Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

207. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 19, 1956¹

Washington, January 19, 1956

SUBJECT

• Visit of Mr. Shuckburgh regarding Recent Talks

PARTICIPANTS

• Great Britain
  • Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh
  • Sir Roger Makins
  • Mr. Ian Samuel
• United States
  • Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr.
  • Mr. William M. Rountree
  • Mr. Fraser Wilkins

Following the conclusion of the talks between Mr. Shuckburgh and his colleagues with Mr. Allen and other officials of the Department, Mr. Shuckburgh called on Mr. Hoover this afternoon.² General aspects of the recent talks were discussed. It was noted that there had been a wide area of agreement on various issues and the United Kingdom and the United States had disagreed only with respect to the issues centering upon the Buraimi case. In this instance, as Mr. Hoover noted, the United States and the United Kingdom had agreed to disagree.

Mr. Hoover said that a memorandum had been prepared incorporating our current views on the latter point which he proposed to hand to Mr. Shuckburgh. Mr. Hoover read this memorandum (copy attached). Mr. Shuckburgh expressed thanks for this information which had previously been conveyed to him orally and, in response, suggested that Sir Roger might wish to give Mr. Hoover a copy of Mr. Shuckburgh’s memorandum to Sir Roger. Sir Roger did so noting that it was an internal document and had not been prepared for submission to the United States Government.³

Mr. Hoover said he did not wish to go into the substance of the case since it had already been discussed but he would like to make one or two comments. He hoped that an early solution of the Buraimi issue would make it possible for the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia to settle their differences. Under such circumstances both the United States and the United Kingdom would be in a better position to persuade Saudi Arabia to devote its great income to worthwhile social and economic projects within Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Hoover noted further that the Saudi Arabian officials were deeply concerned regarding the threat which they believed the Hashemites in Iraq and Jordan posed for them. The Saudi Arabian officials also continued to harbor strong feelings with respect to the establishment of Israel. It therefore seemed desirable, to the extent possible, to make clear to the Saudi Arabian Government that the Hashemites were not being encouraged to move against the Saudis and to make progress toward a settlement between the Arab states and Israel.

Mr. Shuckburgh said that he had been giving thought to ways in which the British might reassure the Saudis with respect to the Hashemite House in Iraq and Jordan. Mr. Rountree thought that in order to have the greatest effect with respect to the Buraimi dispute, any reassurances regarding the Hashemites should be related to the Buraimi issue itself. In general conversation on this subject, it was noted that it would be more important for the Hashemites themselves to reassure the Saudis than for the British to do so on their behalf.

Mr. Shuckburgh also said that he wondered whether the Saudis might not find an economic and financial adviser from overseas useful to them in making plans for the expenditure of their increasing revenues from oil production. In general discussion on this subject, Mr. Hoover observed that Saudi acceptance of advice in this field would probably come slowly. The situation was evolutionary and suggestions would prove more acceptable if put forward over a period of time.

Mr. Hoover believed that the present moment was one of decision for the Saudi Arabs. He believed that the Saudi Arabs were reaching a crossroads in their relations with the United Kingdom and, in general, in their relations with the United States and other Western countries. It would soon be necessary for them to decide whether to raise the Buraimi issue in the Security Council. Once the issue was raised in the Security Council, a Pandora’s Box would be opened. The Saudi Arabs, through bitterness, would dwell at length on their difficulties. The British themselves would be forced to reply. The Russians might be expected to take full advantage of this public forum and of the charge and counter–charge to their own advantage. It was for these and other reasons that Mr. Hoover hoped that the United Kingdom might be able to find some solution to the Buraimi question which would be acceptable to them and to the Saudi Arabs.

Mr. Shuckburgh said that he was returning to London the following afternoon but would be coming back to the United States by sea. He would be discussing this question with the Prime Minister and had no doubt the latter would wish to go into it with President Eisenhower toward the end of this month.

[Attachment]

⁴

MEMORANDUM

Mr. Allen has informed me of your presentation of the British position on the problem of the Buraimi oasis. I know that the Department has found your exposition and the discussions which followed most helpful in adding to our information and understanding.

