Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

379. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, September 1, 1957—7 p.m.

608. Beirut for Henderson; Rome for McSweeney. Noforn except as otherwise indicated by Department. As reported Embtel 604,² talk with Nasser yesterday was a l-¾ hour affair which began as exchange of views on Syria but also covered fundamental aspects of US–Egypt relations. In fact, even when Syria was under discussion parallel with situation here was often so close that it sometimes seemed Nasser might be speaking one word on behalf Syria and two on behalf Egypt. Although two subjects were intertwined in discussion following is re-arrangement by subject.

Regarding Syria I opened by outlining substance Deptel 559.³ Nasser took several minutes before replying; then said he did not think situation as serious as we see it. He had full information and convinced no intent go over to Russians. Real problem had been caused by suspicion and fear not only for security of country but also for safety of persons involved (a phenomenon which Nasser also indicated present in Egypt although he disclaimed any personal concern). This was key to situation and much would depend on how US handled it. Must be understood that people in power in Syria are young and will react violently to efforts to exert pressure; not possible to intimidate them (here again Nasser indicated parallel with Egypt).

Regarding arms, Syria had much same experience as Egypt. It had turned to US and UK without success and finally sought arms from Russians as only course left open in face of arms build-up in Israel with French assistance and also in light of other area developments. But he was certain that stories regarding Soviet technicians were greatly exaggerated. He could not furnish exact figure without checking but was certain number would not exceed 50 and most of these were there temporarily for assembling material and similar tasks. No need for Russians for training purposes because training of all types Syrian units being done in Egypt.

Concerning Soviet economic assistance, story was similar of having no place else to turn in time of acute need. For instance, Syria had been refused loan by World Bank.

However, despite these Force Majeure transactions, Nasser felt confident Syrians (including government, Bath and military) have no intention of abandoning independence and becoming subservient to Russians. Not only that but he convinced it mistake to assume Syrians do not want friendly relations with US. As matter of fact situation in Syria now much better, much calmer; there is greater feeling of security. There is opportunity in this atmosphere for USG to come to understanding with Syrians if it takes initiative. Important thing is to remember that basic difficulty in Syria is fear. In such circumstances it is mistake to talk in terms of 6th Fleet, bringing about change in government, supplying arms to dissidents, Turkish threats or isolating Syria. These will be contra productive and run risk of producing results which we are now talking about in terms of accomplished fact. This is very dangerous because an attempt at isolation which drove Syria into arms of Russians would mean that Syria by its geographical situation could not only isolate other countries of area economically and control pipelines but could also constitute ideal “carrier” for Soviet air force.

Nasser’s recommendation in this situation was that USG should go in for bit of “psychiatry” (his own word) and deal gently with Syrians in such way as relieve their fears. That is line that GOE is following and results reassuring. Nasser admitted however, that he had been very disturbed about 10 days ago, particularly because he feared USG might precipitate crisis and that Syrians would react rashly. That was why he had sent Haikal to see me (Embtel 537).⁴

Regarding Henderson mission Nasser said he had formerly had reservations because Henderson’s Baghdad Pact associations but that personal contact with him on occasion Menzies mission had revealed him to be most reasonable and understanding. He therefore hoped he would visit Syria on present trip and see things for himself. Failure to do so would not seem consonant with real fact-finding mission. Furthermore, fact that consultations restricted to governments unfriendly to Syria carried threatening implications, which he repeated was thing most to be avoided.

Regarding US relations, parellelism of facts and background with Syrian situation were so obvious that I felt appropriate use occasion for another basic review.

I began with following general exposition:

(1) Our fundamental objective is preservation and promotion of area peace and stability.

(2) In pursuing that policy we have assisted countries of area to attain independence and we now want to see independence maintained. We are sympathetic with Nationalism provided it is of constructive character. We welcome area co-operation directed to promotion of peace and stability. Although we think neutralism unwise and short-sighted, we have no necessary quarrel with countries which follow that policy provided that it is real neutralism which respects rights of others to adopt policies designed promote their own best interests.

(3) Main problem, as we see it is threat of international Communism to independence of countries of area. To be emphasized here that what we are specifically talking about is predatory international Communism with world domination as its objective. It is also true that we strongly disapprove of national [Communism?] as practical matter we prepared deal with Nationalist Communist countries such as Yugoslavia on realistic basis.

(4) Specific danger NE is development of increasing intimacy and dependence on Communist bloc which, although intent may be innocent, will in turn lead to loss of independence and in process to perversion of Nationalism and neutralism. Also only Arab unity possible in such circumstances would be common status as Soviet satellites. Thus, in seeking promote these objectives by naive means, independence, nationalism, neutrality and unity would all go out window.

(5) This is why Syria important. Situation in Egypt differs in certain respects but same dark clouds on horizon. It is our sincere and honest judgment that Egypt steering course which could lead to disaster for it and area and in circumstances we can not adopt attitude toward Egypt which would indicate acceptance of what we convinced wrong.

