247. Telegram From the Consulate General in Dhahran to the Department of State1
106. From Ambassador Wadsworth. Department telegrams 1582 and 1773 to Jidda.
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King Saud received me September 11 for 90 minute formal audience with Royal Counselors Yasin and Hussaini in attendance. Followed by half-hour private audience.
Major subject formal audience was extension DAF agreement with brief mention Suez crisis, Saudi-Iraq relations, and Communist threat in Syria (which I shall report in separate telegrams). Private audience was follow-up on DAF discussion.
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Opening formal audience, I said was happy present my government’s reply, especially because it met King’s formula “use my airfield and strengthen my kingdom”. When discussing DAF, however, we believed we should limit ourselves primarily to aviation matters.
[Page 400]I then had Mohamad read in Arabic carefully edited paraphrase USG position and offer set forth Department telegram 158. King interrupted once to clarify that our willingness supply arms was on cash-reimbursable basis; and I to emphasize that our offer of $25 million compares favorably with cost of services extended by US to other nations in area where it enjoys airfield rights and privileges.
At end reading, to which King listened closely, he said: “I wish to speak frankly. I do not see anything really new in this proposal … it gives me nothing to show my people, no justification for accepting.”4
In reply, I argued strongly that our two new proposals were vital contribution towards strengthening kingdom. King replied: “I accept this, but it is not sufficient. I will make … a last offer. It is for you to accept it or not”.
He continued: “If you are desirous of cooperating with us and if you really wish to support your friend, who has been on your side and has supported you, for which there is much evidence, and if you would like to support him with his people and with the world, I will accept extension of DAF agreement for 5 years on this basis—that, besides the $25 million, you furnish me with the $85 million worth of arms as a grant.”
He added, “You have offered Pakistan $300 million and Spain as much. I do not ask equivalent assistance”.
I answered, “As I understand it, any such figure is impossible without a grant military aid agreement”.
King asked, “Why not pay me the money, and I will buy the arms from you?”
I said, “We have grant military aid agreements with Pakistan and Spain, and it is under those agreements that, under our law, we can extend them that much assistance”.
King asked, “Are we not agreed on DAF for 5 years; is that not enough for you to extend us this assistance?”
Perhaps, he added, it could be in field of economic aid. In reply, I insisted on need for aid agreement and urged again substantial character our offer.
King answered, “This is not first meeting at which I have told you I must justify my position …5 if you accept my offer, I shall be glad to carry on our cooperation; if you reject it, we shall part friends”.
I argued further but to little avail and undertook report fully his words, which I shall do by despatch.
[Page 401]King then said there was one important point he wished to clarify. If his offer was rejected, would US-Saudi agreement on supply of arms on cash-reimbursable basis continue in force?
To my reply that I believed it would, King asked, “Does this mean that for our order for $35 million worth of arms you will submit letters of offer?”
I said would be glad to submit question to Washington; we might wish reconsider timing and I asked whether, if answer was in affirmative, King would wish retain MAAG.
King replied, “That is why I inquired”. If answer was “yes”, he would wish MAAG remain.
Final point made by King at formal audience was that his desire continue our cooperation had again been proven by fact that “while DAF agreement has expired, I have not asked you to leave.”
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Opening private audience, King said: “That you should leave Dhahran is neither to your interest nor mine. And that your government should not help me in delicate situation in which I am placed today is also against our common interest. These statements are twins.”
. . . . . . .
He said Egyptians believed that, had USG not acted in Suez crisis, there would have been war, and added: “I, too, believe this and shall always be willing to help where I can. It is in light of all this that agreement between us on DAF is the more important.”
I argued that our air force could not offer more for Dhahran’s relatively limited facilities because this would set wholly unhealthy precedent.
King answered, “I do not ask you to leave; in fact quite the contrary; but I do ask something to justify my position.”
At this point King left for sunset prayers. On his return I said it would be particularly helpful in reporting his views if I could say he accepted statement that our $25 million offer compares favorably with cost of services extended other nations in area where we enjoy airfield privileges. If this was clearly recognized, I could more effectively present his plea for “justification” as being on higher political plane than quid pro quo for extension DAF agreement.
King replied he had no hesitation concurring our offer was eminently fair; question of justification, however, was quite another matter, although of necessity two were interdependent.
I persisted: “Then we are in full accord on the $25 million figure as such? We agree that fair price for the carpet is 25 guineas?” King replied, “exactly”.
[Page 402]I said, “it will remain, therefore, only for my government to consider whether it can meet your Majesty’s need for justification.” Again he concurred and again stressed high common interest in our meeting his offer.
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- Am airmailing from Dhahran today despatch enclosing memorandum of private audience;6 complete record after return Jidda tomorrow.7
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/9–1356. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London.↩
- Supra.↩
- See footnote 3, supra.↩
- Ellipses in this and the next paragraph are in the source text.↩
- Ellipsis in the source text.↩
- Despatch 29 from Dhahran, September 13, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/9–1356)↩
- Despatch 66 from Jidda, September 18, not printed. (Ibid., 711.56386A/9–1856)↩