308. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to
the Department of State1
No. 475
Tehran, April 25,
1955.
REF
- The Department’s Circular Telegrams No. 5592 and 5603 of March 23,
1955
SUBJECT
- The Internal Security Position in Iran
The enclosed report entitled “Country Team Analysis of the Internal
Security Position in Iran” responds to the request therefor contained in
the Department’s Circular Telegram No. 559.
[Page 734]
In compliance with the wish expressed in the Department’s Circular
Telegram No. 560, the Country Team members were assisted by the senior
members of their respective staffs in the preparation of the report.
William M.
Rountree
Chargé
d’Affaires ad interim
Enclosure
COUNTRY TEAM ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY POSITION
IN IRAN
[Here follow sections I. “State of Development of the Threat of
Subversion;” II. “Adequacy of Indigenous Countermeasures;” and III.
“Analysis of United States Aid Programs.”]
IV—Conclusions and Recommendations
A. Conclusions
- 1.
- A threat of large scale insurrection existed in Iran in 1953
but was brought under control, and the problem now is to prevent
subversion from making important headway. U.S. aid to Iran has
played a vital part in the establishment and maintenance of
internal security.
- 2.
- The Shah is the chief bulwark of internal security. As the
symbol of the monarchy, he has the confidence of the people and
the loyalty of the Army. He furnishes the principal direction to
the drive for measures for social and economic progress. If he
were to die either naturally or by assassination and an
inter–regnum were to ensue, the resultant situation might divide
the anti–communist forces and create new opportunities for
communist subversion.
- 3.
- The Shah and Government recognize that positive constructive
countermeasures to communist subversion are needed as well as
repressive measures and in the longer term are an indispensable
reward to the hopes of the people for a better standard of life.
Iran will require continued outside assistance toward this
end.
- 4.
- At this time subordination of the military aid objective of
developing a defensive delaying capability to the other
established objective of maintaining internal security would
have a seriously adverse effect upon U.S. relations with Iran. A
similarly adverse effect would result from any U.S. indication
that outside support, particularly air support, would not be
given to the Iranian Army if the Soviet Union were to invade
Iran in force. Either of these two things might so discourage
the Shah and his Government as to eliminate all possibility of
Iran’s adherence to an area defense pact and result in a
reversion to neutralist policies with a dangerous weakening in
its resolve to stand up under Soviet pressure.
- 5.
- The Shah’s position and the fabric of the Iranian Government
would deteriorate if the Shah should fail to receive adequate
and consistent U.S. political and material support.
- 6.
- The internal security agencies, namely, the Army, Gendarmérie,
National Police, military governors, and Frontier Guard, are as
a group capable of detecting, apprehending, and detaining
Iranian subversives and suppressing armed insurrection.
- a.
-
A major requirement is better coordination among
those forces and a clear delineation and, where
appropriate, realignment of responsibilities and
functions as between the military and civilian type
agencies as well as among the latter.
[Subparagraph b (4 lines of source
text) not declassified]
- c.
- Expansion of the responsibilities and functions of the
National Police and Gendarmerie will generate
requirements for an improvement in their present
organization and capabilities. Their effectiveness
should be improved to the point where they are capable
of coping with subversion short of serious insurrection.
In addition they should be freed so far as possible from
military and political pressures.
- d.
- The ability to detect foreign subversive agents is
largely lacking. The ability to detect Iranian
subversives now rests mainly with the Army; it is
inadequately developed in the Gendarmérie and National
Police. These deficiencies should be remedied.
- e.
- The Army is carrying a greater portion of the burden
of the internal security effort than is compatible with
concentration upon its regular duties or in the long
term with the interests of the country. It should be
relieved of the functions that are more appropriate for
police–type forces as rapidly as the police–type forces
can develop the capability for their effective
performance. The Army’s posture for dealing with riots
and armed insurrection should be maintained and
development of its CIC organization should
continue.
- 7.
- The Iranian Army with military aid already programmed can
bring to bear adequate force to cope with insurrection on any
foreseeable scale if there is no coincident external military
threat. The development of a defensive delaying capability will
enhance this ability to cope with insurrection.
- 8.
