Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

305. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, April 11, 1955—7 p.m.

2062. Ala told me early April Shah concerned about question US military aid and would ask me soon to discuss this and other questions. At Shah’s request I had audience today. Following summarizes main points of conversation.

1. Shah said with governmental change Iran now ready embark upon programs which promised great success all fields. Communists already virtually eliminated and remnants would be ruthlessly wiped out; new Cabinet would carry out vigorous anti–corruption program which he confident would provide integrity and efficiency in government operations; Economic Minister and Ebtehaj would get development rolling as quickly as possible with help foreign technical advisers who he had decided were to be employed by Plan Organization. He stated Iran had made clear decision to side with its friends of West–regional security arrangements foremost in his mind, but closely associated this question was that of American aid.

2. Shah said he had mentioned proposed Iraq–Iran–Turkey–Pakistan staff talks to officials Washington and London and had received encouragement proceed.² Iraq had agreed to talks and suggested they be held London or Washington, preferably with US and UK participation. Turks most amenable and had left to Shah decisions regarding representation, site and timing. Preliminary reply Pakistan indicated they glad participate. He said there had been some suggestion (source unspecified) that staff talks would be premature until Iran in position make political decision regarding treaty alignment. He commented latter not possible in near future since before making political decision they would want to know more than at present about concepts of neighbors regarding military collaboration, and also what Iran could count on from US in matter of military aid. He could not join defense arrangements if Iran were to be weak link with no prospects being otherwise. Key to future developments was US assistance program and particularly military aid which would enable him carry out his carefully laid plans for development of force which would be real asset to defense of Iran and of area. He deplored time which already had been lost and emphasized again that next three years extremely crucial; that military improvements must commence immediately if objectives to be met. In our lengthy discussion this matter Shah made most points included in memorandum which he prepared for discussion with President Eisenhower.³ He underlined need for early decision by US so that he would know how to proceed.

3. In course conversation I responded Shah along following lines:

(a) Gratification regarding smoothness and dignity with which governmental change had taken place;

(b) Admiration for various members new Cabinet and confidence their ability implement programs Shah had outlined;

(c) Gratification that Shah was taking steps he considered essential in connection Iran eventual collaboration with neighbors in security matters.

I took opportunity again to emphasize US attitude that Shah should without pressure decide regarding adherence to regional pact (Deptel 1794).⁴I stated that while I had not yet received Washington’s reaction proposed staff talks I felt sure US would welcome them if area participants felt they would be useful. I expressed some doubt that US and UK should participate since, if fact talks held should become known, this might give rise to charge they were joining other pact countries in bringing pressure upon Iran. I said I would give him more definitive reaction as soon as I had heard from Washington.

(d) Regarding aid, I reviewed both economic and military programs already authorized for Iran and pointed out significance of assistance particularly during past two years. I said that as Shah knew, executive branch considering question of additional military aid, which Shah had previously discussed with Ambassador Henderson and General McClure. I knew Washington officials greatly impressed their conversations with Shah in Washington, and would do their utmost in light real difficulties which existed in obtaining congressional appropriations. Whether or not it would be possible obtain additional monies for military purposes this FY still in doubt since we had not recently heard from Washington regarding this matter.

4. Shah ended conversation by asking me again urge Washington to decide as quickly as possible on military aid. He said Iran house had been put in order and prospects for future extremely bright if we acted now, before it was too late. He appreciated all we had done, but what had been gained should not be permitted to fade away.

Country team has been increasingly concerned lest failure to act promptly upon recommendations now being considered in Washington will operate greatly to detriment US interests in Iran. We realize formidable difficulties which confront agencies in obtaining additional military aid funds from current FY appropriations. However, we hope that some way can be found to make start in expanded military program before end of FY 1955 and that sufficient monies will be included in FY 1956 budget to meet what we consider extremely important military objectives here, as set forth in our previous recommendations.

We earnestly hope that it will be possible in near future for Department to provide information regarding prospects of approving and meeting requirements of (a) recommended FY 1956 program set forth Embtel 1905,⁵ (b) recommended additional FY 1955 program for direct forces support set forth Embtel 1748,⁶ and (c) recommended revised military force basis with adequate funds begin implementation FY 1956 and also to advise regarding US position on proposed staff talks.⁷

Rountree

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/4–1155. Secret.
2. Regarding the proposed staff talks, see Document 6.
3. Printed in summary form as Tab A to memorandum from Jernegan to Dulles, December 9, 1954, Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, p. 1066.
4. Dated March 24, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–2255)
5. See Document 301.
6. In telegram 1748, February 19, the Embassy, MAAG, and OMI recommended a series of self–contained projects to ensure sustained improvements in Iran’s defense capability. As part of a suggested interim program of $9.5 million, the United States would fund development of a detailed plan for construction of major military facilities in Iran, improve Meherbad Airport at Tehran, and construct a series of lesser military facilities throughout Iran. (Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/2–1955)
7. The Department responded in telegram 2009 to Tehran, April 20, that, regarding item (b), “fair chance pick up funds for some of requirements set forth urtel 1748. Matter under active consideration.” (Ibid., 788.5–MSP/4–1155)