Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

364. Telegram From the Ambassador in Brazil (Briggs) to the Department of State¹

Rio de Janeiro, July 18, 1957—8 p.m.

77. Embassy believes we have reached important perhaps critical point in our relations with Brazilian military, and that outcome may bear also on our political and general relations in immediate future. It is suggested this message be considered in latter context.

Called yesterday afternoon on Secretary General Moura of Foreign Office primarily to confirm as per Department telegram 45² unavailability C–54’s desired by Brazilian Air Force. He told me Foreign Minister wanted see me, and Moura and I had 20 minutes alone before spending 3 quarters hour with Macedo Soares, last part of which with Minister Aviation Fleuss present at Foreign Minister’s request. What Moura and Foreign Minister said adds up approximately to the following:

1. Brazilian military, on which stability present government depends, went along last January with Fernando de Noronha Agreement, with varying degrees uneagerness, because A) Brazilian military recognizes US and Brazil must in final showdown be allies and B) Article 6 Fernando de Noronha Agreement notwithstanding fuzziness gives military the hold on claim to additional hardware.

2. Having exchanged Fernando de Noronha Agreement for Article 6, Brazilian military now unwilling accede further US military requests (Maceio and Loran) unless US provides military support for Brazil over and above present MDAP program.

3. Question is therefore: What if anything are we willing to pay, in military matériel, for additional facilities we have requested? It is as simple, and complicated, as that.

Conversation with Moura in substance as follows:

“Let us not deceive ourselves about role of military in Latin America; they run the show in practically every country, including Brazil. Fortunately in Brazil military has tradition of supporting civilian government and acting as watch dog of constitution—providing civilian government looks after military .…

. . . . . . .

Net of Moura’s observations is that unless US willing raise hardware ante, … attitude of Brazilian military toward collaboration with US be affected .…

Moura and I then adjourned to Foreign Minister’s office where Macedo Soares promoted same thesis, but less directly. He first called in assistant who read Articles 66 and 87 of constitution to effect that foreign soldiers (we desire station several hundred at proposed communications center) cannot be on Brazilian soil in absence authorization Congress, which might eventually be forthcoming but only after long delay and ferocious nationalistic attack. Therefore any Maceio–Loran agreement negotiated within framework present Washington negotiations would have to go Congress.³

However, both Minister and President believe best interest Brazil favor our having facilities requested and they are accordingly taking new look at Ambassador Peixoto’s “let’s do it” in Washington idea. Macedo Soares then returned to package deal discussed last January and proposition that whereas current discussions reference facilities are based on Washington request to Brazil, our military collaboration in this particular ought to stem from thesis (which Macedo Soares recalled last August in connection with Fernando de Noronha) that Brazil has requested certain military collaboration from US along specified lines. Foreign Minister said way to arrange Maceio and Loran facilities is to return it [to?] Itamaraty idea of Brazil request for US collaboration, in effect packaged deal which on one side would include “what we want, and on Brazilian side enough to satisfy military”. In this connection he also mentioned highway from Rio to “northeast defense area”. Thus (he argued inconsistently) overall project would be presented to Brazilian public as mutual defense effort initiated by Brazil and in those circumstances arrangements would not have to be submitted to Brazilian Congress.

As relevant to all of which Macedo Soares said he wished specifically our urgent support toward Minister of Aviation Fleuss by making available to Brazilian Air Force limited number 4-motor planes. This would also keep Air Force “on our side”. (He phoned Fleuss at that juncture and Minister joined us 5 minutes later, with request for assistance described following telegram.⁴)

My suggestion is that we inspect this clouded crystal ball in general context indicated by Itamaraty. I do not regard Macedo Soares’ remarks as a definite request that negotiations be returned Itamaraty nor am I convinced that if package deal were satisfactory in other particulars there might not result nationalistic demand that agreement be submitted to Brazilian Congress. (I reminded both Moura and Minister that Pentagon meeting scheduled July 17 specifically to consider Article 6 Fernando de Noronha Agreement.)

What emerges from these conversations is 1) fact that we can have communications and Loran facilities, but only for price of additional equipment, 2) it seems clear that if we decline meet price (or give up idea of new facilities) we may still be faced with considerable Brazilian military resentment.…

I recommend that conversations with Brazilian military in Washington be conducted with above firmly in mind.

Briggs

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 732.5622/7–1857. Secret. Transmitted in two sections.
2. In telegram 45, July 12, the Department explained that the Brazilian Foreign Minister had recently been informed that the six C–54’s Brazil had requested from the United States were not available. (Ibid., 732.5622/7–1057)
3. Documentation concerning these negotiations in Washington between Brazilian and U.S. representatives in regard to proposed military facilities agreements is ibid., Central Files 732.5–MSP and 711.56332.
4. Not further identified.