241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia1
25. Jidda’s 575.2 Department desires you convey following orally to King:
Record of initial talks with King, Prince Faisal, Royal Counselors, re Dhahran has been thoroughly considered at highest levels Departments State and Defense. In spirit close friendship which has characterized relationship our two countries, we desire convey frankly to King USG reactions these preliminary talks.
President’s letter and proposal which represented concerted effort on part USG to assist in strengthening His Majesty and His Majesty’s Kingdom seemed rather quickly laid aside. In place Five Year Plan which had been basis our proposal, new two-division plan appears which on basis preliminary review in Washington appears ambitious and perhaps beyond current Saudi capability.
As regards His Majesty’s reference to recently developed pressures against renewal of DAF agreement, we, too, are disturbed by this development. Although it is first indication of local opposition to DAF to come to our notice in 11 years our presence, we have no desire to continue the operation of DAF in unfriendly atmosphere. We are at loss understand this local opposition in view substantial [Page 390] benefits which Saudi Arabia and especially people Eastern Province have received from DAF in increased trade, international air traffic, and training Saudi Arabians in both civil and military aviation techniques. Nevertheless, in view seriousness with which King regards opposition, we must accept evaluation.
We are concerned, also, over His Majesty’s statement re pressures from Soviet Union and from Egypt and the difficulties which His Majesty faces in resisting them. While motivations behind some of such pressures may undoubtedly be honest, other influences operating in insidious ways, utilize good will for purposes detrimental to Kingdom and its future. Once such forces are able move unchallenged, they can carry all before them. Pressures which would move His Majesty from positions he himself considers right can only threaten orderly development Saudi Arabia.
Immediate matter USG concern is Dhahran Airfield Agreement. While we appreciate privileges enjoyed to our mutual benefit, our principal thought is effect action we take regarding Dhahran may have on our broader relationship with Saudi Arabia. Our presence at Dhahran has been, for eleven years, symbol of spirit of cooperation and common interest. Those who would benefit by removal this symbol represent, in our mind, forces inimical to Saudi Arabia.
US-Saudi cooperation at Dhahran has been on basis mutual benefit. When, in minds Saudi Arabia, our presence no longer desired, US would not wish remain. Further, if our presence can only be justified by substantial financial assistance, question arises whether we should be there at all.
Real justification our presence would appear best found in terms continued value our common effort in development and strengthening Saudi Arabia and defense of principles which we share in common.
During DAF negotiations in recent years various suggestions have been discussed. At one time question of longer term arrangements (on which there was tacit agreement) was explored. On another, we examined questions of grant aid, increased rights for US at DAF, and rent. Currently there has been study of formula which provides $250,000,000 in grant aid for purchase of arms. On review we find this suggestion out of question in view US overall policies and actual rights enjoyed at Dhahran.
Our planners remain convinced five-year plan represents program armed forces development within realm possibility in terms current Saudi Arabian ability provide trained manpower and absorb new equipment. Speeded up program which was given preliminary review in Washington might well result in excessive expenditures for support and maintenance unutilizable equipment and wastage which King does not wish. (In this connection you may wish present to [Page 391] King actual indications over-ambitious planning such as combat readiness B–26s, difficulty finding pilot material, diversion pilot trainees to other fields, etc.)
We have King’s assurance he wishes us remain Dhahran. Our presence will continue to be mutually advantageous, however, only by adoption realistic attitude on both our parts. We would hope King would suggest continuance discussions and that such discussions could be resumed with Royal Counselors by re-examination US proposals. (FYI. You might in this connection again stress benefits given Saudi Arabia over past five years as enumerated Section II, CA–8034.3 End FYI)
Discussion already initiated with Minister of Defense might be continued to consider all various current plans for development Saudi armed forces, including five-regiment plan, thirteen-regiment plan, and two-division plan. We believe it vital in order avoid future misunderstandings and place our relationship in this field on sound basis that there be actual agreement on list of arms for which US willing receive orders during next few years. Monetary and force goal estimates subject varying interpretations. (FYI In this connection we assume figure of $180,000,000 you mentioned to King represented cost $82,500,000 in equipment listed Annex B, CA–8034, plus shipping costs, spare parts, and ammunition over five year period. King and Counselors should, at proper stage, clearly understand exactly what this figure includes. End FYI)
In order reach proper understanding on what US can provide, US willing assign military experts work on urgent basis with Saudis to draft procurement plan for consideration both governments, based on US ability provide and attainable Saudi force goals. Meanwhile letters of offer ready to be submitted on large Saudi ground force order and priorities established. Early agreement in Saudi interest since neither letters of offer nor priorities will remain valid indefinitely.
(FYI Meanwhile, USG has under active consideration suggestions we are willing discuss with Royal Counselors in event resumption discussions on foregoing basis. Once we have King’s reaction foregoing and, perhaps, his proposal for additional extension, we are prepared forward detailed proposals. End FYI)4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/6–2056. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Allen, Newsom, and Wilkins and approved and signed by Dulles. Cleared in substance by Gray and in draft by Bennett and Barnes. Repeated to Dhahran and CINCUSAFE, Wiesbaden. On July 5, in a memorandum sent through Hoover to Dulles, Allen noted that after a meeting with Department of Defense officials on July 2, it was agreed to drop the idea of a Presidential approach at that time in favor of having Wadsworth make a similar approach to the King. The Department of Defense, Allen continued, was considering “on an urgent basis” the necessity of retaining rights at Dhahran and the possibility of concessions. Allen forwarded the proposed telegram for the Secretary’s approval. A notation on the memorandum indicated that the telegram was signed on July 10, “subject to certain clarifications prior to transmission.” (Ibid., 711.56386A/7–556)↩
- See footnote 2, Document 239.↩
- Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751.56386A/4–1356)↩
- On July 14, Wadsworth notified the Department that he was having Mohammed Massoud convey a short message to King Saud through Yusuf Yasin. The message stated that Wadsworth had received new instructions regarding the Dhahran Agreement, but that there was no need to trouble the King until after the Haj. The message also informed the King that the instructions reiterated the U.S. desire to contribute toward strengthening his kingdom, that they rejected the Riyadh formula, and that they proposed the desirability of holding further technical discussions. (Telegram 22 from Jidda; ibid., 711.56386A/7–1456) On July 17, the Department informed Wadsworth of its concern that his brief message to the King did not express the “full tone and implications” of telegram 25. The Department instructed the Ambassador to prepare a memorandum of the U.S. message to be transmitted to the King prior to the Ambassador’s next audience. The Department also added that telegram 25 represented a “firm realistic appraisal” of the U.S. approach to the Dhahran Airfield, noting that there was no reason to expect that it would change in the months ahead. (Telegram 40 to Jidda; ibid.)↩