245. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President of Banco de la Nación of Argentina (Carlos Coll Benegas) and Viron P. Vaky of the Office of South American Affairs, Washington, October 29, 19571
SUBJECT
- Argentine Financial Assistance
The following conversation took place at lunch.
Dr. Coll began by indicating he was disheartened by the results of his visit, and intimated that he felt a hardening of the US attitude toward Argentina. His main worry, he indicated, was what people in Argentina would think who might not understand the situation and problems here. The Argentines he said must judge by realities, and might feel that the US did not care about Argentina.
It was very difficult, Dr. Coll mused, to be treated like a schoolboy with the school master saying you did fine on that problem but you forgot the comma over here, so let’s see how you do next term and maybe you will get a better mark.
Dr. Coll said that he and Dr. Krieger had worked very hard to get the right economic measures pushed through. Both he and the Minister fought through the banking reforms almost alone. Having fought so hard to do the right thing, it was doubly discouraging to be patted indulgently on the head and told only that there is much more to be done.
Dr. Coll said that the most important thing at this point was the psychological factor. The Government and the pro-US elements must have some sign to show of US support. It is not at this stage as important to actually get cash, and to say that no help can now be given because the money was not immediately available did not relieve the situation. If only the US could say that we are interested in Argentina and while we cannot make commitments we will study immediately this, that or the other thing, it would be a great help.
I said that I could certainly assure him that the US was very interested in Argentina and sympathetic to its problems. We desired to be as helpful as we could. There were obviously factors which we had to take into consideration in determining how we could help, such practical matters, for example, as the Bank’s lending authority and similar problems. I noted, that the Eximbank was prepared and had so informed Dr. Coll, to move in the private sector, and that the $15 million earmarked from the previous line of credit was not a limit. The Bank is prepared to go beyond that on a case by case [Page 494] basis. I said that I hoped there was no misunderstanding of the US position by his Government. I stated that we had been informed that the Foreign Minister indicated an Argentine understanding that the Eximbank had closed the door on private credits. This was certainly not the case. In fact the door was not closed anywhere, and the Bank was carefully considering Argentina’s situation.
Dr. Coll remarked sadly that the door might be open but he certainly could not get through it. He said that he had had some hopes when he arrived that additional assistance or support could be obtained in some field, but suddenly he felt as if the roof had collapsed and everything suddenly hardened. He had the impression that people felt it would be best if he left Washington as soon as possible. He said he was frankly groping in the dark. That was why he was leaving. He knew when his usefulness was ended. He said he had only been trying to convince people of the importance of this problem and not to pressure them.
Near the end of the conversation Dr. Coll brought up the CADE question. He said that he was sure it was badly handled, and it had hurt them. If he had been asked what to do he would have advocated not cancelling the concessions. He said that it was nevertheless a moral question, and his Government from its own viewpoint and needs was compelled to rectify that moral blot. The point was, he said, that the people who handled this situation did what they thought to be the honest and right thing. Having done so it hurt to be accused of being dishonest. He said that the Argentine Government also mishandled the explanation and should have explained the case better.
CADE, he said, had a great deal of influence in this country, and the incident had obviously prejudiced a good number of people here. I hastened to say that so far we were concerned the thing we regretted was the repercussions in trade and financial circles and the damage to the general economic climate. I emphasized strongly that the US Government was not concerned in the company’s problem as such. It was not an American problem and the company’s interest there presented no obstacle in US-Argentine relations. I said that I thought it very important that he and his Government not misconstrue comments he may have heard on this matter as anything indicating we were involved or linked to this company’s interests.
Dr. Coll said that that might be true of the State Department, but he felt sure, for example that the CADE case had a great influence on the IBRD. Moreover there were people in CADE (by context he implied SOFINA) who were very influential in this country.
Dr. Coll ended the conversation by remarking that he knew Argentina had many friends in this Government. He said he hoped [Page 495] the US would recognize the good will and intentions of his people, and just as we asked for recognition of the many problems we had to cope with internally that we recognize their problems.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 835.10/10–2957. Confidential. Drafted by Vaky.↩