308. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1

No. 475

REF

  • The Department’s Circular Telegrams No. 5592 and 5603 of March 23, 1955

SUBJECT

  • The Internal Security Position in Iran

The enclosed report entitled “Country Team Analysis of the Internal Security Position in Iran” responds to the request therefor contained in the Department’s Circular Telegram No. 559.

[Page 734]

In compliance with the wish expressed in the Department’s Circular Telegram No. 560, the Country Team members were assisted by the senior members of their respective staffs in the preparation of the report.

William M. Rountree
Chargé d’Affaires ad interim

Enclosure

COUNTRY TEAM ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY POSITION IN IRAN

[Here follow sections I. “State of Development of the Threat of Subversion;” II. “Adequacy of Indigenous Countermeasures;” and III. “Analysis of United States Aid Programs.”]

IV—Conclusions and Recommendations

A. Conclusions

1.
A threat of large scale insurrection existed in Iran in 1953 but was brought under control, and the problem now is to prevent subversion from making important headway. U.S. aid to Iran has played a vital part in the establishment and maintenance of internal security.
2.
The Shah is the chief bulwark of internal security. As the symbol of the monarchy, he has the confidence of the people and the loyalty of the Army. He furnishes the principal direction to the drive for measures for social and economic progress. If he were to die either naturally or by assassination and an inter–regnum were to ensue, the resultant situation might divide the anti–communist forces and create new opportunities for communist subversion.
3.
The Shah and Government recognize that positive constructive countermeasures to communist subversion are needed as well as repressive measures and in the longer term are an indispensable reward to the hopes of the people for a better standard of life. Iran will require continued outside assistance toward this end.
4.
At this time subordination of the military aid objective of developing a defensive delaying capability to the other established objective of maintaining internal security would have a seriously adverse effect upon U.S. relations with Iran. A similarly adverse effect would result from any U.S. indication that outside support, particularly air support, would not be given to the Iranian Army if the Soviet Union were to invade Iran in force. Either of these two things might so discourage the Shah and his Government as to eliminate all possibility of Iran’s adherence to an area defense pact and result in a reversion to neutralist policies with a dangerous weakening in its resolve to stand up under Soviet pressure.
5.
The Shah’s position and the fabric of the Iranian Government would deteriorate if the Shah should fail to receive adequate and consistent U.S. political and material support.
6.
The internal security agencies, namely, the Army, Gendarmérie, National Police, military governors, and Frontier Guard, are as a group capable of detecting, apprehending, and detaining Iranian subversives and suppressing armed insurrection.
a.

A major requirement is better coordination among those forces and a clear delineation and, where appropriate, realignment of responsibilities and functions as between the military and civilian type agencies as well as among the latter.

[Subparagraph b (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

c.
Expansion of the responsibilities and functions of the National Police and Gendarmerie will generate requirements for an improvement in their present organization and capabilities. Their effectiveness should be improved to the point where they are capable of coping with subversion short of serious insurrection. In addition they should be freed so far as possible from military and political pressures.
d.
The ability to detect foreign subversive agents is largely lacking. The ability to detect Iranian subversives now rests mainly with the Army; it is inadequately developed in the Gendarmérie and National Police. These deficiencies should be remedied.
e.
The Army is carrying a greater portion of the burden of the internal security effort than is compatible with concentration upon its regular duties or in the long term with the interests of the country. It should be relieved of the functions that are more appropriate for police–type forces as rapidly as the police–type forces can develop the capability for their effective performance. The Army’s posture for dealing with riots and armed insurrection should be maintained and development of its CIC organization should continue.
7.
The Iranian Army with military aid already programmed can bring to bear adequate force to cope with insurrection on any foreseeable scale if there is no coincident external military threat. The development of a defensive delaying capability will enhance this ability to cope with insurrection.
8.
Improvement in the administration of justice including elimination of officials and judges who sympathize with the Tudeh is needed to permit the transfer of prosecution of subversives from the military to the civil courts.
9.
Internal security suffers for lack of a competent, devoted, and adequately paid public service. The security forces (Army, Gendarmérie, and National Police) are grossly underpaid by other Middle Eastern standards.
10.
The Iranian people favor the monarchy and the suppression of its enemies. They would welcome positive countermeasures to subversion, progress in which would help public attitudes in relation to other U.S. objectives. Editorial and other informed opinion tends increasingly to favor Iranian alignment with the West.
11.
Presently programmed military aid is adequate to maintain the Army for its internal security role. Future assistance as recommended by the Country Team on the basis of plans formulated by the Chief of ARMISH–MAAG/Iran would develop in the Army a defensive delaying capability which would make a useful contribution to Middle East defense. The latter objective has great political and psychological importance in addition to its military significance.
12.
Expansion of Gendarmérie activities and their effective performance will require improvements in its organization and capabilities; its needs will include continued aid in equipment and training and some aid for operational facilities.
13.
Technical and financial assistance furnished to Iran was a major factor in keeping the political institutions intact during the period of crisis in August 1953. Thereafter it helped the new pro–Western government meet its budgetary deficit and improve its organization and capabilities to attack some of the causes of social discontent and unrest which subversive elements had seized upon in order to weaken the Government. Continued U.S. technical and defense support aid will be needed for several years in order to help strengthen the Government’s capabilities, first, to improve the internal security situation, and second, to speed the development of a more adequate economic and administrative base which would support the forces required for the maintenance of internal security and for the fulfillment of Iran’s role in area defense arrangements.
[Page 737]

