Office of the Historian

233. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State1

Washington, May 21, 1956.

SUBJECT

  • Possible Visit of King Saud to the United States

Discussion:

NEA has previously indicated that, at an appropriate time, during or following the renegotiation of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement we might wish to invite King Saud to visit the United States. Ambassador Wadsworth confirms other reports we have received of the King’s keen interest in receiving such an invitation.

We envision that such an invitation would come in the context of a successful conclusion of the negotiations which are about to commence. The dates of the actual visit could be arranged to fit the convenience of the President and the King, probably in 1957.

Ambassador Wadsworth mentioned the possibility of such a visit to the President when he saw him on May 9 and urged that favorable decision at this time might well assist him in his negotiations, [Page 375] particularly if full accord could not be reached before June 18 when the present agreement expires. The President’s reply, while in no sense a commitment, was to the effect that the suggestion had “good points”.

We have, therefore, prepared the attached memorandum2 to the President, suggesting that, if the President concurs, Ambassador Wadsworth be authorized at an appropriate stage in the negotiations of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement, to tell the King that the United States Government would be pleased if, upon the conclusion of the new agreement, Saudi and American ties could be further strengthened by a state visit by His Majesty to the United States.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached memorandum to the President.3

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.11/5–2156. Secret. Drafted by Newsom on May 18.↩
  2. The memorandum to the President recommended, among other things, that upon successful conclusion of the Dhahran Airfield agreement, the United States could further strengthen its relations with Saudi Arabia by inviting King Saud to this country in 1957. The memorandum also pointed out that although Saud had visited the United States in 1946 while Crown Prince, he would, if invited, be the first reigning Saudi leader to pay a state visit.↩
  3. A notation on the source text by Macomber indicates that Dulles disapproved the memorandum. An additional marginal notation, presumably by Macomber, reads as follows: “Will play too early. Domestic implication Jewish [friends?]”.↩