Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

259. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 30, 1957, 3 p.m.¹

Washington, January 30, 1957, 3 p.m.

SUBJECTS

• 1. Saudi Arabian Friendship for the United States
• 2. Possible Future Arab Cooperation with the West
• 3. Eisenhower Doctrine and the Threat of Communism
• 4. Dhahran Airfield
• 5. Suez Canal
• 6. Soviet Influence in Egypt, Syria, and the Yemen
• 7. Saudi Memoranda on, (a) Subjects to be discussed during the visit; (b) Meeting of Arab heads of state in Cairo

PARTICIPANTS

• Saudi Arabia
  • His Majesty King Saud
  • Prince Musaad
  • Prince Fahad
  • Shaikh Yusuf Yassin
  • Jamal Bey Al-Hussaini
  • Shaikh Muhammad Surur
  • Others
• United States
  • President Eisenhower
  • Secretary Dulles
  • Mr. Hoover
  • Mr. Rountree
  • Ambassador Richards
  • Ambassador Wadsworth
  • Others

The President said that he was honored that His Majesty had come this long distance to meet with him and to discuss problems of mutual concern to Saudi Arabia and the United States. The basis of friendship between the two countries had already been established and this visit afforded the opportunity to exchange views on how we as friends could work together to strengthen the peace. The President asked whether His Majesty had any preliminary statements to make before beginning the discussion. He said he wished to assure His Majesty the conversations they were to have were strictly confidential and nothing would be made public except an agreed joint statement or statements.

His Majesty thanked the President for “his kind words” and said he wished to assure the President he had looked forward with anticipation for a long time to meeting him and members of the American Government. This keenness had been enhanced by recent events.

His Majesty said, first, he wished to assure the President they were true friends, and he wished to preserve that friendship and to make it grow. He was ready to do his utmost to work in this direction.

His Majesty said international developments of the past year were of great moment, and he wished to suggest that problems arising therefrom be reviewed with the aim of finding solutions. The President expressed his agreement.

His Majesty said that a topic of special importance was the consideration of possible areas of cooperation between the Middle East and the West. He reiterated that he was prepared to cooperate with the President to the utmost to help solve this and other problems, the solutions to be based on the principles that are to be brought out in the meetings.

His Majesty had prepared a summary of the goals he and his country were seeking, but he also hoped the President would agree to allow discussion of any subject which either side wished to raise.

His Majesty said he prayed for God’s speed in these talks. Peace-loving peoples everywhere were looking to us in the hope that these meetings would truly contribute to the cause of peace.

The President agreed that each side should feel free to raise any subject it wished. He then asked whether His Majesty would like the Secretary to review certain major problems as seen by the United States, in order to ascertain whether both sides saw the facts in the same light. His Majesty agreed with pleasure.

The Secretary began by saying that the primary concern of the foreign policy of the United States was to assure conditions which would allow the peoples of the world to maintain their full independence, live in peace, and enjoy economic freedom and prosperity. The United States were once a colony, and Americans have not forgotten their efforts to gain freedom and independence. Unfortunately, there were cases of countries who have tried to take away freedom from their own and other peoples. Britain and France were once colonial powers, but their former rule over other peoples has diminished and has now been largely eliminated. However, the greatest danger at present was from international Communism, which started with a conspiracy of a small number of people who were able to take over all Russia and since then have seized control over approximately one third of the peoples of the world.

The doctrine of Communism contradicted every religion in the world and aimed at the destruction of every form of free society. The Communists, once they gained control, were entirely ruthless. The United States believed the Russians were anxious to extend their sphere of control into the Middle East. That was their traditional ambition, and if they succeeded in the Middle East, with its great resources of oil and its position as a strategic cross-roads, Russia would have gained a position of great power.

The present purpose of the United States, as announced in the new program, was to assist countries endangered by the ambitions of the Communists. (The Secretary stated parenthetically that the House had just voted 355–61 in favor of the President’s program.) It was important to have this opportunity to explain to His Majesty and his Counselors the purpose of the new program because it had been largely misrepresented in the Middle East by Communist propaganda.

The Secretary was confident His Majesty could provide very useful information about the program by giving his views, and those of other countries in the Middle Eastern area. At this time he wished only to emphasize that it was not the purpose of the program to extend the power of the United States into the Middle East; rather it was to help insure the independence and economic well-being of those states who expressed their desire for aid from the United States. The Secretary added that another item the advisors and officials of both countries would probably wish to discuss was the continued use of the Dhahran Airfield. This field was useful, but by no means indispensable. It facilitated travel and communications between the West and South and West Asia and it was important as a symbol of our friendly cooperation.

