Office of the Historian

223. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 10, 19561

Washington, April 10, 1956

SUBJECT

  • Renegotiation of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement

PARTICIPANTS

  • Defense
    • Gen. Alonzo P. Fox, Military Adviser to Secretary Gray
    • Mr. Charles A. Sullivan, Director, Office of Special International Affairs,
    • OSD
    • Mr. James Wilson, Chief, Foreign Military Rights Affairs, OSD
    • Mr. William Lang, Office, General Counsel, OSD
    • Col. Philip Shepley, Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern, South Asian
    • and African Affairs, OSD
    • Maj. Edwin B. Owen, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, OSD
    • Mr. Leighton Cain, Office of Program and Control, OSD
    • Col. Fred Field, Director, Foreign Military Rights, G–3, Army
    • Comdr. Richard Markham, Office of Political–Military Affairs, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
  • Air Force
    • Gen. Richard King, Chief, Policy Division, and Directorate of Plans
    • Maj. James Martin, Foreign Military Rights
    • Gen. O’Keefe, newly appointed Commanding General of Dhahran Airfield
    • Dr. Delavan Evans, International Branch, Policy Division
    • Mr. William Hancock, Office of the Air Force General Counsel
  • State
    • Ambassador George Wadsworth
    • Mr. David D. Newsom, NE

Ambassador Wadsworth said that, in approaching the renegotiation of the Dhahran Airfield, it was necessary to appreciate how King Saud, himself, and the other Saudi Arabs regarded the field.2 It is their airfield and, unless a satisfactory new arrangement can be worked out before June 18, they will take it over. He said they had the men to operate the civil airport and that the acquisition of the very fine facilities which the Air Force has constructed will make it unnecessary for them to build their own facilities.

In their eyes, he said, the airfield is now worth $50 million. We gave so much, he said, for an airfield in 1951 worth $10 million, they believe we should pay much more for one worth $50 million. The fact, he said, that we built the additional $40 million worth of installation is immaterial to them.

[Page 360]

But for one thing, the Ambassador said, it would probably be most difficult to obtain an extension of the rights at Dhahran; King Saud, however, needs the help of a strong power because of his dispute with the British over Buraimi and his other frontier areas. He, therefore, feels a necessity of continuing his close cooperation with the United States. He appreciates what the United States has done to date in the Buraimi matter.

If the United States is to retain the rights at Dhahran, therefore, the Ambassador said, it must first do the same four things which it agreed to do in 1951. These are:

1.
To operate the civil airport
2.
To train Saudis in airport operations
3.
To provide a military mission, and
4.
To sell arms.3

The Ambassador said that he believed we should offer to Saudi Arabia our firm commitment to sell the arms required by the Five Year Plan, which had been worked out with United States and Saudi Arabian military personnel in Saudi Arabia and which he, personally, had reduced to its present form. He said this would entail the sale of approximately $70 million on phased basis over the next five years.

In addition, the United States must do something more and he suggested, first, that the United States build a terminal for the airport at Dhahran which would surpass those of Beirut and other cities of the area. The Ambassador pointed out that, if Dhahran is to become an international airport of importance in the jet age, it must have a decent terminal. The Ambassador then suggested that, in addition, we might give to Saudi Arabia T–33 jet training air craft, six C–119 aircraft and 18 M–47 tanks.

The Ambassador said he appreciated that his suggestions would raise problems which he hoped to be able to discuss during his period of consultation. It was arranged that officials of the Department [Page 361] of Defense would review his version of the Saudi Arabian Five Year Plan and would confer subsequently with him on this matter.

  1. Source: Department of State, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 70 D 148, DAF Negotiations 1956. Secret. Drafted by Newsom on April 12.↩
  2. Wadsworth arrived in Washington on April 6 for consultation on the Dhahran Airfield and other matters.↩
  3. On April 23, in a memorandum to Hoover regarding the proposed reply of the President to Saud’s letter of April 3 and the Dhahran negotiations, Assistant Secretary Allen indicated that any reply to Saud “should indicate a willingness to supply arms if we are to achieve our objectives in Saudi Arabia. We believe some specific assurances at the time of the renegotiation of the Dhahran Air Field agreement are necessary if we are to enter into the negotiations with a reasonable prospect of success.” (Department of State, Central Files, 786A.5–MSP/4–2356) Later that day, during a phone conversation with the President on the question of arms sales to Israel, Hoover noted, in part, that the United States would soon be involved in negotiations for the Dhahran Airfield, and that “then we will have to sell to the Saudis.” According to the transcript of the conversation, Hoover wondered how “we can do that without getting into trouble with our Israeli friends.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries, Telephone Conversations)↩