187. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) and Philip J. Farley of the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs to the Secretary of State1
Washington, September 26,
1956.
SUBJECT
- Proposed Approach to Adenauer on EURATOM
- 1.
- The Foreign Ministers of the Six will meet in Paris October 8 to discuss the outstanding disagreements in the Brussels negotiations on Euratom and the Common Market. Mollet and Adenauer at a preliminary meeting this weekend will try to resolve their major points of difference. These two meetings may be decisive for the course of the Brussels Conference, and will probably determine whether a Euratom Treaty before the end of the year is a possibility.
- 2.
- The major disagreement in the Euratom conference arises from the German position against common ownership (by Euratom) of all fissionable materials, similar to the control our own AEC exercises over this material. The other five governments represented in the Brussels talks are agreed not only that such common ownership is technically necessary if Euratom is to exercise “airtight control”, but also that its acceptance in the proposed Treaty is an essential test of the willingness of the Six countries to share fully their resources in this field. Mollet in particular has taken a commitment to this effect in the National Assembly debate in July.
- 3.
- Franz Joseph Strauss, who has so far determined the German position on this central issue, is pushing for freedom for German private industry to own and freely dispose of fissionable materials, subject only to control by the German government through the Laender, and a general review by Euratom. The others have not accepted this position.
- 4.
- The opponents of the Strauss position (which include Brentano and other C.D.U. leaders) have been making efforts to obtain Chancellor Adenauer’s intervention. Monnet and Etzel have recently [Page 467] seen the Chancellor and have some hope that he will modify the German position. However, the Chancellor is not committed, and given the internal German political struggle, would have difficulty in overcoming Strauss and his industrial backers on this issue.
- 5.
- Ambassador Conant, when he was here a few weeks ago, felt that discreet U.S. intervention with the Chancellor on this issue might be effective. We agree with this judgment. In view of the forthcoming meetings, we feel we should do so now. A private message from you to the Chancellor would in our opinion be likely to have the most effect, and we have therefore prepared a draft of such a message.
Recommendation:
That you sign the attached telegram to Bonn containing a message to the Chancellor.2 (Tab A)