Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

354. Despatch From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State¹

No. 43

Damascus, July 29, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Syrian Foreign Office Note on United States-Syrian Relations

The Embassy transmits an informal translation of a note dated July 8, 1957 from the Syrian Foreign Office enclosing a detailed memorandum setting forth Syrian views with respect to current relations with the United States.² The memorandum was drafted pursuant to conversations between Foreign Minister Bitar and myself with members of our respective staffs on June 24 and June 27, 1957 as reported in Embassy Despatch 18.³ According to Mr. Ghalib Kayyali, Acting Director of the Syrian Broadcasting System and “consultant” to the Foreign Office, the note contains modifications and addenda to the oral discussions that preceded it.⁴

At the request of Mr. Kayyali, an Embassy Officer discussed with him line-by-line the Embassy’s translation of the memorandum and Mr. Kayyali requested further modifications in the English which are indicated in the text. Mr. Kayyali corrected the Arabic text to conform to the English wherever he considered it necessary and initialled the corrections.

There follows under the heading “Background” an account of the Embassy Officer’s conversations of July 18, 19 and 20 with Mr. Kayyali, and under the heading “Discussion” Embassy comment with respect to points raised in the note.

Background

Most of Mr. Kayyali’s modifications did not affect substance but on two points there was some revealing discussion, viz.:

1. The Embassy Officer queried the statement on page 17 reading, “The Syrian Government looks to the United Nations which led to the creation of Israel, to be itself the final arbiter in the settlement of the Palestine problem and it cannot be said in any way that the presence of Israel is its settlement.” He recalled that Foreign Minister Bitar in his oral presentation had said that the Arabs do not ask the elimination of Israel. The foregoing might thus be subject to misinterpretation.

With the request that he not be quoted, Mr. Kayyali said that the existence of Israel could be “part” of a settlement; he agreed during the discussion to change the sentence to read, “The Syrian Government looks, etc….⁵ and it cannot be said that the mere creation of Israel represents a solution of the Palestine problem.” The Arabic text as received, however, was not modified accordingly. Therefore the Embassy has left the original phraseology in the attached translation.

2. In the discussion on page 18 of the “New American Policy” Mr. Kayyali asked that the specific mention of international communism in paragraph A be changed to refer to attempts “by any foreign power to create internal subversion”. Mr. Kayyali stated (with some justification) that the original phraseology was in conflict with the discussion that followed. Mr. Kayyali took pains to emphasize, however, that whereas the Syrian Government does not believe international communism constitutes “the first and major danger”, it does recognize that international communism constitutes “a danger”, but did not wish explicitly to say so. The Embassy Officer thereupon objected that the subsequent description of international communism as a “non-existing danger in reality” was inconsistent with what Mr. Kayyali had just said. During the conversation Mr. Kayyali agreed to change the latter phrase to read “a non-imminent danger” but the Embassy translator says a closer rendition of the Arab text, as corrected, would be “a non-existing danger at present in reality”.

Mr. Kayyali said that the intended implication of the Syrian Government’s criticism of the American (Eisenhower) Doctrine is that the United States should give firmer guarantees that it would oppose attacks on Arab States from any quarter, rather than merely from international communism.

The Embassy Officer expressed the belief that King Saud, on behalf of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, had raised this point during his visit to the United States in the winter of 1957 and had appeared satisfied with the assurances given him (paragraph 3 of United States-Saudi Joint Communiqué, February 8, 1957).⁶ Mr. Kayyali said assurances given Saud could not be considered sufficient as regards Syria.

Discussion

From the amount of labor the Syrian Foreign Office has expended in holding conversations and in producing and amending the attached note, the Embassy would infer that certain Foreign Ministry officials at least take it seriously and hope for a response to the points raised. Mr. Kayyali in fact discussed the possibility of publishing the note and the response as a kind of White Paper on United States-Syrian relations.

The Memorandum is full of ambiguous accusations and imprecise language which illustrate the confusion in the collective Syrian official mind. It contains little which has not been said before. It is a tissue of misinterpretations, part truths and half-concealed falsehoods woven from the tangled skeins of exaggerated self-pity, political irresponsibility, intellectual dishonesty and desire to capitalize on the nuisance value of a small state: all characteristic of the army clique now controlling Syria.

The Memorandum calls into question the faithfulness of the United States Government to its announced principles; accuses the United States of second-degree imperialism, and by implication of direct imperialism; asserts that the United States foments tension and instability in the Near East, etc., etc. False premises and fallacious reasoning inevitably lead the Government of Syria to erroneous conclusions. My own experience with the present Syrian Foreign Minister leads me to believe that he reached his conclusions first, and worked backward to contrive premises and fancied circumstances which would justify his preconceived views.

