Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

218. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)¹

Washington, March 3, 1956.

Dear Mr. Murphy: Your letter of August 18, 1955² requested the views of this Department on the continued use of Dhahran Airfield in Saudi Arabia. This request was referred for comment to the Air Force, which in turn submitted the question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views.

The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were furnished to Mr. Hoover by this office on an informal basis in January pending receipt of final Air Force views. (For your convenience an additional copy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum is inclosed.³) The subject has also been discussed recently with representatives of the Department of State in connection with the temporary suspension of arms shipments to Saudi Arabia.

Both the Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it important that the Dhahran Airfield be retained, pointing out that if we were forced to relinquish Dhahran comparable facilities would be required in the same general area to meet U.S. military requirements. They would not be prepared, however, to meet exorbitant Saudi demands in return for Dhahran’s retention. While some improvement in the present Dhahran agreement is desirable, as noted in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Air Force recognize that we may have to be content with maintaining the current arrangements at the Airfield. This Department concurs in these views.

The major problem presented is the quid pro quo to assure the improvement or retention of U.S. rights at Dhahran. This Department has considered the matter in terms of the possibility of continuing current military assistance to the Saudi Arabian Government, with the object of offering the minimum necessary to secure the extension of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement. It is considered that the initial offer should be a continuation of military aid on a reimbursable basis, suggesting, however, the curtailment of activities of the training mission as indicated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The crucial question presented is the extent to which we can make matériel and equipment available on a reimbursable basis to meet such Saudi desires as may emerge during the forthcoming negotiations.

Preliminary analysis of the current Saudi Arabian so–called “five year” or “five phase” plan for the expansion of its armed forces indicates that during the first phase of this buildup the majority of the items requested can be made available, provided the Saudi Arabian Government does not insist on special concessions as to price and delivery times. This Department is prepared to recommend that the Saudi Arabian Government be so informed.

It is recognized on the other hand that acceptance of a commitment to provide the matériel and equipment included in the first phase of the Saudi Arabian plan must be integrated from the political standpoint with the overall U.S. policy regarding arms shipments to the Middle East. This will of course require extensive examination by the Department of State and where appropriate by the other government agencies concerned.

If it should develop during the course of negotiations that the Saudi Arabian Government will require more than U.S. matériel and equipment on a reimbursable basis (for example, a Saudi demand for grant military assistance), this Department would be prepared to examine such request, but can make no commitments without detailed study of specific Saudi proposals. The following observations, however, are offered for your interim consideration:

1. One possible measure of the upper limit of grant assistance might be the extent of the present U.S. investment in Dhahran itself. The Air Force has spent approximately $50 million on fixed installations there, and these would become the property of the Saudi Arabian Government in the event of the withdrawal of U.S. forces. In addition, the Air Force has imported into Saudi Arabia approximately $10.5 million worth of movable property, some of which could not be removed economically. The Army and Air Force together have provided Saudi Arabia each year with approximately $1 million in goods and services, most of which is incidental to the U.S. military training program for the Saudi Arabian armed forces. This investment would have to be written off if the U.S. forces were required to give up Dhahran.

2. In the event we should be forced to seek an alternate location for the military facilities now located in Dhahran it is probable that some form of U.S. military or economic assistance would be demanded by the country concerned in return for the grant of necessary new facilities and operating rights. This, coupled with the loss of valuable time in establishing new facilities, must also enter into any calculation of the price we might be willing to pay for the retention of Dhahran. In this connection, the views of the Department of State on the political feasibility of possible movement to other countries in the Middle East would be appreciated.

3. There are other related measures, short of grant assistance which might be offered as a further quid pro quo to reimbursable aid and which are within present U.S. military capabilities.

a. The Air Force is responsible for discharging the U.S. commitment under the 1951 Air Base Agreement to train Saudi nationals in airport administration and to organize the Dhahran Airport technical administration. We are prepared to review this program and expand it in accordance with the capacity of the Saudi Airport administration to provide and use qualified personnel and to adopt improved methods.

b. Inasmuch as the Air Force construction program at Dhahran is now complete, the Department of Defense might be prepared to participate in a modest program for the construction of airfield facilities which would be useful to both the Saudis and the United States. This might take the form of a joint U.S.-Saudi Arabian program for the construction of such facilities as a terminal building and improved accommodations for Saudi military personnel living at the Airfield.

c. Under the 1951 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement the United States has sent an Army–Air Force training mission to Saudi Arabia to provide military training and advice for the Saudi armed forces. If necessary, this Department is prepared to review the objectives and compositions of this program, and, subject to the availability of funds, to expand it to an extent consistent with the U.S. objectives in the Middle East. The measure of such expansion would of course require further study by the military services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. Saudi Arabian plans for the expansion of its air force might call for military air operations at Dhahran. While the Department of Defense would wish to review most carefully any proposals for increased Saudi use of any of the air base facilities, we are prepared, if additional facilities are required, to accommodate Saudi operations within the limits imposed by Air Force operational requirements and subject to the availability of funds. In considering Saudi proposals for the joint use of the Airfield, it should be borne in mind that in addition to current operations, which include rotational training, the Air Force has a requirement to station an air defense unit at Dhahran, together with supporting facilities in adjacent areas.

4. It has been suggested from time to time that Saudi Arabia might request an annual cash payment, perhaps camouflaged under the heading of “economic aid”, in return for continued U.S. use of Dhahran Airfield. The Department of Defense is not prepared to seek funds for such payment. In this connection it will be recalled that it was only because of unusual circumstances that the Department of the Air Force undertook to seek funds for an annual cash payment to Libya for the duration of the Wheelus Field Agreement. The Libyan payment arrangement was approved with reluctance by the interested Congressional Committees and only on the understanding that it would not be a precedent for cash subsidies to other countries in which we receive military rights.

It should be noted finally that in the event Saudi Arabia refuses to extend the Dhahran Airfield Agreement on acceptable terms, the Air Force will require approximately nine months from the time a decision to leave Dhahran was made in order to remove personnel and removable property from the base.

In view of the shortage of time available in which to accomplish the renewal of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement, it is suggested negotiating instructions be dispatched as soon as it is possible. While representatives of our respective Departments are already engaged in working level discussions aimed at producing appropriate instructions, the views of the Department of State would nevertheless be appreciated as a matter of priority on the considerations raised above.⁴

Sincerely yours,

Gordon Gray

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/3–356. Top Secret.
2. See footnote 5, Document 174.
3. Not found attached. A memorandum of January 27 from Gray to Hoover enclosed a copy of an appendix entitled “Military Guidance to be Used in Formulating a U.S. Position for the Forthcoming Negotiations with Saudi Arabia Concerning Dhahran Airfield.” (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386a/1–2756)
4. On May 1, responding to Gray’s letter, Murphy noted that the Department had reviewed the considerations in the March 3 letter and substantially incorporated them into the instructions for the renegotiation of the Dhahran Airfield. Murphy indicated that while it was expected that negotiations would be difficult, the Department felt it should make a strong effort to retain the U.S. rights and position. As to alternative base rights, Murphy added, preliminary study had not indicated that such rights could be easily obtained in any suitable neighboring country. (Ibid., 711.56386A/3–356)