221. Editorial Note
On March 31, Rountree informed Dulles and Hoover that in a discussion of Near East policy with MacArthur, he had raised the problem of Saudi Arabia with the following recommendation:
“e. Regarding Saudi Arabia, we have asked Ambassador Wadsworth to return in early April for consultation. By then we must have definitive ideas as to what arms can now be offered to Saudi Arabia and what assurances can be given regarding other Saudi arms requests. We must develop instructions to Ambassador Wadsworth relating to his conversations with the King following his return to Saudi Arabia. These instructions would be consistent with our efforts:
“(1) to reassure King Saud of US willingness to work with him; (2) to make him feel that we look upon him as leader of the Arab world and therefore count heavily upon him to influence policies in the Arab world which would prevent Soviet infiltration and ultimate domination of the Arab states; (3) to endeavor discreetly to cause him to recognize the dangers of too close association with Egypt and Nasser; (4) to reassure him (assuming that we will have some success with the British in this connection) of our confidence that a satisfactory solution can be reached upon the Buraimi issue; (5) to elicit his help in preventing Yemen infiltration by the Soviets as a result of Yemeni purchases of Soviet arms.” (Memorandum from Rountree to Dulles and Hoover, March 31; Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—memos, etc. from March 24, 1956 to April 23, 1956)
On April 1, Dulles, Hoover, and MacArthur met with Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador, and Ronald W. Bailey of the British Embassy at the Secretary’s home. After discussion of Anglo–American cooperation in the Middle East and the upcoming visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to London, Dulles turned to the problem of Saudi Arabia:
“The third point the Secretary said he wished to stress was our belief that the key to any constructive program in the area involved the winning away of the Saudi Arabians from their present alignment with Egypt. We believed that it might be possible to win King Saud away from Nasser, and Saud could give important anti–Communist leadership in the Arab world, which was important. However, we believed the winning away of the Saudis from Egypt depended on the UK reaching an accommodation with the Saudis on Buraimi. A settlement of the Buraimi issue was of vital importance, and if an immediate settlement could not be achieved, it might be possible for the UK and the Saudis to agree to some form of indefinite postponement of final decision on the Buraimi matter. The Secretary said he had stressed the importance of a UK–Saudi settlement on Buraimi…. The Secretary said we had reason to believe [Page 352] that King Saud had some concern over the general philosophy of Nasser and his revolutionary group. Also, King Saud was in a position to exercise religious influence in the area. All these elements might be marshalled and used…. We believed it would be extremely difficult to counter the combined Nasser–Saud alignment, and therefore in our view Saudi Arabia represented the key.” (Memorandum of conversation by MacArthur, April 1; ibid., Omega Rountree (for NATO meeting May ’56))