Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

338. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)¹

Washington, July 20, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Negotiation of Military Facilities Agreement with Brazil

I believe Mr. Gray’s inquiry of you regarding our action on Defense’s request to obtain from Brazil an interim right to entry on Fernando de Noronha provides a good opportunity to discuss with Mr. Gray our problem of getting prompt answers from Defense to questions that have arisen in the course of our preparations for negotiations, and now the negotiations. This problem was discussed between Mr. Bennett² and Mr. Sayre on July 13. The background of our problem is as follows:

We have known since late 1952 that the Department of the Air Force is interested in a guided missile tracking station in Brazil. In early 1952 we were also advised that the Army had an interest in obtaining real estate in Brazil for an Army communications station. At that time, however, it was unwise for us to explore this problem with the Brazilians on a diplomatic level because the Brazilian Government was under vigorous attack both in its Congress and in the press for concluding a Military Assistance Agreement with the United States. It was over a year before the Brazilian Congress approved that Agreement. When Defense’s requirements became a little more firm we did agree, however, that Defense representatives could approach the Brazilian military and attempt to obtain approval for site surveys. This was done in late 1954 and 1955.

Brazil had a major political crisis in 1954 which resulted in the suicide of Vargas in August 1954. Vargas was followed by the caretaker government of Cafe Filho who was unwilling to make firm commitments. Brazil was also going through preparations for a presidential election which took place October 1955. All of these factors combined to make it unwise to attempt to negotiate such a delicate matter as a base agreement and have it become a major political issue in Brazil. Nevertheless, Defense went ahead with its surveys and completed them in early 1956.

The election in October 1955 was followed by continued political unrest for Brazil in which the military felt compelled to step in and install a temporary president in November 1955. After the inauguration of Kubitschek in January 1956, however, we advised Defense we were prepared to negotiate and informally asked for a revision of the Agreement Defense had proposed in October 1954, and for a restatement of Defense’s requirements. You made this request officially in your letter of March 29, 1956.³ Mr. Gray answered your letter in part on May 11,⁴ but as you pointed out in your letter to him of May 25,⁵ the Department could not undertake to negotiate an agreement until such time as Defense gave us the draft it wanted negotiated. We received an advance copy of the proposed agreement on June 21⁶ and this was forwarded to Ambassador Dunn, but formal Defense approval of the agreement was not received until June 26. It was then five months after we told Defense we were prepared to negotiate.

We sent our instruction to the Embassy on July 3⁷ and followed that by a telegram on July 5 asking the Embassy to present the Agreement it had received previously.⁸ The Embassy held its preliminary discussions with the Foreign Office on July 10 and reported these in telegram No. 45.⁹ Brazilian Foreign Office officials … suggested that the same facilities be negotiated under the terms of the MDA Agreement which had already been approved by the Brazilian Congress. Defense gave us its comments on July 18¹⁰ to a draft telegram to our Embassy on this point which we gave Defense on July 11.

Mr. Gray should be aware that his own Department has not handled this matter on a priority basis and that the difficulty we have in getting answers from Defense has held us up considerably. On the specific question about an interim right of entry on Fernando de Noronha, our Embassy has recommended against making such a request until it could present our proposals to the Brazilian Government. We have been unable to do this because Defense did not give us formal clearance until June 26 to negotiate and has now taken over a week to answer the Embassy’s inquiry about handling the negotiations under the MDA Agreement.

I would suggest Mr. Gray also be informed that we are prepared to make a request for interim right of entry for the guided missile station when we receive Defense clearance on a reply to our Embassy’s questions about negotiating under the MDA Agreement. We have also asked the President to bring this problem to the attention of the Brazilian President during the Panama meeting.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56332/7–2056. Secret. Drafted by Sayre.
2. W. Tapley Bennett.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 732.5–MSP/3–1956)
4. Not printed. (Ibid., 732.5–MSP/5–1156)
5. Not printed. (Ibid.)

6. The proposed agreement was enclosed in a letter from Lieutenant General Alonzo. P. Fox of ISA to Murphy. The agreement reads in part:

   “The facilities which the Department of Defense desire are:

   • “1. Guided Missile Tracking Station on Fernando de Noronha;
   • “2. Two airbases, one at Belem and one at Natal;
   • “3. An Army communications facility in the area of Maceio; and
   • “4. Permission for the establishment of three Coast Guard Loran Stations.

   “Pending completion of negotiations for the new agreement, the Air Force has an immediate requirement for an interim right of entry at Fernando de Noronha to permit the start of construction. The Embassy is therefore requested to seek such right of entry to be effective on or before July 1, 1956.

   “It is apparent from reports by the Embassy that the Brazilian Government plans to treat our request for military facilities on a quid pro quo basis. The Embassy should make clear early in the negotiations, however, that the United States hopes the Brazilian Government will receive our proposal for facilities in the same spirit of cooperation which has long characterized relations between the two countries and that the Brazilian Government will not make any particular Brazilian military request a prerequisite to providing the facilities we desire. The willingness of the United States to cooperate to the maximum extent possible with Brazil in the military field is demonstrated by the military assistance we have already provided and that which we are prepared to offer at this time.” (Ibid., 732.56311/6–2156)

7. Not printed. (Ibid., 732.5–MSP/7–356)
8. Telegram 21 to Rio de Janeiro, not printed. (Ibid., 732.5–MSP/7–556)
9. In telegram 45, Chargé Trimble reported that the Secretary General of the Brazilian Foreign Office had warned him that the proposed facilities agreement would certainly be attacked by opposition elements in Brazil and final action would be delayed. He had also suggested that a separate agreement of the kind contemplated would probably require Congressional approval. (Ibid., 732.5–MSP/7–1056)
10. Not found in Department of State files.