Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

253. Telegram From the Consulate General in Dhahran to the Department of State¹

Dhahran, January 6, 1957—6 p.m.

319. From Ambassador Wadsworth. My telegrams 315² and 318³ from Dhahran. Following highlights my audience January 3 with King Saud:

(1) After discussing with King arrangements and schedule his visit to United States⁴ I outlined for him substance Department circular telegram 426.⁵ On economic interdependence His Majesty queried whether Britain and France included in concept and said: “Remember as far as ME relations with west concerned, economic confidence cannot be built up without political confidence”. On Palestine King said: “I wish assure you we carefully studying Palestine question and will not oppose constructive action solve problem soon as it clear proper time has come”.

Re UN force for security King said: “Of course we know if had not been for US, force never would have been established, and Britain and France would never have left canal. This not compliment, this fact”.

(2) Arab relations with Britain and France.

King asserted he not authorized by other Arab states broach question but wished ask “personally, frankly, and privately, how can we restore relations with Britain and France? …⁶ World War II was honorable and open, but look at dastardly way Britain and France chose attack Egypt … what do you think of Britain’s using Israel to launch its attack on us? In spite of most treacherous act of great powers—so mean as to use Israel as “cat’s paw”—I have counseled Egypt, Syria, and Jordan not continue cry out against Britain and France … when fighting, one should fight hard, but when peace comes, one should not exaggerate what has happened … I intend discuss this point with Quwatly and, on my way to US … with Nasser”.

(3) Baghdad Pact.

His Majesty said: “I am convinced … aim of US is to oppose Communism … you have my support and can be sure I will always work against Communism … but regarding Nuri and Britain, am sure they want Arab disunity. After its treacherous act, Britain still chief member of BP … Britain would give Israel anything it wanted … how can we not assume it working for Arab disunity through its membership in BP? … We can never have confidence in BP as long as Britain is member of it … .

“Chief aim my policy is to see that peace, security, and stability applied to whole world and especially to ME … I try keep balance among interests of Arabs. They ask my views because they know I am sincere in keeping my word and not interfering in their affairs … of course some Arab states following policies which I do not consider in their best interests, because now forced to … .

“Any pact or bloc in this area, unless supported by SA, will not succeed, and I will never join anything I think will cause harm to Arabs or bring destruction their homes”.

(4) Defense of SA.

King concluded: I am spending 400 million riyals a year on army which cannot go into action … you cannot have good morale in army unless it has arms … we are under pressure, directly and indirectly, take arms that have been offered (but) I have taken nothing because I gave my word to US … we will train and you must send arms”.⁷

Carrigan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.11/1–657. Secret; Priority.
2. In telegram 315 from Dhahran, January 3, Wadsworth informed the Department that in an audience with Saud on January 3, the King had expressed the hope that the Eisenhower Doctrine would “meet vital area needs” as the Truman Doctrine had done. The Ambassador also conveyed details on the proposed visit of Saud to the United States. (Ibid., 786A.11/1–357) A full memorandum of Wadsworth’s January 3 audience was transmitted in despatch 56 from Dhahran, January 5. (Ibid., 786A.11/ 1–557)
3. In telegram 318 from Dhahran, January 6, Wadsworth noted, inter alia, that he had forwarded the President’s letter of January 3 to Saud. According to the Embassy’s Arab consultant, the letter was read aloud to the King and President Quwaitly of Syria, then visiting Saud. (Ibid., 786A.11/1–657) The letter to Saud highlighted the President’s program for providing economic and military assistance to Middle East nations seeking to resist communism. (The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 250 to Dhahran, January 4; ibid., 684A.86/1–457) According to Wadsworth, the Saudi reaction to Eisenhower’s January 5 speech to Congress followed the general lines of Saud’s initial reaction to the President’s January 3 letter. Although Saud wanted time to study the letter, he expressed “general satisfaction” with the President’s policy, particularly the aspects involving economic and military aid. (Telegram 382 from Jidda, January 15; ibid, 611.80/1–1557)
4. On January 7 a White House press release indicated that King Saud would visit Washington on January 30, 31, and February 1. (Department of State Bulletin, January 28, 1957, p. 135) Documentation concerning details of the Saud visit, including travel arrangements and ceremonies, is in Department of State, Central File 786A.11.
5. Not printed here.
6. All ellipses in this document are in the source text.
7. In telegrams 251 and 285 from Dhahran, November 26 and December 7 respectively, Wadsworth reported the King’s concern over his country’s immediate need for arms. (Department of State, Central Files, 786a.5–MSP/11–2656 and /12–756) On January 5 the Department informed the Embassy in Jidda that the question of emergency arms for Saudi Arabia was under active review and that a message on this topic and on the Dhahran Airfield would be dispatched within the week. (Telegram 470; ibid., 786A.56/1–557)