The Secretary said it would also be useful to have an exchange of views on the Suez Canal.² The Canal, as well as the oil pipeline, was very important in the transporting of oil to the markets of Western Europe. The United States believed the Suez Canal should be operated on the principle of full respect for the authority of Egypt; but, as specified in the Canal Convention of 1888,³ the Canal must always remain an international waterway. The United States, furthermore, did not believe Egypt or any other nation should be in a position to stop or otherwise control unilaterally the movement of ships through the Canal, because that would put the nations using the waterway under the control of and at the mercy of those who could close it anytime they wished. If nations could not be assured their ships would move freely through the Canal and their oil supplies were steady and safe, there would be redoubled efforts to develop atomic energy as a substitute for oil. If this were done, it certainly would not be in interests of countries like Saudi Arabia, which depended upon exports of petroleum for economic prosperity. The Secretary stated that there were other matters on the American agenda for discussion in forthcoming meetings, but first he wished to inquire whether His Majesty would like to ask any questions at this point.

His Majesty said he only wanted clarification on the point about control and freedom of the Canal. Did the Secretary mean that it would be sufficient, in the American view, for Egypt to give assurances that the freedom of the Canal would be maintained? The Secretary replied such assurances would be sufficient if they were implemented in such a way that they could be relied upon. The nations using the Canal had to have the confidence that the Canal would always be open to them. The Secretary added he did not mean to imply control of the Canal needed to be taken away from Egypt, but in fact there would have to be conditions giving rise to confidence that shipping through the waterway would not be interfered with.

His Majesty then asked what assurances by Egypt would be acceptable to the nations using the Canal. The Secretary recalled for His Majesty that at the United Nations Security Council meetings in October there was unanimous agreement on six principles governing the operations of the Canal. There was also a private conversation between the Egyptian Foreign Minister and Britain and France, which went a good way toward determining how these principles were to be implemented. The results of this conversation were embodied in a letter dated October 24 written by the UN Secretary-General.⁴ The letter also indicated the two sides were close to agreement on the important aspects of the problem. The Secretary said agreement could be reached within a few days, if the negotiations had not been interrupted by the armed attack on Egypt by Israel and then by Britain and France. The Secretary concluded by saying the Secretary-General’s letter pointed the way toward an acceptable solution to the Canal problem.

His Majesty said it was his understanding that the six principles referred to had been agreed to by Egypt. The Secretary said this was true. Another area of serious concern to the United States was the extent of Soviet Communist influence in certain countries of the area. The increase in Communist influence had been based largely on the supply of arms made available by the USSR to these countries, of which were Egypt, Syria, and lately the Yemen. The Secretary hoped His Majesty would express his views on how Saudi Arabia and the United States could work together to combat this influence.

The President inquired whether His Majesty wished to mention any subjects in addition to the topics the Secretary had brought up. It would be useful to know what these subjects were prior to the actual discussion of them in the formal meetings.

His Majesty said the Secretary had touched on the points Saudi Arabia also considered the most important and which were included on its agenda for the meetings. This similarity in the agendas of the two countries demonstrated the degree of identity of their interests. He expressed the hope and belief it would not be difficult to resolve the points of difference in the views of each side. His Majesty said he had prepared a memorandum⁵ on the main topics which Saudi Arabia wished to table for discussion. In summary, these were: (a) Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia and how to strengthen and consolidate them, (b) Aims for the defense of the country, (c) The Dhahran Airfield Agreement. Saudi Arabia wished the United States to retain the airfield, which formed a continuing link between the two countries. The proof of his desire to have the United States Air Force remain at Dhahran was that he had not raised the question of renewal of the Agreement, although it expired some months ago. (d) His Majesty’s views on the present situation in the Middle East. As the President was well aware, His Majesty was one of the Communists most bitter enemies; he had worked hard and would continue to work hard to bring home to his neighbors the dangers of Communism in their respective countries, (e) His Majesty also wished to give the President a memorandum on the meetings in Cairo (January 18–19) of the Arab heads of states, who had asked him to convey to the President their viewpoints on many of the current problems in the Middle East today and to be their spokesman at these meetings.⁶ (f) There were certain other points, not mentioned in the memorandum on subjects to be discussed, that His Majesty wished to discuss later with the President and the Secretary.