Our concern in this dispute is essentially the preservation of the Western position in the area, including the assurance of continued Western access to the oil of the region. Our mutual position and our joint access to the resources of the area can most effectively be preserved by recognizing the challenges to the West and to traditional control in the area and reducing to a minimum through agreed settlements the conflict between Western nations and the states of the region.

As a friend to both parties we believe the continuation of tension between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia threatens the stability of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula and creates difficulties for the settlement of other disputes.

Consideration of the Buraimi case in the Security Council will provide an unfortunate opportunity to the Soviet Union and other elements unfriendly to the West to exploit the situation for their own ends. Unless the Saudi Arabs see some alternative, such as direct talks with the United Kingdom, we do not believe Saudi Arabia will any longer refrain from asking the Security Council to consider the Buraimi problem. If the question should arise in the Security Council, the United States position would necessarily be determined largely by the developments in the Council and the facts then presented. It is, however, difficult to see how the United States could oppose a resolution incorporating the principles of peaceful settlement through some form of arbitration or negotiation and it would be in a very difficult position if it were to appear to support a U.K. position which offered no alternative course for settling the dispute.

We have noted reports of Saudi Arabian activity indicated in the documents presented to us by your representatives. We certainly do not condone activities of this character. In view of the political implications of the problem, however, and in view of traditional practices in the area, we doubt that these documents would represent an effective argument for world opinion against a return to arbitration or negotiation with the addition of appropriate safeguards.

We acknowledge the threat to our mutual position by Saudi Arabian activities in other parts of the Arab world. We do not believe Saudi Arabia is irrevocably committed to an anti–Western position. We believe that, following a solution of the Buraimi issue and some solution to the Arab–Israeli question, Saudi Arabia might be persuaded to reorient its current anti–Western policies and activities. Saudi Arabian reaction to any efforts to curtail payments to them by commercial companies, even if this should be possible, would, in our opinion, further aggravate the situation.

We understand the problems confronting the United Kingdom in this matter and your reasons for opposing a return to arbitration. We hope, however, that, on the basis of the discussions here in Washington, you may be able to recommend to your Government that every effort be made to find a practicable alternative method of settlement to Security Council consideration.

Alternative methods might include one or more of the following and perhaps others: resumption of arbitration under neutral supervision with a terminal date on evidence, direct talks, mediation, referral to the International Court of Justice and direct negotiations between King Saud and the local rulers.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/1–1956. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins.
2. On January 19 British Foreign Office and Department of State officials held a final meeting in which they reviewed the progress of their earlier talks. Discussion ranged from the prospects of Saudi Arabia submitting the Buraimi issue to the Security Council, to the British refusal to resume arbitration, to the use of Saudi oil revenue. The conversation also touched on Muscat, the Persian Gulf, the Soviet offer of aid to Libya, the Sudan, and Syria. (The memoranda of these conversations are ibid., NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Eden Talks, Washington, Jan. 28–Feb. 1, 1956 (Background Papers))
3. The British memorandum, January 19, attached to the source text but not printed, emphasized the weakness of the Saudi claim to Buraimi, evidence of Saudi bribery, the importance of secure access to Persian Gulf oil, and the danger of Communist encroachment. The memorandum urged the United States to tell the Saudis that the British would fight the Buraimi issue in the Security Council and that the United States would not support Saudi Arabia in this regard. The United States would further advise the Saudis not to proceed with the appeal and state that the British were willing to open discussions with Saudi Arabia on all matters. On the question of frontiers, only minor modifications would be possible.
4. Secret.
5. On January 20, the Department conveyed the substance of the memorandum to the Embassies in London and Jidda and to the Delegation at the United Nations. (Telegram 4019 to London, January 20; Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/ 1–2056) In telegram 347 to Jidda, January 21, the Ambassador was instructed to inform the King that preliminary talks had been held in Washington before the Eden–Eisenhower meetings, but that no decisions had been reached. The Department also expressed the hope that the King would continue to act with restraint in the Buraimi matter and avoid any action which might make “our current exercise of good offices more difficult.” (Ibid.)