135. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 5, 19571
SUBJECT
- Various Matters Relating to the Middle East
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Charles Malik, Foreign Minister of Lebanon
- Mr. Azkoul, Member Lebanese Delegation to the UN
- The Secretary
- Mr. Fraser Wilkins, Director, NE
Dr. Malik called on the Secretary to discuss various matters relating to the Middle East. Dr. Malik referred to the Agenda which he had submitted in advance (attached2) and said that as the Secretary’s time was limited he would only cover parts of it.
Dr. Malik continued that as a representative of the Lebanon he would like first to refer to its basic policy and matters relating to its interests. He said Lebanon, through its own character and through the attitude of the present Government, was committed to a Western course. They were formally identified with the West and fully supported its policies of freedom, justice and peace.
Dr. Malik referred to the security of the Lebanon and said it needed strength which it thought could be achieved by special arrangements with the West and through internal measures within Lebanon. Lebanon needed technical and economic assistance which might be on a larger scale than was now the case. Dr. Malik thought it was possible Lebanon might become the headquarters of a UN [Page 201] Emergency Force if and when that force became permanent for the United Nations for the Middle East.3
Dr. Malik next referred to the coming Parliamentary elections in Lebanon and said he had discussed them with the Secretary’s assistants. In Dr. Malik’s view these elections were crucial. At the present time there was collusion between … Egypt and Syria on the one hand and the Communists on the other to bring about a change of regime in Lebanon. Such a change of regime would be disastrous. As the new Parliament, which was shortly to be elected, would be required in 1958 to select a new President, it could be seen that an adverse development now would have serious effects later.
The Secretary asked Dr. Malik on what grounds he reached the conclusion that Saudi Arabia was involved in the Lebanon and, specifically, whether Saudi Arabian money was being spent there and whether King Saud knew of these activities… .
The Secretary suggested that if the opportunity arose Dr. Malik might mention this general subject to the President during his conversation with him on February 6.4
Dr. Malik next referred to Lebanon’s arms requirements and said they needed assistance in modernizing Lebanon’s forces. The Secretary observed that all of the Middle Eastern states seemed to consider arms an absolutely essential requirement and asked Dr. Malik why this was the case. Dr. Malik replied that, in his view there were three principal reasons: 1) fear of Israel and distrust of the West which was protecting it; 2) Arab-Muslim infatuation with strength, and 3) Soviet offers of arms.
Dr. Malik observed regarding Soviet offers that Lebanon had been offered arms by the Soviet Union but had refused them.
The Secretary said Egypt had obtained arms from the Soviet Union and what had been the result? It was not Soviet arms that had saved Egypt following the recent Israeli attack and the subsequent intervention by the British and the French but U.S. influence which led the way for UN action. The Secretary continued he was depressed that Middle Eastern states were relying upon arms which they were unable to use and which were obtained at great cost.
Dr. Malik observed that the Secretary’s remarks reflected a deeper question. This question was the way in which the Communists were penetrating the Middle East and the extent of Middle Eastern distrust of the West. The question was deeper than the [Page 202] Arab-Israeli problem. The Middle Eastern countries wished arms without aligning themselves with the United States. The Soviet shadow lay over the Middle East. In another phrase, it might be described as a bulwark behind which some of the Arab states sought salvation. The Eisenhower Doctrine, as recently announced, was another bulwark and was greatly welcomed.
Dr. Malik said Lebanon wanted two things: 1) Security from external aggression through arrangements with the West and 2) internal security through the development of a loyal army. Recently the loyal Lebanese Army had saved the situation within Lebanon. No other Arab state, even Iraq or Israel, had an army as loyal as the Lebanese Army. It was strictly pro-West and would continue as such for another twenty years, provided it was properly equipped and staffed. The Secretary said he had during recent testimony before Congressional Committees emphasized to the Congress the importance of well equipped internal security forces. It was accordingly reassuring to the Secretary to know that the Lebanese Army was pro-West. Dr. Malik said another factor in Lebanese security was its mountainous terrain in which small well equipped security forces could be especially useful.
Dr. Malik added that if the United States wished Lebanon to give assurances of non-aggression against Israel or any other state, Lebanon was prepared to do so.
Dr. Malik said he wished to speak on the subject of Egypt. On his way to the United States recently he had talked with Nasser for four hours and had given more than a hundred hours of thought to the situation of Nasser and his activities.
Dr. Malik had reached an absolute conclusion. Nasser was personally charming, pure in motives from his point of view, well meaning and disinterested, but his limitations and policies were such that they could not lead to peace and progress in the Middle East. Dr. Malik believed it necessary to search for an effective alternative to the type of nationalism which Nasser represented. This search should be the immediate object of high policy. The Secretary observed we were not opposed to nationalism but supported it. We did not, however, support the type of nationalism which would lead to a loss of independence, especially among the countries at one of the most important crossroads of the world as was the case in the Middle East. The Secretary thought that countries which, in pursuing this type of nationalism, became dependent upon Communism, would isolate themselves and die. Nasser’s philosophy would have this result.
Dr. Malik said he considered this type of nationalism as a virulent and morbid type which was constantly being fanned and agitated by the Communists. Dr. Malik’s experience indicated Arab nationalism and Communism in the Middle East must be brought into conflict. Arab [Page 203] nationalism was being penetrated by Communism. Ways must be found to suffocate Communism as it appeared.
The Secretary observed that the British and French concept of nationalism as it had developed was somewhat different than the concept of nationalism in the United States. Because vital interests were involved, some European states felt unable to trust other countries and wished to retain some control of them. The Secretary had told Molotov that the post-war Russian program for Germany seemed a repetition of the Versailles Treaty. The United States on the other hand was dependent upon the rest of the world to a different degree because of distance, resources and other factors. We were thus more willing to have confidence in other countries.
Dr. Malik said an understanding could be reached between Middle Eastern countries and European countries provided Arab nationalism was purified of Communism. It was the latter factor which caused the difficulty. Communists and nationalists in the Middle East now spoke exactly alike. They both used the same phrases and the same substance. A wedge must be driven between Arab nationalists and Communists. The Communists must suffer a radical defeat, especially in Syria or Egypt.
In summary, Dr. Malik thought we should concentrate upon a radical defeat for Communists, not by word or by economic assistance, but by political change in Syria or Egypt. If there were a change in Syria or Egypt, there would be brighter prospects for all other Middle Eastern problems, including Israel. We were mistaken if we thought the Middle Eastern situation could be improved by assisting Saudi Arabia. Only a political change in Syria and Egypt would achieve the desired result.
The Secretary inquired if Dr. Malik had placed any of his views on paper. Dr. Malik said he had drawn up a set of 21 propositions of one sentence each, summing up his philosophy regarding the Middle East. He was prepared to be judged by these propositions one hundred years from now. He said he would make them available to the Secretary within the next few days.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 680.00/2–557. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins.↩
- Not printed.↩
- In December 1956, Chamoun and Malik had proposed stationing a permanent U.N. Emergency Force in Lebanon to keep peace in the Middle East. The Department of State entertained the idea for several months, but apparently dropped it from active consideration after January 1957. Documentation on this matter is in Department of State, Central File 320.5780.↩
- See infra.↩
- By the time Malik sent these propositions to Dulles, on February 12, they had grown to 34 propositions of one sentence each. (Letter from Malik to Dulles, February 12; Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/2–1257)↩