Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

369. Telegram From the Ambassador in Brazil (Briggs) to the Department of State¹

Rio de Janeiro, November 7, 1957—7 p.m.

608. Notwithstanding brave words and comforting assurances Brazil leaders, I believe citizens this country profoundly affected by Russian scientific achievement² and that Brazil confidence in American technological supremacy has been temporarily impaired. Obviously first concern is re-establishment confidence in our abilities, but within that urgent preoccupation following observations are submitted as germane to local scene:

1. Although President Kubitschek’s declarations reported Embassy telegram 593³ envisage no change Brazil’s policy, nevertheless in light orbital astonishment some reassessment by Brazilians of this country’s position in free world versus Communist world struggle seems inevitable. Combined strength proponents thereof should not be underestimated. Furthermore Brazil public opinion confused stream, fifty percent illiterate. It is tempting water for Communist fishing.

2. Brazil must be primary Latin American Communist target new campaign, triggered by belief spectacular scientific achievement presents opportune moment, has already begun. Its immediate objectives are probably trade-plus-diplomatic relations, and legalizing Communist party. But other attractive fields may include development Brazil’s enormous resources: offer to loan Petrobras X million dollars at nominal interest, with petroleum technicians attached, may be imminent possibility. Iron resources may appear almost equally tempting.

3. Kubitschek administration while well-meaning … lacks broad basis popular support. Financial difficulties impend and can multiply GOB’s troubles. We can continue to shore up government, at not insignificant cost: we should probably continue to do so. … Government’s success in countering demands for “reassessment” inevitably handicapped even though friendship and good intentions of administration are believed genuine and based on leaders’ conviction of self interest.

4. Our assumption that Latin America is a safe rear area might well be re-examined. Brazil possesses gigantic potential but its safety in baleful Sputnik afterglow is debatable matter. Brazil also enjoys leadership value in hemisphere by reason of size, population and relative freedom from parochial rivalries. I again suggest that within framework of inter-American relations, Brazil should occupy special position.

5. Brazil leaders are eager to be taken into our confidence, and to share our plans. Personal message given Kubitschek November 5 from President Eisenhower had excellent effect. Whatever we do to give Brazilians sense of greater participation pays dividends. Last year Brazil wanted send observer to NATO. We rejected proposal, fearing it might lead to 20 neighborhood kibitzers cluttering up premises. Now however, consonant with Secretary’s “we do not stand alone” estimate, might it not be desirable invite OAS (rather than separate members) to send observer to NATO?

Following that meeting, visit to Rio and perhaps other principal hemisphere capitals by Secretary would seem desirable, especially since Latin Americans remember last visit terminated because of Suez crisis.

After same meeting Spaak⁴ or some other non-American spokesman of prominence might profitably tour good neighborhood, seeking to interpret free Europe to Latin America (and incidentally soothe new world apprehensions over Common Market).

Canada’s position vis-à-vis OAS might likewise be re-examined with view to making greater use of Canada as hemisphere partner.

7. Foregoing and other moves and suggestions will doubtless occur to Department. Purpose this message is to warn that recent assurances, sincere though I regard them to be, give scant ground for complacency in post-satellite Brazilian situation.

Briggs

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.32/11–757. Secret.
2. Reference is to the successful launching by the Soviet Union on Oct. 4 of the first man-made earth satellite into outer space, Sputnik I.
3. See footnote 3, supra.
4. Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary General of NATO.