(6) I had heard argument advanced, some times by Nasser himself, that East-West conflict is battle of giants to be fought out between them while small countries like Egypt remained to one side and look to their own immediate problems. Nothing could be more fallacious. Clear prospect, based on many precedents and current developments, is not that Russians will in foreseeable future seek to come to grips with US direct but rather that their immediate concentration of effort will be where picking is easiest and clear indication is that NE at top of priority list for subjugation. It is NE, including Egypt, that is in immediate path of Soviet predatory action.

As military man, Nasser should appreciate that a division commander on basis of his appraisal of situation in his immediate area might think desirable conduct campaign in quite different way than would commander-in-chief with full information of whole war area. Thus, as regards international Communism, we are in position to analyze it on global basis not merely theoretically but as result of experience gained the hard way. We are confident we know what we are talking about and believe Nasser would be wise to profit by our counsel.

(7) Conclusion is that we not motivated by an Imus [animus?] toward Egypt or by opposition to objective it espouses provided they are constructive in intent. We are convinced however that way in which Egypt is going about attaining its objectives (here I cite not only Soviet relationship but also attacks on other Arab countries not following Egyptian lead) is not only misguided but dangerous. There is the problem.

Nasser listened attentively and, after pause for reflection, said he was in general agreement with foregoing analysis. However, having said this, he immediately and characteristically went over to defensive.

He said he always tried analyze all factors in situation and recognized that Soviet threat was one of them. However, there were other factors which impinged more immediately on Egypt and one of these was American pressures and efforts isolate Egypt. If we continue to follow these tactics, he would have to fight back. He did not know how he would do it but he could not remain passive. We were making same mistake in Egypt as in Syria by failing understand inevitable reaction to our policies. Exertion of pressures not only results in reaction from fear but it also offends sense of dignity. Senator Fulbright had understood this in his criticism of way Aswan Dam matter handled.

Nasser said he strongly opposed domestic Communism and repeated story of how he was prepared crack down on local Communists before elections but had held his hand when he learned that anti-government leaflets of American origin were being circulated.

Regarding dealings with USSR Nasser said he now has enough arms for next 5 or 6 years by which time most of it would probably be obsolete. He had also taken precaution of laying in 6-year supply of spare parts; in fact, ⅓ of arms purchases had consisted of spare parts. He did not wish take any changes which would put him at mercy of Russians in that regard. Regarding ammunition, he was building factories which should make Egypt self-sufficient. Regarding economic dealings, he did not wish become dependent on Russians and for that reason had not accepted proffered gold loan earlier in year but met situation by special arrangements with India, China, Greece, Spain and Saudi Arabia. However, can not buy from US without dollars and in circumstances trade with USSR necessary. More we apply economic pressure, more economic relations with USSR increase. General situation is that we always refuse and Russians always help out. Egypt would like come to understanding with US but we leave no room.

Nasser said that following helpful stand which we had taken at time Suez invasion he had entertained hopes that new page could be turned in relations with US, but that those hopes had been dashed by new policy of pressures to weaken Egypt internationally and by Eisenhower Doctrine to isolate Egypt externally. It was foregone conclusion Egypt could not agree to Doctrine and he wondered what we felt we had gained by it. It seemed to him that all that had happened was we had given $170 million to number of countries which already were on our side and that only case where new country had come over to US was Lebanon where main results seemed to be it had become country divided against itself. He could not help wondering how we assessed value of this expenditure as compared with $54 million for Aswan Dam.

I observed that seemed we were going through same old routine where we were always wrong and GOE always right. Did not he have anything more constructive to offer? Nasser replied he could not be placed in position of coming to us with regrets and excuses. It would be contrary to Egypt’s dignity. Then with grin he said he did have one proposal to make: We should forget past and our complexes and begin all over again. Then, more seriously, he cited case of Sudan, where when things had not gone as Egypt had hoped, he had been advised by some to adopt policy of retaliation but he had vetoed idea and relations with Sudan now good.

Although, despite its length and depth, conversation produced nothing really new, it was obvious that Nasser very much wanted to talk and that he was trying at least to give impression of desire mend his fences with us but, despite repeated probing, it was impossible find anything to indicate that he was prepared to make any real concessions. However, I believe that on balance conversation was useful if for no other reason than to clarify our position in way Nasser seemed to understand even though he could not bring himself to agree.

Hare

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/9–157. Secret. Received at 9:17 a.m., September 2. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, London, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Rome, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, and Khartoum.
2. In telegram 604 from Cairo, August 31, Hare reported that he had had a 1-¾ hour conversation with Nasser on August 31. The gist of Nasser’s comments regarding Syria paralleled previously reported remarks made by Haikal to Embassy officials in Cairo, except that Nasser’s tone on August 31 had been more moderate than Haikal had described. According to Hare, Nasser made repeated appeals that the United States approach the Syrians directly, particularly through a Henderson visit to Damascus, and warned that failure of the United States to do so would give the impression of action hostile to Syria and would contribute to the increase of tension. (Ibid., 783.00/8–3157)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., 783.00/8–2657)
4. Telegram 537 from Cairo, August 23, reported one of the conversations between Hare and Haikal mentioned in footnote 2 above. (Ibid., 780.00/8–2357)