It is worthy of note, and characteristic of the present Government of Syria, that the Foreign Ministry has everywhere assumed that Syria is blameless and is always the offended party. To the Ministry, therefore, it is obvious that the task of improving Syrian relations with the free world is the responsibility of the free world, not of Syria. Furthermore, invoking the formula of Arab nationalism, the Foreign Ministry appears to believe that the United States Government is answerable to Syria for American policy toward all “Arab” states, e.g., Tunisia and Morocco.

Much more could be said along the same lines. The readiness of Foreign Ministry officials to state their views in writing and to invite the United States Government’s comment thereon may be explained by a Syrian desire to improve relations between the two countries by the elimination of misunderstandings and the reconciliation, insofar as possible, of differences. Their readiness is subject to another possible interpretation: that the Syrian Foreign Ministry wishes to achieve maximum publicity for its criticism of American policy and actions. Since a large portion of this criticism is presented on behalf of “the Arab nation”, the Syrian Government may be endeavoring to establish its position as a spokesman for other “Arab” governments.

If the American government fails to make prompt reply to the Memorandum, the Syrian Government might seize upon this circumstance in an effort to show that the United States is, in fact, unwilling to improve Syro-American relations or to help ease the situation in the Near East. Unless carefully drafted, any American reply might be used by the Syrian Government for the same propaganda purpose.

It is my belief that a reply to the substance of the Memorandum can be made only by challenging the assumptions and the so-called facts on which the Memorandum is based, and proceeding thence to an attack on the Ministry’s conclusions and its suggestion that the United States Government can improve Syro-American relations by adopting a foreign policy in harmony with the views of the clique now controlling Syria. Such a response would probably produce little of benefit in Syria: even if it induced the civilian officials to reappraise the basis of Syro-American relations, there is scant prospect that the reply would have a similar effect on the Syrian army group which controls the constitutional authorities.

Rather than to attempt to answer the Memorandum in extenso, perhaps the best course would be to deliver a brief Note Verbale to the Syrian Embassy in Washington dismissing the Memorandum as being false, slanted, prejudiced or erroneous to a point where a detailed discussion promises no benefit. In drafting a reply, the Department might wish to consider the use of a few illustrative points couched in suitable language, chosen from the Syrian Memorandum. The following points, which by no means constitute an exhaustive list, have been chosen to illustrate the basic dishonesty of the Memorandum.

1) The Government of Syria, in its memorandum, does not confine itself to a presentation of Syrian views, but presumes to express the views of “the Arab nation”. Without contesting the existence of an “Arab nation”, the United States Government might point out that it has diplomatic relations with several sovereign Arab states, each one uniquely qualified to speak on its own behalf, and not one for another. Until the views put forth in the Memorandum in the name of “the Arab nation” are confirmed by the other Arab states, the United States Government should consider them exclusively as the views of the Syrian Government.

2) In the transmitting Note, third paragraph, the Syrian Foreign Ministry accuses “various American circles” of conducting a violent and biased campaign which has given a false picture of conditions in Syria. In view of the hostile attitude of the Syrian Government for the past three years and the false, violent and malicious campaign it has conducted against the United States, beginning with the malodorous Adnan Malki trial, the Department might wish to suggest that the Syrian Government set its own house in order before complaining about “various American circles”.

3) Section 1. of the Memorandum excoriates “imperialism” which appears to be any aspect of British, French or United States policy which the present Syrian Government in its role as champion of “Arab nationalism” dislikes. Besides being unconvincing, the indignation of the Government of Syria is ludicrous so long as Syria remains indifferent to Soviet imperialism (Hungary, East Germany, Latvia), Indian imperialism (Hyderabad, Kashmir), Indonesian imperialism (Western New Guinea), Communist Chinese imperialism (South-east Asia, Tibet), and especially as long as Syria itself, in concert with Egypt, attempts to practice imperialism in the name of Arab unity (Jordan, Iraq).

4) Section 2. of the Memorandum opens by asserting that “the policy of positive neutrality advocated by Egypt, the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and Jordan has been exposed to a biased campaign illustrating it in a manner contradictory to its reality.” The Embassy was not aware that the Saudi Arabian and Jordanian Governments followed the same policy of positive neutrality, so-called, as Egypt and Syria. All evidence in possession of the Embassy is to the contrary.

5) Section 2.C. contains the following: “(The Baghdad Pact’s) basic aim is to tie the countries which recently liberated themselves from the yoke of imperialism to a new imperialist system and to throw its states into a war between the two camps in which they have no interest. By compelling Iraq to enter the Baghdad Pact, Britain has destroyed the basic interests of the Arab people because it has created a division and hostility among the Arab states in addition to the fact that it has impaired the independence of this Arab country.” The Syrian Foreign Minister knows that this assertion is untrue. The defense of this vicious statement, if there is one, might be that the Minister of Foreign Affairs did not originate it, but merely parroted the Soviet propaganda line—under orders.