B. Recommendations

1. U.S. Objectives

The Country Team recommends:

a.
That the present broad U.S. objectives with respect to the capabilities of the Iranian armed forces remain unchanged; in particular the development of a defensive delaying capability.
b.
That, pursuant to existing objectives, the organization, effectiveness, and capabilities of Iranian police–type forces for dealing with subversion be improved with a view to relieving, gradually and over a period of time as feasible, the Iranian Army of police–type functions in the internal security field while continuing the Army’s ability to put down any serious insurrection.
c.
That U.S. objectives continue to take due account of the short term value and long term indispensability to the maintenance of internal security inherent in positive constructive measures in the realm of economic and social progress.

2. U.S. Advice

The Country Team recommends:

a.

That the Iranian Government be encouraged to strengthen its police–type forces, particularly their capabilities for detecting and coping with subversion, and to improve coordination among all internal security forces.

[Subparagraph b (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

c.
That the Iranian Government be further encouraged to provide all of its essential police–type organizations with sufficient budgetary, matériel, and training support to enable them in time and as feasible to relieve the Army of its responsibilities in this field.
d.
That the Iranian Government be encouraged to continue its efforts in eliminating corruption and communist influence in the existing judicial system, pressing for reorganization and new legislation where indicated.
e.
That operations in Iran of the United States Information Service be maintained on a scale adequate to permit it to continue its informational output at the present level, and to assist and support the information departments of the Iranian Government, by providing technical advice and limited equipment as required, in developing the most favorable possible public opinion for programs supported by the United States.

3. U.S. Aid

The Country Team recommends:

a.
That military aid continue to be extended to Iran in pursuance of present NSC policy objectives.
b.
That the U.S. contribute to the objectives stated in paragraphs 1b and 2a, 2b, and 2c of this sub–section B, by the provision of matériel and training support as required.
c.
That technical assistance, supplemented by limited amounts of development aid related to technical assistance projects, be continued at about the level recommended by the Country Team for Fiscal Year [Page 738] 1956; and that defense support assistance on a diminishing scale be provided to accelerate Iran’s development program, particularly in specific areas related to the improvement of Iran’s security forces.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5/4–2555. Top Secret.
  2. In circular telegram 559, March 23, the Department instructed recipient Chiefs of Mission “to have the country team, including representatives from FOA, MAAG, (or service attachés), [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] prepare a report on the possibilities and requirements for U.S. assistance in increasing the effectiveness of police–type forces to deal with communist subversion and, in those countries where communist subversion has reached the stage of actual or potential large–scale insurrection, increasing the effectiveness of the regular armed forces to deal with communist subversion and insurrection.” (Ibid., 700.5/3–2355) The information was to enable the OCB to formulate a concept for U.S. assistance in the development of forces adequate to provide internal security in countries vulnerable to Communist subversion. Eventually this information was for the use of the NSC. (NSC Action No. 1290–d; see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 844, footnote 10)
  3. In circular telegram 560, sent to Tehran and 90 other Middle Eastern, Asian, and Latin American posts on March 23, the Department further explained that this attempt to combat Communist subversion grew out of Eisenhower’s personal interest and country team assessments would weigh heavily in NSC deliberations; therefore the assessments should be prepared by the best officers of the mission, should include points of disagreement as well as agreement, and should be submitted on schedule. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5/3–2355)