318. Memorandum of Discussion at the 264th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 3, 19551
Present at the 264th Council meeting were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were Mr. H. Chapman Rose for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Mr. Robert Matteson for the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; Assistant Secretary of State Holland (for item 5); Mr. Harry H. Schwartz, Department of State; the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the [Page 683] Acting Secretary of the Air Force (for Items 5 and 6); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; General W. B. Palmer for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, General Thomas D. White for the Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force, and Maj. Gen. Robert E. Hogaboom for the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Items 5 and 6); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President Anderson and Rockefeller; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1–4: “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security,” “U.S. Policy Toward Formosa and the Government of the Republic of China,” “U.S. Policy on Turkey,” and “The Arab-Israeli Situation.”]
5. Situation in Brazil Following the Elections (NSC Action No. 1454–b)
Mr. Allen Dulles first presented the more or less final figures on the recent Brazilian election. These figures showed that Kubitschek had undoubtedly been elected President and that Goulart had been elected Vice President of Brazil. He pointed out that both Kubitschek and Goulart had had the support of the Brazilian Communists in the election. There was no reason, however, to believe that Kubitschek had any pro-Communist tendencies. Goulart could be described as an opportunist who had played ball with the Communists in order to get to the top of the heap. The likelihood of a military coup to prevent Kubitschek from taking office was now slipping into the background.
Mr. Dulles then proceeded to outline the problems which would confront the new Brazilian administration: heavy inflation; a very serious foreign exchange problem; lack of power resources; the necessity of working with a Congress elected in 1954; and others. Mr. Dulles stated that he believed Kubitschek was relatively friendly to the United States—certainly as friendly as any other of the candidates in the recent election. Mr. Dulles concluded with the suggestion that Assistant Secretary Holland would probably wish to add to the statement he had made.
In the first instance, Secretary Holland expressed complete agreement with the statements made by Mr. Dulles. He said he could summarize the situation in Brazil as follows. The short-term situation was relatively favorable, but over the long term Brazil was facing serious problems which would require U.S. assistance. Among these problems the Communist situation was very tough. The Brazilian Communist Party was the largest and best led of all the Communist Parties in Latin America. Brazil’s future in the economic [Page 684] field would depend on coffee prices. Production of coffee would soon seriously outstrip consumption. Two years from now Brazil would face a serious coffee problem. With respect to U.S. policy toward Brazil, Secretary Holland pointed out that we had undertaken to delineate a program of economic reform which we believed Brazil should undertake to execute. We proposed to press this program on Kubitschek when he came to the United States for his informal visit, probably during the period January 2 to 9 of next year.…
. . . . . . .
[Here follows discussion of agenda item 6, “Status of National Security Programs as of June 30, 1955: The Military Program.”]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on November 4.↩