Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

105. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE–83.3–56

Washington, 27 September 1956.

PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL STABILITY IN NICARAGUA²

The Problem

To estimate the prospects for political stability in Nicaragua (1) if President Somoza recovers from his wounds, or (2) if President Somoza should die.

Conclusions

1. If President Somoza should recover and resume his office, his regime would probably be able to maintain itself indefinitely in power, although there would probably be a considerable intensification of political unrest in Nicaragua.

2. If President Somoza should die or be unable to exercise his office, Luis Somoza, his son and legally designated successor, would probably be accepted as interim president pending early elections. The demand for and expectation of political change in Nicaragua would be greatly stimulated and the struggle for the eventual succession would be intense. The position of the Guardia would be crucial.

3. Present indications are that, in these circumstances, the Somozistas would attempt to substitute Luis Somoza for his father as the Liberal candidate for president and to elect him in the same manner as his father would have been. Such a course could be prevented only by the defection of a major portion of the Guardia, which at present appears unlikely. Luis Somoza would not be as strong a president as his father has been, but would almost certainly be able to maintain his position so long as he retained the united support of the Guardia.

4. There remain possibilities for a different development of the situation between now and election day: (a) Luis Somoza may be shaken by a rising demand for political change and shrink from the repressive measures required to control it; (b) the Somozistas may not unite in support of his candidacy; (c) a substantial element in the Guardia may defect in favor of another political solution. In these circumstances, either Luis Somoza or the effective leadership of the Guardia might make a deal with the opposition leading to the election of a president acceptable to both sides. If the political situation should become so confused that no agreement among contending factions seemed possible, the Guardia would probably feel compelled to act as arbiter and install a government of its own choice.

Discussion

Background

5. President Somoza, through his control of the Guardia Nacional, the only armed force in Nicaragua, has been in effective control of that country ever since the withdrawal of the US military occupation in 1932. He has occupied the presidency himself since 1936, except for a brief interval (1947–1950) during which he continued to control the Guardia. In anticipation of the presidential election to be held in February 1957, he procured the removal of the constitutional prohibition against re-election and presented himself as the candidate of the Liberal Party. Inasmuch as he completely controlled the electoral machinery, his re-election was a certainty.

6. The Liberals’ traditional opposition in Nicaragua is the Conservative Party. One faction of this party, by an accommodation with the Somoza regime, has been assured of one-third of the seats in the National Congress. Recently, however, even this faction has become restive regarding the prospect of Somoza’s perpetuation of himself in power. Conservative Nicaraguans desiring a change in the regime profess to fear that, if it is not accomplished soon by conservatives, it will be accomplished eventually, with violence, by radicals. There is reason to believe that a Conservative revolutionary attempt was in preparation, designed to forestall the re-election of Somoza in February, but that these conspirators were surprised by the unrelated assassination attempt.

7. Another opposition element is the Independent Liberal Party composed of Liberals who broke with Somoza in 1945, and, in conjunction with the Conservatives, demonstrated preponderant electoral strength in the election of 1947. This group could prove a significant factor in a fluid political situation.

8. Another factor in the situation is Colonel Manuel Gomez Flores, a former Guardia officer who mortally hates Somoza and is the leader of a motley group of Nicaraguan exiles, former Caribbean Legionnaires, and other quasi-professional revolutionaries, including some Communists.

9. The outlawed Communist Party, which numbers fewer than 200 militants in Nicaragua, has not been consistently anti-Somoza. Some Communists are known to belong to a pro-Somoza labor front, others to an anti-Somoza labor front.

Present Situation

10. There is so far no evidence to connect the would-be assassin with any political group and the attempted assassination has been followed by no related revolutionary attempt. The Guardia, in particular, appears to be loyal to Somoza. A state of siege has been proclaimed and numerous opposition leaders have been arrested.

11. Luis Somoza, the President’s elder son, is in temporary charge of the situation as President of the Congress and the constitutionally designated successor in the event of his father’s death. Despite this designation, Luis Somoza is a colorless figure, lacking in his father’s qualities of personality and leadership. The other important personalities in the regime are Colonel Francisco Gaitan, the Minister of Defense, and Colonel Anastasio Somoza, Jr. (“Tachito”), the President’s younger and favored son, who is in immediate command of the Guardia. Gaitan is an old soldier who came up from the ranks and is highly regarded in the Guardia, particularly by senior officers who resent and distrust “Tachito”. “Tachito” is a violent, impulsive, and arrogant character, not generally popular in the Guardia. However, he may be able to exploit the impatience of younger Guardia officers with their seniors.

Prospects

12. Even if President Somoza should fully recover, his near-elimination will have had a stimulating effect upon the stagnant political situation in Nicaragua. Unrest will have been intensified, and this may encourage further efforts to overthrow the regime. These results would be even more probable if Somoza had a long convalescence or if he did not fully recover from his wounds. Unrest would also increase if there were violent and indiscriminate retaliation upon opposition leaders for alleged complicity in the attempted assassination. However, so long as Somoza is capable of exercising command the Guardia will probably remain united in support of him. With this support he could maintain himself against any opposition, although the task would be more difficult if he were in ill health.

13. If President Somoza should die or be unable to exercise his office, Luis Somoza, his son and legally designated successor, would probably be accepted as interim president pending early elections. The demand for and expectation of political change in Nicaragua would be greatly stimulated and the struggle for the eventual succession would be intense. In these circumstances, the position of the Guardia would be crucial, and much would depend on whether the principal adherents of Somoza remained united.

14. In the event of President Somoza’s death or incapacitation, the most effective course, from a Somozista point of view, would be to substitute Luis Somoza as the Liberal candidate for president and to elect him in the same manner as his father would have been elected. Present indications are that this course would be attempted. Luis being willing and the Somozistas being agreed among themselves, it could be prevented only by the defection of a major portion of the Guardia, which at present appears to be unlikely. Luis Somoza would not be as strong a president as his father has been and opposition to a continuation of the Somoza regime would be substantial. However, given the continued united support of the Guardia, Luis Somoza would almost certainly be able to maintain his position as president.

15. There remain, however, possibilities for a different development of the situation between now and election day: (a) Luis Somoza, who is considered to be irresolute, may be shaken by a rising demand for political change and shrink from the repressive measures required to control it; (b) the Somozistas may not unite in support of his candidacy; (c) a substantial element in the Guardia may defect in favor of another political solution. In these circumstances, either Luis or the effective leaders of the Guardia might make a deal with the opposition leading to the election of a president acceptable to both sides. The feasibility of this solution would depend on its acceptance by the leaders of the Guardia.

16. If the political situation should become so confused that no agreement among contending factions seemed possible, the Guardia would probably feel compelled to act as arbiter and install a government of its own choice.

17. “Tachito” has threatened violent reprisals on the opposition if his father dies, and is believed personally capable of carrying out this threat. If he were to do so, there would be a strong revulsion of feeling in Nicaragua and a Guardia junta might feel compelled to take over.

18. It is unlikely that either exiled revolutionary elements (e.g., the group led by Colonel Gomez) or the weak Communist Party in Nicaragua could succeed in gaining control of the situation, even in circumstances of political instability and confusion.

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. Files of National Intelligence Estimates, Special Estimates, and Special National Intelligence Estimates are retained by the Directorate for Regional Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems on an immediate or crisis basis. SNIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of Cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of SNIEs.
2. According to a note on the cover sheet, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on September 27.