Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

193. Telegram From the Ambassador in Argentina (Nufer) to the Department of State¹

Buenos Aires, September 20, 1955—4 p.m.

305. Once truce negotiations are successfully concluded a definitive military junta (to replace present temporary one) will doubtless emerge and question recognition will arise. We believe US should be prepared recognize new government as soon as we have satisfied ourselves it has effective control, that it can maintain law and order, and will respect Argentina’s international obligations. Without acting with undue haste, I believe we should be among first to recognize. If Department believes prior consultation with other American states necessary, it is hoped undue delay can be avoided. We would not want to follow European and especially Iron Curtain countries, while on other hand, earliest possible recognition would clearly demonstrate our positive policy toward Argentina was dictated by best interests both countries and not addressed to Peron or dependent on his continuance in power.

Although too early forecast new government’s attitude toward US, especially as its composition as yet unknown, it doubtless will more than ever require economic help from US if it is to recover from present upheaval within any reasonable time. I believe this help should be forthcoming if new government policies make this at all possible.

While as previously said, final composition of new government not yet known, it can be assumed it will consist of high ranking military men probably representing both revolutionary factions most of whom until recently Peron supporters who received their high ranks and position under Peron regime. Such a junta would have to conduct affairs of state until elections can be called so that barring unforeseen developments junta will remain in power for months and perhaps even a year or more. The revolution at the outset, therefore, does not represent immediate shift of political power to opposition parties which have been espousing anti-US policies.

Seems important recognize in this connection that revolution was in no sense uprising of civilians against government. It was a military split in which initially smaller group rebels, who represented discontent and opposition of large segment population, finally took action. Final outcome was determined by fact that other military units, not originally with the rebels, defected to them. Overt civilian opposition sentiment was not expressed until issue was decided at which time those opposed to government came into streets of Buenos Aires in large numbers to celebrate. Whether important civilian participation occurred in Cordoba we do not yet know. British Military Attaché’s observations (Embtel 303)² suggest this was not case during fighting.

Above represents our preliminary views upon which we would appreciate the Department’s observations.³

Nufer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 735.00/9–2055. Confidential; Priority.
2. Dated September 20, not printed. (Ibid.)

3. At a meeting of the Secretary’s Staff on September 22, Lyon discussed recent developments in Argentina as follows:

   “Mr. Lyon reported on the Junta of four Generals and one Admiral which had come to power in Argentina. He said that he and Mr. Holland had met with the Business Advisory Group of the Department of Commerce yesterday and that senior executives of American firms with interests in Argentina are generally optimistic. He said that they expect certain difficulties over the next few months during the transitionary period but view the long-term future with relief.” (Notes of the Secretary’s Staff Meeting; ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)