. If the aggressive spirit which is being inculcated into Syria by means of Soviet arms, propaganda, etc., should, as seems likely, manifest itself in actual deeds—and some such manifestations have already occurred in Lebanon—the United States would hold that a case existed for individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and that there would be no violation of Article I of the NATO Treaty.³

5. The United States believes, however, that Israel should, irrespective of provocation other than large-scale invasion, show restraint so as not to unite and inflame the Arab world against Israel and in support of Syria on the theory that Israel has aggressive purposes and territorial ambitions.

6. The United States further believes that Turkey should not act other than in requested reinforcement of Arab defensive action….

7. If Syria’s Moslem neighbors should consider their security endangered by the threat of Syrian aggression and should request from the United States economic assistance and military supplies in connection with a concrete plan effectively to meet such aggression, the US would give prompt and sympathetic consideration to such a request. If any one or more of Syria’s Arab neighbors, responding to provocation, should act pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter, the United States would, upon request, and pursuant to the Middle East Resolution, extend such countries economic assistance and military supplies; it would support such countries if attacked in the UN SC or the GA.

8. If any of Syria’s Arab neighbors were physically attacked by the Sino-Soviet Bloc, the United States, upon request, would be prepared to use its own armed forces to assist any such nation or nations against such armed aggression. This would include the organized use of “volunteers” from Sino-Soviet Bloc countries.

9. If hostilities between Iraq and Syria should result in the closing of the pipelines and the cutting off of revenues from Iraq, the United States would, as a temporary emergency measure, help to mitigate the financial consequences of this to Iraq.

10. If, despite what is said in (6), Turkey should feel compelled to react to armed provocations which implied a serious threat to its own national integrity and independence, or if Turkey should come to the aid of any of Syria’s Arab neighbors engaged in hostilities with Syria, the United States would support Turkey in the UN. The US also would not stand idly by if the Sino-Soviet Bloc should attack Turkey, directly or by organized volunteers. In that case the US would honor its obligations under the NATO Treaty, and the Middle East Resolution would also be applicable.

. . . . . . .

12. If any of Syria’s neighbors should become involved in hostilities with Syria, it is a precondition to any US support that it be made clear that such hostilities are not for the purpose of impairing the political independence or the territory of Syria but are merely for the purpose of restoring Syria to the Syrians.

13. The United States will continue to deploy the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.

14. US has consulted with UK which is in complete agreement with this position.

15. In separate telegrams we are repeating messages conveyed to Governments of Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. These messages should also be conveyed orally to GOT.

16. We appreciate the Prime Minister’s expressed intention to keep in contact with us in view of the delicacy and importance of the Middle East situation.⁴

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell and Burdett; cleared in draft with Dulles; and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Beirut, Baghdad, and Amman.
2. Not printed. (Ibid.)
3. Printed in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. IV, pp. 471–475.

4. At 11:30 a.m. on September 12 in Ankara, Warren conveyed to Menderes the contents of the messages sent to Menderes, Abdul-illah, Chamoun and Malik, and King Hussein (see infra). According to Warren’s report, Prime Minister Menderes, Zorlu, and Kuneralp, who were also present, listened carefully, nodded their heads in agreement from time to time, and occasionally interrupted Warren to ask that he repeat certain phrases and clauses. Later that day, Kuneralp queried the Embassy in Ankara about the differences in wording between paragraph 8, which referred to the use of U.S. “armed forces” to assist “Syria’s Arab neighbors,” and paragraph 10, which had stated that the United States “would not stand idly by” if the Sino-Soviet bloc should attack Turkey. (Telegram 698 from Ankara, September 12; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123)

   Upon receipt of telegram 698, Secretary Dulles discussed the Turkish question by telephone with President Eisenhower. Dulles asked Eisenhower’s permission to respond that there was no difference between the two statements. Eisenhower agreed. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Bernau, September 13, 1:07 p.m.; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)