6) Section 2.C. of the Memorandum expatiates on “the principle of non-alignment” followed by the Government of Syria. If credence is to be given to the recent statements of Syrian officials, even lip service for a policy of non-alignment was scrapped during the visit of the Syrian Acting Minister of Defense, Khalid Bey al-’Azm, to Moscow.

7) Section 2.D. of the Memorandum asserts that “these states” have agreed to coordinate “these interests” according to the United Nations Charter which provides for the non-interference of states in the affairs of others. It is to be hoped that the Syrian Government will, in the future, observe this principle with regard to neighboring sovereign states, especially the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

8) Section 2.E. states in part: “Although we welcome unconditional economic aid coming from any source, we nevertheless believe that the United Nations and its competent organizations are the best means for the presentation of this aid considering this is safer for the state giving it and the state receiving it ....” Recent Syrian agreements with the USSR seem to provide for important bilateral aid publicly described as unconditional. The purchase of Soviet arms by Syria was likewise characterized as unconditional. The Department has been informed of at least a part of the political conditions attached to the purchase of Soviet arms, and so cannot accept uncritically assertions that Soviet economic aid to Syria is, in fact, without conditions.

9) Section 3. maintains that Israeli immigration policy is not a domestic Israeli matter, but that it is international in character and should be determined in a manner conforming to the views of the Syrian Government. Few states would accept an extension of this rule to their own immigration policy. Would Syria?

10) Section 3. of the Memorandum attributes to Mr. Ashkul⁷ a statement which is indefensible—as indefensible, for example, as the repeated statements by Syrian officials to the general effect that Syria will not tolerate the continued existence of Israel.

11) Section 4. of the Memorandum contains the following: “Britain and France previously took as an excuse the Communist infiltration into what they called the Middle East and gave themselves the right to attack, exert pressure, interfere in the internal affairs of this area and maintain the division between its states. The American Government has proved that it adopts the same logic because it ended with the same results previously reached by the British-French imperialist policy”. That this statement is untrue is known to the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

12) Section 4. of the Memorandum also contains: “Finally, the result of the application of the (American) Doctrine by means of force and coup, as happened in Jordan, was not simply to widen the gap between the Arab countries which were proceeding on the road toward unity, to divide them, and to create a large gap between the rulers and the ruled, but it also made of the Arab countries a center of the cold war, and increased tension and lack of stability in the area to the detriment of the interest of peace, which is the basic necessary condition for the economic and social development needed more than anything else by the peoples of the area.” It is fair to assume that by accusing the United States Government, the Syrian authorities hope to conceal their subversive actions a) in first promising and then refusing financial aid to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and then b) in encouraging elements endeavoring to overthrow the government of King Hussein.

13) Section 6. reads, in part, as follows: “By reviewing these problems and by debating them with a spirit of complete frankness, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs once again reaffirms its definite desire to reach settlements of these problems consistent with the principles of international law, right, justice, the United Nations Charter, and the basic human customs agreed upon. …” The Embassy will be gratified when the Government of Syria brings its actions into conformity with its professed principles. Since the Ministry has expressed its views of United States policy with complete frankness, it will no doubt be happy to have comment of the United States Government which is equally frank, if not equally comprehensive.

Action Requested

That the Department consider delivery to the Syrian Embassy in Washington of a Note Verbale along the general lines discussed above.⁸

James S. Moose, Jr.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.83/7–2957. Confidential. Drafted by Barrow. An official-informal letter of July 31, from Counselor of the Embassy in Damascus Robert Strong to Ambassador Moose who was then in Washington, indicates that despatch 43 was airpouched to Washington under cover of Strong’s letter for Moose’s review and signature. (Ibid., NEA/NE Files: Lot 59 D 38, Syria Correspondence—Damascus) No indication has been found as to whether Moose revised the despatch.

   Strong’s letter of July 31 also made the following comment concerning the situation in Syria:

   “Things are not improving here, as you can imagine, and more Syrians are being intimidated by the G–2 into avoiding association with Americans. There may be trouble with the military over a run-in Chefic had last evening with a carload of Syrian officers while driving me back to Damascus from a dinner with Anwar Kotob near Bludan. Syrian military police and G–2 agents have appeared outside the Embassy scrutinizing the car and Chefic. Perhaps the matter will be dropped after some demonstrations of this sort. I have told Chefic to proceed normally; if there is trouble I’ll do my best to protect him. This is a cheerful note for a letter to you.”

2. The 22-page informal translation is attached to the source text but not printed.
3. Supra.
4. Inclusion of criticism of the Baghdad Pact is an example. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. All ellipses are in the source text.
6. For text of the Joint Communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, February 25, 1957, pp. 308–309.
7. The Syrian note quoted a statement purportedly made by Israeli Finance Minister Levi Eshkol during a conference of Israeli Ambassadors in Western Europe to the effect that the purpose behind Israeli immigration was to reduce the proportion between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East and that a large number of immigrants were about to enter Israel.
8. No response to the Syrian note has been found.