Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

316. Memorandum of Discussion at the 262d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 20, 1955¹

Washington, October 20, 1955

Present at the 262nd meeting were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General;² the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament;² the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission;² the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Assistant Secretary of State Bowie; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Assistant to the President;³ Special Assistant to the President Dillon Anderson; Special Assistant to the President Nelson Rockefeller; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

[Here follows discussion of agenda item 1, the forthcoming Foreign Ministers meeting, and the opening portion of agenda item 2, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

At the conclusion of Mr. Dulles’ regular briefing, the Vice President inquired whether Mr. Dulles had any late information on developments in the Brazilian election. Mr. Dulles replied that he had not planned to discuss this matter on the present occasion but he could say that Kubitschek had been clearly elected President. Mr. Dulles added that he was not inclined to agree with those who said that Kubitschek was a fellow-traveler despite the fact that he had had the support of the Communists in the electoral campaign. In fact, Mr. Dulles predicted that the United States would probably be able to work successfully with Kubitschek.

Governor Stassen, who expressed doubt as to Kubitschek’s reliability, said that in any case the Communist trick might well be to assassinate Kubitschek in two years or so. Then Goulart, the Vice-President … would take over control of Brazil. He believed that this was a situation which bore watching.

After further discussion, including a discussion of the possibility of a coup d’état to prevent Kubitschek’s getting the Presidency, the Vice President stated that the problem of the Brazilian election deserved more discussion than time permitted at the present meeting. Perhaps, he thought, the NSC Planning Board, together with Assistant Secretary of State Holland, should do some thinking about the problem and present their views to the National Security Council at its next meeting.…

Governor Stassen once again emphasized his belief that the situation in Brazil was actually far more serious than the U.S. Government had realized over the past two years.

Admiral Strauss⁴ pointed out that the AEC had sent a mission to Rio last spring which had negotiated a contract for exploration.⁵ Moreover, negotiations were about to begin on providing Brazil with an atomic reactor. He wondered whether the developments which were being discussed suggested that the AEC should move more cautiously and slowly than it had planned. Mr. Nelson Rockefeller said that he did not think so. He believed that the thing for the United States to do was to try to work with Kubitschek as much as possible and to bring him and his followers into the Western camp. Secretary Humphrey agreed with this position as did the Vice President.

Mr. Dulles again said that he would get together with Secretary Holland and prepare a report on Brazil for next week’s meeting.

Assistant Secretary of State Bowie said that Secretary Holland believed that the United States could work successfully with Kubitschek if he stayed in power.

[Here follows discussion of several other agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on October 21.
2. Did not attend the reconvened meeting at 2 p.m. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. Did not attend the reconvened meeting at 2 p.m. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. Did not attend the reconvened meeting at 2 p.m. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Did not attend the morning session of the meeting. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.
5. For text of this agreement for a cooperative program for reconnaissance of the uranium resources of Brazil, effected by an exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro on August 3, 1955, and entered into force on the same date, see 6 UST (pt. 3) 3835.