Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

241. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of South American Affairs (Bernbaum) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow)¹

Washington, August 22, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Bilateral Military Pact with Argentina

Background

On May 13, the Argentine Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Beaulac that Argentina would like to begin talks on a military agreement, but would like the suggestion that negotiations be undertaken to come from us.² On May 29, in response to instructions, Ambassador Beaulac told the Minister that the US would be receptive if Argentina wished to negotiate such a pact, but felt that we were not in a position to take the initiative. The fact of general budgetary limitations restricting the amount of aid available and the inability to include Argentina in the FY-58 budget were also mentioned.³ In a subsequent conversation on June 3, the Minister suggested that the matter be left in suspense for the time being and that it might be taken up later.⁴ The Ambassador indicated he would discuss the matter further in Washington on his then-impending consultation. As things stand, therefore, we are under no particular obligation to reopen the matter ourselves, although our failure to follow up will clearly be taken as a turn down of the Argentine feeler.

From his conversations, the Ambassador deduced 1) that the Argentine Government sincerely wants a defense agreement with the US; 2) that it had overestimated how badly we wanted an agreement; and 3) that the Government’s enthusiasm for immediate negotiation was somewhat dampened by the realization that Argentina could not be included in the FY-58 program.

While in Washington, the Ambassador discussed the matter with State and Defense officials. It was decided that the JCS would be asked for a military evaluation of the desirability of a pact, and to consider whether negotiations for force objectives could be undertaken through the Argentine representatives on the IADB rather than a US survey team being sent to Argentina. On the basis of these decisions, a determination of the political aspects would be made, and the Embassy instructed accordingly.

The JCS have determined that a pact with Argentina is desirable. In a letter to Mr. Murphy dated August 6, Defense requests that State initiate action to secure such an agreement with Argentina. Defense states, however, that no discussion as to missions or force objectives be undertaken until an on-the-ground survey by a US military team has been accomplished, “it being considered impractical by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish a judicious determination of the extent of military assistance to Argentina without a survey of the status of Argentine military forces and their equipment.” A copy of this letter is attached.⁵

Discussion

The first thing to be decided, of course, is whether we want a military agreement with Argentina. This has been answered from the technical or military standpoint—we do. I believe it is fair to say that, politically, closer military cooperation through a pact is a desirable and useful means of bringing Argentina further out of isolation and closer to us, and hence a desirable goal in furtherance of basic policy objectives. I believe it also fair to accept the premises that 1) the present Argentine Government wants closer relations with us in all fields; 2) it wants more military assistance from us, preferably grant aid.

Given these premises and the Defense request that we negotiate such a pact, we must now answer the questions: 1) Do we want to negotiate with the Provisional Government, given the fact of its limited tenure and the present political situation? 2) Are we prepared to assume the risk of political attack in Argentina against us and against the Provisional Government, and to take the risk of possible failure of the negotiations, if the Argentine Government also is prepared to take these risks?

The answer to the above two questions must take into account a) the present political situation and existence of nationalistic sentiment, and the possibility that feeling may run high enough to undercut the Government and even endanger its stability; b) the possibility that negotiations may fail with consequent adverse effects on the US position in Argentina; and c) the possibility that an elected Government might not respect the agreement and seek to denounce it.

It is possible that Argentina has changed its mind, and would decline to proceed further. In that event, the matter could be closed. However, on the supposition that it is still interested, and starting from the general proposition that a pact is desirable from both the military and political viewpoints, I believe that only some overriding risk to the general US interest deriving from the particular political situation in Argentina should prevent us from seeking to negotiate such a pact. This belief is strengthened by the fact that it would be unwise to decline to negotiate with this government so long as we have similar agreements with its neighbors and most of the other American Republics. This is true even though the same reasons that prompted us to negotiate with the other countries do not exist today.

In assessing the magnitude of risks involved, we must concede that there would be nationalistic opposition to such a pact and to negotiations. Possibly, such opposition would reach sufficient magnitude or become vocal enough to cause the Argentine Government to back off of negotiations after they started, or even to force a change in the Government. Another risk is that the Government may be forcefully changed, due to other causes, and that some persons may mistakenly establish a relationship of cause and effect between the negotiations and the change in Government.

