Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

204. Telegram From the Ambassador in Argentina (Nufer) to the Department of State¹

Buenos Aires, December 13, 1955—2 p.m.

659. The pressures on the revolutionary government which the Department foresaw in its telegram 275 September 21² have existed and continue to exist but there is general Embassy agreement that the provisional government which took over after September 16 revolution (first headed by Lonardi and now by Aramburu) has thus far resisted those pressures beyond our fondest hopes, is the friendliest toward US which has existed here for many years, and has demonstrated democratic convictions and purposes. Both factors—friendly disposition toward US and democratic orientation—have been relatively infrequent in Argentina history and do not have firm, deep roots. It, therefore, appears important and in our own best interests to help nurture this tender plant and do what we can ensure its continuance and further growth. The alternatives of a return to oligarchic government, resurgence of Peronism under whatever name, or rapid spread of Communism are certainly not reassuring and we should move promptly to do what we can to help forestall them.

We must be prepared for possible further changes of personalities, similar to change which forced Lonardi out and replaced him by another comparatively unknown general. Tendencies, however, are often more important than personalities and changes do not necessarily mean situation has worsened. There is reason to believe, in fact, that general tenor of government under Aramburu is better than existed under Lonardi. We may see further such changes; we should be prepared to take them in our stride and to carry through a consistent policy, provided changes do not mean success of one of the alternatives mentioned above. In particular, we must keep constantly in mind that our principal enemy is Communism and we must be sufficiently flexible to be able to support any government clearly prepared to carry torch against Communist ideology. In adopting policy of affirmative assistance we of course take calculated risk of (1) conversion of government to ultra-nationalist policy with anti-US bias, as would prospectively be case if intransigent radicals came to power or (2) development of some new form of dictatorship.

In light of present situation—10 years of dictatorship, when few people had opportunity to learn by experience art of governing—and in view many favorable factors which exist now, but which may not exist for long, I strongly recommend we promptly undertake policy of concrete assistance to Argentina, that it be followed through even in face of possible discouraging developments which may well ensue from existing circumstances. The successful visit of Holland group came at propitious time and further strengthened friendliness toward United States of those now in power, but feeling of let down will almost inevitably ensue unless we can take prompt steps to show we approve and support friendly disposition and democratic orientation which important elements of government have so clearly manifested. Specifically, I recommend for Department’s consideration following policies to be pursued actively by US in immediate future:

Economic Aid

The San Nicholas credit remains open and it appears provisional government will take it up. However, this is tagged with Peron label and will do little to win additional support for revolution. I do not mean to belittle its future importance for Argentina and think we should do everything we can to see that project is completed quickly and efficiently; but it will, I am afraid, be of minor help to present government.³ General public expects additional help and this must be forthcoming if government is to be effectively assisted maintain itself against many contrary forces. Therefore, Embassy recommends that when specific requests for credits received they be considered promptly and not only in light present Argentine ability to repay but that good credit record, future economic growth potential, and politico-security factors also be taken into consideration (as was seemingly contemplated by Department telegram 275).

Military

Argentine Navy is one of soundest, most stabilizing and democratic forces in Argentina; has been and remains unitedly behind revolutionary government. Through Vice President Rojas and its officer corps, it has consistently and actively supported democratic objectives of revolution. Navy has widespread popular support, especially among middle and upper classes and has shown itself willing and able assume responsibilities thus placed upon it. I believe, therefore, it is in our interest to supply on best possible terms equipment which has been requested through diplomatic channels for Navy. I recommend we take prompt steps to supply available material and that we move promptly on negotiations regarding substitutes for unavailable items. (All this is of course on assumption official government request for naval assistance will be maintained despite deprecatory attitude on its importance reflected by Aramburu in informal luncheon conversation with Holland.)

No requests from Air Force have yet been made but, if and when received, should be given prompt sympathetic attention. Air Force has certain tradition, although briefer in time and not so firmly fixed, with respect to separation of military career from politics and this should be encouraged. As raised by Argentines in talk with Douglass during Holland visit reestablishment US air mission is distinct possibility which we should of course promote.

The question of army assistance impresses me as being longer term problem. It should be considered as one of main tasks of military survey team if such team established; I assume we will want to await Argentine initiative. We should however look forward to possible general military aid agreement and to re-establishment of military mission.

Embassy would appreciate receiving Department’s instructions on any of these matters which should be followed up here. It would seem desirable I receive early indication Department’s thinking on matters outlined above so initiative attained during Holland visit and as result of message to Lonardi (Embassy telegram 321 September 22⁴) will not be lost.⁵

Nufer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.35/12–1355. Secret.
2. Document 194.
3. The agreement in question, the Export-Import Bank loan of $60 million for construction of an Argentine steel mill, was signed in Washington on February 27, 1956, by representatives of the Bank and SOMISA. Bernbaum informed Nufer of the signing in a telephone conversation that same day. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Bernbaum; Department of State, Central Files, 835.10/2–2756)
4. Not printed.
5. In telegram 616 to Buenos Aires, December 16, the Department explained that it had been pleased to receive the Embassy’s “thoughtful estimate” of the Argentine situation and concurred with the Embassy on the desirability for extending concrete assistance to the new government. The Department commented specifically on the Embassy’s aid suggestions and pointed out that requests for military assistance should not be brought into discussions with the economic mission. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.35/12–1355) In a memorandum to Holland, also dated December 16, Bernbaum explained why OSA believed it was desirable that requests for military assistance not be combined with discussions on economic aid, stressing that any combined talks might serve to deepen the existing split in the new Argentine Government. (Ibid.)