- Improvement in the administration of justice including
elimination of officials and judges who sympathize with the
Tudeh is needed to permit the transfer of prosecution of
subversives from the military to the civil courts.
- 9.
- Internal security suffers for lack of a competent, devoted,
and adequately paid public service. The security forces (Army,
Gendarmérie, and National Police) are grossly underpaid by other
Middle Eastern standards.
- 10.
- The Iranian people favor the monarchy and the suppression of
its enemies. They would welcome positive countermeasures to
subversion, progress in which would help public attitudes in
relation to other U.S. objectives. Editorial and other informed
opinion tends increasingly to favor Iranian alignment with the
West.
- 11.
- Presently programmed military aid is adequate to maintain the
Army for its internal security role. Future assistance as
recommended by the Country Team on the basis of plans formulated
by the Chief of ARMISH–MAAG/Iran would develop in the Army a defensive
delaying capability which would make a useful contribution to
Middle East defense. The latter objective has great political
and psychological importance in addition to its military
significance.
- 12.
- Expansion of Gendarmérie activities and their effective
performance will require improvements in its organization and
capabilities; its needs will include continued aid in equipment
and training and some aid for operational facilities.
- 13.
- Technical and financial assistance furnished to Iran was a
major factor in keeping the political institutions intact during
the period of crisis in August 1953. Thereafter it helped the
new pro–Western government meet its budgetary deficit and
improve its organization and capabilities to attack some of the
causes of social discontent and unrest which subversive elements
had seized upon in order to weaken the Government. Continued
U.S. technical and defense support aid will be needed for
several years in order to help strengthen the Government’s
capabilities, first, to improve the internal security situation,
and second, to speed the development of a more adequate economic
and administrative base which would support the forces required
for the maintenance of internal security and for the fulfillment
of Iran’s role in area defense arrangements.
[Page 737]
B. Recommendations
1. U.S. Objectives
The Country Team recommends:
- a.
- That the present broad U.S. objectives with respect to the
capabilities of the Iranian armed forces remain unchanged;
in particular the development of a defensive delaying
capability.
- b.
- That, pursuant to existing objectives, the organization,
effectiveness, and capabilities of Iranian police–type
forces for dealing with subversion be improved with a view
to relieving, gradually and over a period of time as
feasible, the Iranian Army of police–type functions in the
internal security field while continuing the Army’s ability
to put down any serious insurrection.
- c.
- That U.S. objectives continue to take due account of the
short term value and long term indispensability to the
maintenance of internal security inherent in positive
constructive measures in the realm of economic and social
progress.
2. U.S. Advice
The Country Team recommends:
- a.
-
That the Iranian Government be encouraged to strengthen
its police–type forces, particularly their capabilities
for detecting and coping with subversion, and to improve
coordination among all internal security forces.
[Subparagraph b (6 lines of source
text) not declassified]
- c.
- That the Iranian Government be further encouraged to
provide all of its essential police–type organizations with
sufficient budgetary, matériel, and training support to
enable them in time and as feasible to relieve the Army of
its responsibilities in this field.
- d.
- That the Iranian Government be encouraged to continue its
efforts in eliminating corruption and communist influence in
the existing judicial system, pressing for reorganization
and new legislation where indicated.
- e.
- That operations in Iran of the United States Information
Service be maintained on a scale adequate to permit it to
continue its informational output at the present level, and
to assist and support the information departments of the
Iranian Government, by providing technical advice and
limited equipment as required, in developing the most
favorable possible public opinion for programs supported by
the United States.
3. U.S. Aid
The Country Team recommends:
- a.
- That military aid continue to be extended to Iran in
pursuance of present NSC
policy objectives.
- b.
- That the U.S. contribute to the objectives stated in
paragraphs 1b and 2a, 2b, and 2c of this sub–section B, by
the provision of matériel and training support as
required.
- c.
- That technical assistance, supplemented by limited amounts
of development aid related to technical assistance projects,
be continued at about the level recommended by the Country
Team for Fiscal Year
[Page 738]
1956; and that defense support assistance on a
diminishing scale be provided to accelerate Iran’s
development program, particularly in specific areas related
to the improvement of Iran’s security forces.
