209. Message From British Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles1
Mr. Shuckburgh has informed me of his discussions with the State Department. I am glad to hear that on so many aspects of the Middle East problem there is general agreement between us and that it is really only in regard to Saudi Arabia and Buraimi that real differences exist.
I have seen the memorandum handed to Mr. Shuckburgh by Mr. Hoover on January 19. I quite understand the difficulty which this question presents for you in view of the important American stake in Saudi Arabia. They certainly are not easy people to handle. At the same time I must tell you that the stakes for us are even more vital and that we cannot afford to lose. Our position in the Persian Gulf States depends upon the confidence of the Rulers and [Page 323] people in our ability to protect their interests. Any sign that we were going to let the Saudis back into Buraimi would be fatal to that position. We have to remember that thirty per cent of the Middle East oil, upon which our economy so entirely depends, lies under the Persian Gulf States with which we have special relations. The proportion will be much higher if substantial deposits are found in Muscat. We must at all costs retain control of this oil. It might make the whole difference to our national survival particularly if for any reason the larger oil–bearing states were to go wrong.
We are satisfied that return to arbitration in any form is unacceptable. Not only would it be regarded throughout the area as surrender to Saudi Arabia, but Saudi bribery has so perverted the loyalty of the tribes that the wisest and most impartial arbitrator would find it impossible to ascertain the true position. The Buraimi Oasis as you know is not contiguous to Saudi occupied territory; it is 400 miles away, beyond impassable deserts, and lies within the most sensitive point of junction between Abu Dhabi and Muscat. It has no oil. Its only value to Saudi Arabia is as a base from which to suborn and penetrate those states. Already they had begun this process under cover of the previous arbitration agreement, as can be seen from their activities in Oman. The present position therefore, though it may be wounding to King Saud’s pride in that it marks the failure of his expansionist policy, represents no threat to Saudi Arabian security or to her interests.
If the Saudis take the matter to the Security Council we shall fight any resolution proposing arbitration. I hope we shall have your support and am confident that we can defeat any unacceptable resolution. At the same time I am very conscious of the difficulty this will cause you and I have been considering whether there is anything I can say now which would help to dissuade the Saudis from going to the Security Council. We are ready for direct talks with the Saudis without prior conditions at any time. In the course of such talks we would be willing to give King Saud the fullest assurances about our friendly intentions towards Saudi Arabia (i.e. we would deny the various suspicions he is alleged to entertain about our intention to build up a federation of peripheral states against Saudi Arabia or to encourage claimants to his territories). We could also discuss possible minor rectifications of the frontiers we have declared, and we are open to suggestions about the future of the tribesmen who left Buraimi after its occupation by us. Do you think that it would help if you were to inform the Saudi Arabian Government of the above? If so, I gladly agree to your doing so. Needless to say the main obstacle to direct discussions with the Saudis at present is their refusal to receive Her Majesty’s Ambassador. [Page 324] I would be willing to send him straight back to Jedda if I could receive assurances that he will be received by the King.2
- Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK officials corres. with Secy. Dulles/Herter 7/54 thru 3/57 Vol. I incoming. Top Secret. Ambassador Makins conveyed the message to the Department on January 23. A notation on Makins’ covering letter indicated that it was shown to the Secretary that day. An additional chit, dated February 1, from H.G. Appling of the Executive Secretariat, indicated that Allen and MacArthur agreed that no action was required beyond discussion with Eden. (Ibid.)↩
- The source text is not signed.↩