His Majesty said he had sensed from his recent talks with other Arab leaders that they wanted to improve their relations with the United States and with the West as well, but only provided they could be assured the West would treat them fairly. There were undoubtedly hardships to overcome and knots to be unraveled before this could be done, but, according to an Arab proverb, where there was good will it was possible to move mountains.

His Majesty also said he would not wish to leave this meeting without mentioning the Eisenhower Doctrine. He was convinced the Doctrine would greatly benefit the countries of the Middle East but he believed there were many uninformed and illiterate people who did not understand its full implications. His Majesty said he knew it was no secret to the President that the Communists were doing everything they could to throw up barriers between the Middle East and the West, and that ignorant people could easily be deceived by Communists and other extremists. However, once the ideas and motives behind the Doctrine were explained and made clear to the Middle Eastern peoples, all opposition would melt away and everyone would be ready to cooperate with the United States.

The President said he would like to say a word about this program, called the Eisenhower Doctrine, which, he assured His Majesty, he had not named himself. The friendly interest of the United States in the Middle East was one of long standing. It included respect for the great religions that have come from the area and an acute sense of the importance of the area from the point of view of its strategic position and its great resources. The United States had always been sincere in its desire to assist in the advancement of the peoples of the Middle East and in its desire to see the peoples themselves benefit from their own resources and advantages. When the recent difficulties of the British brought to the attention of the United States that Western interests in the Middle East no longer seemed to be receiving adequate attention, this country decided that a new facet of its traditional friendship with the Middle East needed to be developed to meet new conditions. The President assured His Majesty, however, the United States contemplated no action other than what was being discussed today or had already been openly announced.

The President said the new Doctrine recognized two forms of threat. The first was the threat of military force by aggressors, and the second was the threat that resulted from the inability of people to make a living under modern conditions. If people were left in peace they could make their own living with nothing more than friendly technical help from outside. The first tenet of the Doctrine was that the United States wanted to help only those who wished for assistance. For those who asked, the United States was ready to sit down and discuss the problems involved and to work out what to do and how the United States could help. The United States sought no monopoly of economic or military power in the area. We sought only to help people who lived in peace and under their own rulers. The President said he particularly wished to assure His Majesty on this point, and anyone who tried to put a sinister or wicked meaning into the Doctrine was doing a serious disservice to the interests of both the United States and Saudi Arabia.

The President said he understood His Majesty to say that he had a memorandum on the meeting of the heads of the Arab states in Cairo. Would the best procedure be for the American side to study the memoranda prepared by His Majesty and his Counsellors and for the Saudi delegation to study the verbal presentation made at the meeting by the Secretary? His Majesty said there were three memoranda and an English translation of an outline of the memoranda. He wished to point out that the memoranda were not to be considered as final statements of policy but were to serve as points of departure for the coming discussions. The President said he understood perfectly. There was no use having a meeting if the respective positions were already firm. The Good Lord had given us brains to use and not to simply set aside.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 833. Confidential. Prepared in the Department of State. No other drafting information is given on the source text.
2. Documentation on Saudi interest in the Suez Canal Crisis is primarily ibid.,Central File 684A.86.
3. For text of the Convention of Constantinople, see British and Foreign State Papers, 1887–1888, vol. 79, pp. 18–22.
4. For text of Hammarskjöld’s letter to Fawzi, see U.N. doc. S/3728.
5. The memorandum was entitled “Memorandum From King Saud To H.E. President Eisenhower On His Views Concerning Saudi Arabian Relations With The U.S.A. And Affairs Of The Middle East.” It consisted of three primary sections: Saudi-American Relations, Matters Of Interest To The Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia, and General Questions Concerning The Middle East. A copy is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 833.
6. On January 18, Nassar opened meetings in Cairo with King Saud, King Hussein, and Syrian Prime Minister Sabri al-Asali. The Memorandum of the Exchange of Views between the four Arab heads of State dealt with the following subjects: the Cold War; U.S. Objectives in the Area; Schemes In the Arab States; the Economic War; Israel; the Palestine Problem; the Suez Question; Settlement Of Relations With Britain and France; Differentiation between Nationalist and Communist Trends; Legitimate Western Economic Interests; and the Algerian Problem. (Text of the memorandum is ibid.)