Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

149. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, July 23, 1957—4 p.m.

633. Selwyn Lloyd asked me to call at FonOff this noon. Lloyd presented HMG’s views concerning the situation in Oman as follows:

He briefly reviewed history of present outbreak, mentioning rebellion against Sultan in 1913 followed by 1921 agreement in which Sultan gave Imam substantial amount autonomy in interior Oman.² Lloyd said that in 1950s Imam was corrupted by money from outside and it therefore became necessary for Sultan to establish his rule in interior, which he did in 1955. Recently, however, rebels have appeared in Oman with a few machine guns and land mines and created “a certain amount of alarm and despondency” among the Sultan’s forces. Sultan had thereupon asked help from HMG which Lloyd said “we will give”.

Lloyd continued that “military side is minor matter, on scale of sending 50 men or so and shooting up a fort or two”. In old days, he said, HMG would have spent six months getting up a punitive expedition. However, Lloyd said, nowadays the press is so active and so interested in any appearance of trouble, and there are so many interests which would like to draw sides out of this affair between the Sultan and Saudi Arabia or even if possible between HMG and the US Govt.

Therefore, Lloyd said, he hoped that (1) the Secretary of State, if he were asked at press conferences or elsewhere, might take the line that this is a small, local affair, without great significance and (2) that US Govt might do anything it could to acquaint the Saudi Govt with fact that HMG “does not plan to magnify this affair whatever the provocation.”

Lloyd referred to plans for conciliatory meeting between King Saud and Sultan (Deptel 625³ and Embtel 442⁴) and made point that “if we can get this affair cleaned up then Sultan will have enough prestige to make a meeting with King Saud possible”.

Lloyd then outlined HMG’s program of military action in support of Sultan.

(1) A support company of troops would be moved from Kenya thereby bringing the total of UK ground forces available in Sharjah and Bahrain to a battalion. Lloyd noted that no UK troops were being moved into Sultan’s domain “because of the temperature”.

(2) The Trucial scouts may be used for “sealing off action”.

(3) HMG would transfer some arms to the British officers in command of the Sultan’s forces.

(4) The RAF would drop leaflets in the area affected by the uprising.

(5) The RAF would then attack with rockets “at one, two, or three points, then there would be a pause” to assess the effect.

(6) After that it might be necessary “to do a bit of bombing, perhaps a fort or two”. However, Lloyd said, that the idea of laying the place waste was out of the question “because the Sultan’s motive was purely to reestablish his rule”.

I asked what, if any, evidence of Saudi involvement had come to light and Lloyd said mainly the fact of Talib’s presence in Oman after being given refuge in Saudi Arabia and being treated as honored guest there.

I inquired if rumor of Suleyman Bin Himyar’s death (Embtel 600⁵) had been confirmed, and Beeley of FonOff, who also present with Lloyd, said no. Both Lloyd and Beeley agreed that he was a member of the rebel group.

Lloyd then concluded by reiterating hope that Secretary of State might choose to take line that Oman affair is “small stuff” and not considered important by USG. Lloyd said HMG does not wish to ask for USG support “because that might involve the US with King Saud”. However, he added, “If we don’t beat this down we will have trouble with other areas around the coast of Arabia.”

Lloyd said he plans make further statement on Oman in Commons this afternoon.

Comment: Lloyd seemed sincerely worried that divisive efforts in press and political groups would put great pressure on US either to support UK action or to declare for the right of the warring groups to have it out without HMG interference. While not agreeing that Lloyd’s comment to effect this “small, unimportant show” would be appropriate, it true, of course, that if US policy or sympathy are not involved, a statement to that effect would help HMG.

I note that the Exchange Telegraph News Service has carried at 1:34 pm today an item stating:

“The U.S. Ambassador, Mr. John Hay Whitney, had a 20 minute meeting with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary at the Foreign Office late this morning.

“The meeting had been arranged during the morning the Ambassador was asked to call.

“Mr. Lloyd is likely to make a further statement on the situation in Oman in the Commons this afternoon, writes the Exchange Telegraph Diplomatic Correspondent.

“Before the Ambassador’s arrival a Foreign Office spokesman had stated it was known that the UK and US Govts were in touch on the Oman situation, as would be expected between two govts in friendly relations”.

Department repeat as desired.

Whitney

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786E.00/7–2357. Secret; Niact.
2. Presumably reference is to the 1920 Treaty of al-Sib. The full text of the treaty was transmitted in despatch 757 from Cairo, January 13, 1956; ibid., 786E.00/1–1356.
3. Telegram 625, July 20, informed the Embassy that on July 19 British officials in Washington had notified the Department that British military forces, in response to an appeal from the Sultan, had been authorized to assist him against the insurgents. The Department added that the British had also presented memoranda regarding a proposed meeting between King Saud and the Sultan of Muscat. (Ibid., 786E.00/ 7–1657)
4. Not printed. (Ibid.)
5. In telegram 600, July 22, the Embassy conveyed additional information on the nature and extent of the recent uprising in Oman. (Ibid., 786E.00/7–2257)