Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

353. Telegram From the Ambassador in Brazil (Briggs) to the Department of State¹

Rio de Janeiro, January 2, 1957—7 p.m.

656. Re Deptel 531.² Since I have heard nothing further from Foreign Office subsequent to December 29 conversation reported Embtel 652³ and since I share Department’s growing concern as expressed December 31 to Ambassador Peixoto by Bernbaum, I am this afternoon sending following letter marked “personal and confidential” to Secretary General Moura:⁴

“There are certain aspects of the delay in reaching agreement on Fernando de Noronha which are giving me such increasing concern that I know you will not misunderstand my writing you this personal note. Washington has observed from various newspaper stories from Rio de Janeiro indications that an effort is being made to take advantage of Fernando de Noronha for bargaining purposes on economic collaboration and military equipment. The counterproductive results of such a situation on American opinion and in strengthening the position of those in the US advocating a quid pro quo for economic and military assistance rendered Brazil, will be apparent to you. Advocacy of a quid pro quo policy has previously carried little weight in Washington because of the sincere belief entertained in American Government circles that our relations with Brazil will be served by an avoidance of bargaining techniques and by emphasis on the merit of the various projects successively studied. This has clearly been illustrated by the volume of loans already extended to Brazil and by the fact that the recent $150,000,000 Export-Import Bank line of credit and the wheat agreement signed on December 31 were authorized by the American Government without any attempt to utilize them as bargaining instruments, for example, for a guided missiles tracking station.

“Washington is also concerned over indications in the press that the proposed Fernando de Noronha agreement may be represented to the Brazilian public as the basis for widespread concessions from the US in economic and military fields, thereby giving rise to exaggerated or unwarranted hopes and a danger that their subsequent frustration could place the Brazilian Government and its relations with the US in a difficult or embarrassing position.

“In that connection, there is the matter of a list, to which the Minister and you have referred in conversation on several occasions, as representing certain Brazilian estimates or proposals. You indicated such a list might be handed me on the date when our exchange of notes on Fernando de Noronha is effected. We shall of course be pleased to receive and give immediate study to any document which your government may desire to present, but I assume it is not proposed to give publicity to any such list or document, since to do so might create the erroneous impression that the American Government had made commitments as a part of the Fernando de Noronha agreement beyond those set forth in the agreement itself. Such an impression I am sure you will agree might be highly misleading and undesirable.

“In Washington our record of economic collaboration with Brazil is considered a good one, not justifying attempts for a ‘new program’. On the military side, our defense authorities are prepared to look into the military responsibilities accruing from the establishment of a missiles tracking station on Fernando de Noronha, but could hardly accept the proposition that this constitutes a basis for a commitment to grant extensive quantities of military equipment unrelated to the base. The readiness of the Defense Department to discuss the broader question of general military collaboration has already been made known, as you are aware, through the Embassy’s note of October 5, 1956, paragraph 3.

“I feel that it may be useful to you to have these observations in connection with our present efforts to conclude the Fernando de Noronha agreement at the earliest possible date.”

Briggs

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 732.5–MSP/1–257. Secret; Priority.
2. Supra.
3. See footnote 3, supra.
4. Auro Moura Andrade, Secretary General of the Brazilian Foreign Office.