494. Despatch From the Chargé in Paraguay (Wardlaw) to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- The Stroessner Administration: An Estimate of its Stability
President Stroessner ended his first year in office on August 15 apparently in at least as strong a position as he had enjoyed at any time since coming to power. He has preponderant backing from the military, which has benefitted from substantial pay raises, promotions, and Stroessner’s interest in advancing its professional status, evinced most spectacularly in the acquisition for the Armed Forces of numerous planes. He has also the formal, and in instances, the enthusiastic, backing of the Colorado Party, with which he has been at pains publicly to identify himself, and to most of whose objectives in the political sphere he has been amenable. The Administration’s success in negotiating economic agreements with Bolivia and Uruguay, in obtaining Brazilian cooperation in the building of roads, and in procuring foreign financing for important public works projects (Asunción waterworks, airport reconstruction, road-building, improvement of riverine transport) have been definite assets to its public relations position and should become more so as these projects are implemented.
A substantial part, perhaps a majority, of the Paraguayan people are, to be sure, opposed to, or discontented with the Stroessner administration: the opposition Liberal and Febrerista political parties, excluded from participation in the country’s political life; Catholic elements, aroused principally because of the Administration’s subservience to Peron in the Argentine state-church controversy; business, commercial and agricultural interests, resentful of the Government’s restrictive and politically motivated economic policies; and labor, restive over food scarcities and the high cost of living. These groups, however, appear to have neither the capability nor the disposition to contest seriously the Administration’s tenure. Nor has the small Communist Party been able to capitalize significantly on current dissatisfactions.
Despite the apparent present security of the Stroessner Administration there exists a serious potential threat to its stability in the basic rivalry and tensions between its military and civilian components and in the conflict between the current ruling element and the dissident factions of the Colorado Party. In both these areas of [Page 1001] dissension, Epifanio Mendez Fleitas—President of the Central Bank, a leading figure in the Colorado Party Junta, and an ardent Argentinophile—is a principal focus of controversy. On his intentions and actions political developments in the immediate future may largely depend.
The rivalry between the Colorado Party and the professional military is principally over the exercise of political power. The Colorado Party seeks to eliminate or neutralize the military as an independent political force, to subordinate it to the Party’s will, and to decrease the participation of military men in the Administration. Various military leaders have revealed a similarly aggressive intent vis-à-vis the civilian Colorados, feeling that the armed forces, as the major factor in Stroessner’s advent to power, should have greater representation in the Government. By and large, however, the military has been on the defensive, its aims being to preserve its professional status and its present political prerogatives.
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Paralleling the conflict between military and civilian elements is a multi-lateral rivalry between various elements of the Colorado Party: the currently dominant group of “Democrats” responsive mainly to Epifanio Méndez Fleitas and Minister of Interior Tomás Romero Pereira; the Chavista “Democrats,” followers of ex-President Federico Chaves, overthrown in early 1954; the Guión Rojo (Red Hyphen), followers of ex-President Natalicio Gonzales; and the “Unionistas,” of whom Dr. Felipe Benigno Molas López and Eulogio Estigarribia are the principal leaders. Basically these groups differ little in principles and program and are mainly representative of the personal ambitions of individual politicos. In general, however, the Guión Rojo has a larger proportion of professional men than the other Colorado groups, and appears to be more conservative.
Méndez Fleitas and Romero Pereira, working in close cooperation, have dominated the Colorado Party Junta throughout the Stroessner Administration, and Méndez, in particular, the stronger of the two, has steadily increased his control, at the expense of the Party’s dissident elements. The virtual exclusion of these elements from participation in Party or governmental affairs led to several abortive plots during Stroessner’s first year in office, aimed principally at Méndez, although the position of President Stroessner probably also was at stake. The Government and the Colorado Party Junta responded to these conspiracies with effective political reprisals, and Méndez became even more intransigent in his refusal to cooperate with opposition Colorado groups.
[Page 1002]In recent months Méndez, reversing his political strategy, has shown a conciliatory attitude toward dissident groups. He appears now to be seeking an alliance with the Guiones, in particular, and with some Chavista and Unionist elements. Méndez’ current promotion of party unity may be an effort to compensate for recent political changes in Argentina, which have weakened or threatened to weaken Argentina as a source of support for his political position.2 His changed attitude may also reflect increased appreciation of the danger with which he might be confronted by the military and which party unity might serve to minimize. Whether Méndez will succeed in attracting the support of other Colorado Party groups is questionable. In any case, the conversations which have been going on for some time with regard to party unification have resulted for the time being in a diminution of intra-party tensions.
The position of President Stroessner is affected significantly by the dissension among his supporters. The rivalry between the military and the Colorado Party in particular has been of serious concern to him. On the one hand, he needs military support to remain in office. On the other hand, he has felt that civilian support is necessary for the formulation and the implementation of a constructive governmental program, without which his tenure, sooner or later, also might be jeopardized. An additional motive for collaboration with civilian elements, and in particular with Central Bank President Méndez Fleitas, is the opportunity for easy financial gain which such collaboration reportedly has provided him. Accordingly, Stroessner has sought to follow a policy of compromise which, while not fully pleasing to either element, would stop short of bringing dissatisfaction in either case to a critical point. At the same time, he has sought to safeguard his position by isolating the high professional army officers who have been most resentful of his collaboration with the Colorados, and particularly with Méndez Fleitas. This effort is particularly obvious in his careful personal cultivation of officers of junior grades.
Intra-Colorado Party rivalries have had less impact on the stability of Stroessner’s position, but the President appears nevertheless to have taken an interest in the party’s internal policy. In general he appears to favor a closing of Colorado Party ranks, presumably on the theory that a broadening of the Colorado Party Junta’s political base would make available to the Government additional political and administrative talent as well as reduce the possibility of conspiracies organized by dissatisfied elements.
[Page 1003]As to future political developments, the outlook appears to be one of continued stability of the Stroessner regime as long as the present balance between the military and Colorado Party is maintained. Trouble is most likely to develop should Méndez become impatient of his present position and make a bid to increase his power. There is no indication that Méndez contemplates such a move.