As of June the Embassy believed that the Government had carefully estimated the probable importance of nationalistic opposition and had discounted it. The situation is somewhat changed now, following the Constituent Assembly elections, and the Government may feel the risk now worthwhile. I have asked for Ambassador Beaulac’s assessment on this point. As a general proposition, however, the Provisional Government seems more stable now than last May.

If the Argentine Government weighs the risks and decides they are too great to proceed, we, of course, have no problem. If they decide the risks are not an obstacle and are willing to take them, and the Embassy concurs in this assessment, I believe that we should go along. To a considerable extent such risks can be minimized by seeking to avoid protracted negotiations or publicity while they are in progress.

As to the possibilities that the negotiations might fail, one cause of failure might be the nationalistic opposition already discussed above. As indicated, the answer here would be the assessment of how realistic such a possibility might be by both the Argentine Government and our Embassy. However, we should also consider that negotiations might fail because the Argentines find they will not get out of it what they thought they would. This risk can be minimized by making as clear as possible in advance what the Argentines may expect and by obtaining clear agreement as to the conditions of negotiation. If the Argentines still wish to proceed, the risks would seem minimal that negotiations would fail for that reason. Since the point of most interest to the Argentines will be how much aid they get and the missions to be agreed on, and since this is just the information we cannot give with any precision ahead of time, this is a practical problem. It is further discussed below.

With regard to the possibility of repudiation by a successor government, this, of course, is always a possibility. There is, however, a greater possibility that a successor government, even one headed by Frondizi, would respect it and try to utilize it. This seems true because if negotiated, it can be assumed that the military would have generally supported it and would stand to gain by it. An elected government is hence not likely to risk antagonizing military support. The tendency of the Argentine military toward closer relations with us can be expected to continue, and this tendency would have to be taken seriously by any government, whether or not the political party or parties in power themselves strongly favor that tendency. It seems to me that the chances are in favor of acceptance by a successor.

Another aspect, however, is that negotiations may not be completed before a successor government comes in, and that either we would have to start all over or find that the successor regime will not want to carry on for political reasons. The answer here would be to insure a quick negotiation by reaching a considerable degree of pre-understanding. In any case, the risk of not being able to complete the negotiation would not seem serious enough to warrant great concern, except in the circumstance that the US was made to appear as the initiator or the “pusher” for such an agreement vis-à-vis the Provisional Government. I do not for that reason believe that we should agree to appear to be the initiator as suggested by the Foreign Minister, since we only increase the risks to our position in Argentina thereby.

It is clear that the risks derived from the points raised above can be considerably minimized by telling the Argentines plainly in advance what we would expect from them and what they would expect from us. It had been hoped that we could avoid the procedure of sending a joint survey team down before being able to determine or negotiate on force objectives and the extent of grant aid. Defense, however, insists on the survey. If negotiations on the general agreement and on the classified addendum proceed together, as I understand is generally done, the political risks are increased. This is so, because it would require the presence in advance of signature of a US military team. This would make virtually impossible the avoidance of publicity and speculation, would mean a longer negotiation, and would give the opposition considerably more time to whip up sentiment against it. A solution, acceptable to Defense, would be to negotiate and sign first the unclassified and relatively innocuous general agreement and give it publicity. We could then proceed to negotiate the classified annex on missions as the circumstances indicate. The opportunity to gauge the reaction to the general agreement will indicate when and how to proceed to the other, and any publicity surrounding the military survey team will be irrelevant since the survey would be expected.

The disadvantage, of course, is that the Argentines would be asked to agree to the general agreement without knowing what specific “reward” they will get out of it, and we naturally would have to get Argentine understanding of this and acceptance of the procedure before we proceeded with any negotiations at all. We could justify the procedure to the Argentines by pointing out the adverse effect upon our relations of any failure to conclude negotiations satisfactorily once they were initiated due to adverse publicity or nationalistic opposition. We might also be able to give some general indication of the magnitude of aid to enable the Argentines better to decide whether they wish to embark on such a course.

