Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

185. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, August 30, 1956—7:41 p.m.

Topol 312. Ref: Polto 355 rptd info London unnumbered, Oslo 262, The Hague 378, Geneva 203.² Following are Department views Soviet All-European Economic Agreement for discussion at NATO meeting: Dept preliminary view when Agreement initially presented at ECE last April was that underlying purpose of USSR in Agreement was to disrupt Atlantic Alliance and Atlantic Community institutions, such as OEEC. Our view on this remains unchanged. Soviets have attempted deny charge their motivation in proposing Agreement is to undermine Atlantic Community organizations, contending All-European Agreement would supplement these Atlantic arrangements leaving existing institutions unaffected. Myrdal Executive Secretary ECE with whom Dept has discussed these preliminary views, has also disputed our interpretation Soviet motivation re proposed Agreement and has attempted persuade other countries benign intention Soviets. Our position on Soviet motivation reinforced by USSR blast at EURATOM in July in context proposal for European nuclear energy organization similar to one suggested in Article 14 of Agreement.

1) Consider proposed Agreement highly objectionable and one to which U.S. could not subscribe. From economic viewpoint treaty would not in any way add to prospects for sound economic cooperation. From political viewpoint proposed Agreement has very serious obstacles, major one being that Agreement has as underlying assumption (second paragraph Preamble) that closer economic cooperation will lead to solution problems of collective security and disarmament. This is argument Western powers have always rejected. Acceptance proposed Soviet Agreement could begin to reverse entire orientation western alliance on this important question. NATO alliance founded on awareness Soviet aggressive aims and fact that greater “confidence in relations between nations” dependent on more basic modifications of Soviet aims and actions than mere profession of its desire for “economic cooperation” particularly as defined this draft Agreement;

2) Generalized professed objectives, insofar as relate to genuine multilateral effort promote economic cooperation, already set forth in aims and largely met by existing organizations including UN, UNESCO, UNTAA, ECE, OEEC, GATT, IBRD, IMF, EPU and others. Necessity for reaffirmation these objectives by new agreement and new organization not apparent particularly as membership in most of existing organizations long has been open to USSR and satellites. Needless multiplicity of organizations and duplication of activities contrary to intent of UN Charter and would yield confusion and dissipation of efforts;

3) Based on premise “lessening of international tension has created favorable conditions for extending foreign trade …” (Preamble), proposed agreement (Article 5) would dismantle entire multilateral system of East-West strategic trade controls. Agreement also would go in opposite direction of liberal international trade policy through encouragement bilateral agreements and long-term bilateral trade arrangements. If provisions meaningful would also mean the end of GATT;

4) Several provisions proposed agreement merely restate work already being carried forward in ECE and are unobjectionable. Despite acceptability these provisions however see no reason accept body of agreement which is inimical Atlantic Alliance.

We hope NATO partners share U.S. appraisal Soviet proposal and will reject entire Agreement. You should press for this. If however certain members deem outright rejection undesirable as political tactic and wish discuss in NAC alternative ways of handling Soviet draft Agreement, one alternative which occurs to us might be to draw up list of questions to be submitted to USSR, attempting elicit more specific information of meaning and actual operation of certain more general proposals in draft Agreement, with view toward delaying consideration of Agreement beyond next plenary session of ECE in April. Other approaches may occur to USRO. Request comments.

Foregoing are broad major reactions to proposed agreements. Technical and economic study of Agreement currently underway here and will be submitted for OEEC consideration. Since proposed Agreement is addressed primarily to European countries and could come into force without US, US Rep should use discretion in utilizing foregoing views in open session and in order and method presentation. Will instruct further after report initial discussion and your recommendations. Would be most helpful have some indication prior meeting of country positions particularly UK and France.

Department attitude toward Soviet nuclear energy proposal unchanged from views expressed Circular 29 July 14, 1956.¹

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.00/8–2256. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Phillips and approved by Timmons. Repeated for information to London, Oslo, The Hague, Moscow, Geneva, and Bonn.
2. Polto 355, August 22, reported that the British Delegation to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) had informed the U.S. Delegation that it desired both NAC and OEEC discussion of the Soviet proposals for peaceful uses of atomic energy and for an all-European agreement on economic cooperation. (Ibid.)
1. Document 182. In telegram 454 to Geneva, October 19, the Department of State transmitted the text of the U.S. reply to the ECE Secretariat on the proposed Soviet Agreement on Economic Cooperation. (Department of State, Central Files, 840.00/10–1956)