Office of the Historian

212. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 30, 1956, 2:15–4 p.m.1

ETW MC–1
Washington, January 30, 1956, 2:15–4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • US
    • The Secretary
    • Under Secretary Hoover
    • Ambassador Aldrich
    • Mr. Merchant
    • Mr. MacArthur
    • Mr. Bowie
    • Mr. Allen
    • Mr. Rountree
    • Mr. Hagerty
    • Mr. Cottman
  • UK
    • Prime Minister Eden
    • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
    • Ambassador Makins
    • Sir Harold Caccia
    • Sir Leslie Rowan
    • Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh
    • Mr. Ian Samuel
    • Mr. Willie Morris

[Here follows discussion of press arrangements during Eden’s visit; the draft of a declaration to be issued at the conclusion of the talks; European integration; and the Arab–Israeli Conflict.]

[Page 328]

Saudi Arabia and Buraimi Dispute

Turning to Saudi Arabia, Mr. Lloyd said the expenditure of Saudi money for bribery throughout the Middle East made things extremely difficult for the West. Egypt provided to the area “school masters” and other intellectuals who undermined the Western position, with the Saudis providing the money. He thought extraordinary the Saudi action of working against the Western position and in giving comfort to the communists since, if communism should take over in the area, the Saudi regime would be the first to go.

The Secretary said the United States had a very large stake in Saudi Arabia—the Western stake in the Middle East as a whole was enormous, but the United States was particularly interested in Saudi Arabia. There were massive oil resources which were extremely important, and we also had an air base under an agreement scheduled to expire this year. The United States did not want to be put in a position where those interests might be lost. He had hoped the British Government would agree to renewal of arbitration of the Buraimi dispute to avoid having this issue seriously endanger the Western position generally in the Middle East and in Saudi Arabia in particular.

Mr. Eden said this was a big matter for the United Kingdom. The whole position of the British in the Persian Gulf was at stake. Excluding Saudi Arabia, the Americans held almost an equal interest with the British in Persian Gulf oil operations. That interest understandably was important to the United States, but it was vital to the very existence of the United Kingdom. In the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms, the basis for the British position was a series of treaties with the local rulers. If the British should weaken in the present dispute with Saudi Arabia and yield the position of the Sheikhdoms, the resulting situation would be untenable. Thus, the British could not give way. They had suggested a settlement be based on the so–called Riad line (identified on the map) and had proposed to discuss that suggestion with the Saudi Arabs. The British would be prepared to make minor adjustments of that line, but that that was as far as they were prepared to go.

The Secretary suggested, and it was agreed, that discussion of the Buraimi dispute be deferred until the President joined the meeting.

[Here follows discussion of the Baghdad Pact, Iran, Iraq, Syria (see Document 321), and Jordan (see Document 16).]

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Drafted on February 7. No other drafting information is given on the source text. Prime Minister Eden visited Washington January 30–February 3.↩