Recommendation

I recommend that Ambassador Beaulac be instructed to reopen the matter with the Foreign Minister along the following lines:

1. The US Government appreciates Argentina’s suggestion with reference to a possible Bilateral Military Agreement and would welcome such an agreement with Argentina.

2. Our Government has shared the apprehensions expressed in the past by Argentine officials regarding possible political repercussions and risks to the negotiations of such an agreement, particularly during the forthcoming political campaign in Argentina, and assumes that the Argentine Government has given full consideration to this situation.

3. If the Argentine Government continues to believe that such possible political repercussions should not constitute an obstacle to negotiation of a military agreement, the US is prepared to negotiate with the following understanding:

a. It is too late to assure inclusion of Argentina in any FY–58 program.

b. In any event, the amount of military aid which might become available to Argentina would be limited by budgetary considerations. (If possible, give here some idea. This would seem essential.)

c. Agreement concerning the military mission which Argentina would undertake (force objectives) would be arrived at following a survey and on-the-ground discussions with Argentine officers by a joint US military team, which Defense is prepared to send to Argentina.

d. To avoid undesirable publicity or protracted negotiation, the US believes it would be desirable to negotiate and sign first the standard general agreement establishing the general principle of military collaboration, following which the agreement as to missions can be worked out. (This can be justified as above.)

4. Joint announcement of negotiations can be made without reference to which country suggested negotiation, or reference might be made to the general US interest in such pacts expressed some years ago with reference to the entire question of hemisphere defense.

We are now drafting a request for Circular 175⁶ authorization to negotiate and to clear an instruction to the Embassy along the above lines.⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 735.5–MSP/8–2257. Secret. Drafted by Vaky.
2. Beaulac reported this development to the Department in telegram 1134 from Buenos Aires, May 14. (Ibid., 735.5–MSP/5–1457)
3. Beaulac reported this conversation to the Department in telegram 1214 from Buenos Aires, May 31. (Ibid., 735.5–MSP/5–3157)
4. Beaulac reported this conversation to the Department in telegram 1231 from Buenos Aires and despatch 1490 from Buenos Aires, both June 4. (Both ibid., 735.5–MSP/6–457) The Department had instructed him to pursue this approach in telegram 1257 to Buenos Aires, May 23. (Ibid., 735.5–MSP/5–2357)
5. Not printed. (Ibid., 735.5–MSP/8–657)
6. Circular 175, December 13, 1955, concerned the proper exercise of the treaty and executive agreement-making power of the United States, as well as the approval of texts of treaties and the making of arrangements for signature. It is in a file retained by the Records Management and Regulations Division of the Bureau of Personnel, Department of State.

7. In a handwritten comment on the source text, dated October 21, Snow noted the following: “We are now awaiting Presidential determination re Argentina’s eligibility under our MSA law before drawing up instructions for Amb. Beaulac.”

   In A–161 to Buenos Aires, November 8, the Department attached a draft text of a military assistance agreement between Argentina and the United States, “which it is proposed to negotiate, should the circumstances indicate.” For the present, the Department explained, the Embassy was requested to do the following:

   • “1. To submit a current assessment of the political risks involved, and an estimate of whether, on balance, it would be in the US interest to reopen this matter at this time.
   • “2. To submit its judgment as to whether the Provisional Government continues to desire such an agreement. The Ambassador may, in his discretion, informally sound out the Foreign Minister as to present Government desires. It is repeated, however, that authority to negotiate has not been obtained, and the impression should not be given that the US is immediately prepared to enter into negotiations.
   • “3. If reactions to paragraphs 1 and 2 are affirmative, to review the attached text and submit its comments. The Embassy should particularly note any wording or provisions which might in its judgment be troublesome in negotiation.” (Department of State, Central Files, 735.5–MSP/6–457)

   In despatch 800 from Buenos Aires, December 5, Ambassador Beaulac enclosed a memorandum of a conversation which he had with the Argentine Foreign Minister on December 4, “during which we agreed that because of the imminence of national elections in Argentina, the present would not be an appropriate time to negotiate a military agreement with Argentina.” (Ibid., 735.5–MSP/12–557)