Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

196. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, 24 July 1956.

Dear Mr. Secretary: The Taiwan Defense Commander and the Commander Seventh Fleet have an urgent requirement for aerial photographic coverage of inland targets and the distant strategic areas of military concentration on the Chinese mainland. The urgency of this requirement, as you are aware, lies in the fact that photographic coverage of air fields and supply installations, by indicating comparative activity, will furnish the critical indications which must precede Phase II of Chinese Communists’ operations against the Republic of China.

For more than a year the Government of the Republic of China (GRC), under the specific supervision of J–2, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) and the Intelligence Officer, Taiwan Defense Command, have been engaged in aerial reconnaissance of the coastal area of mainland China to ascertain the amount and kinds of air field, rail, and harbor construction being undertaken for possible Communist offensive purposes. Information gained from these overflights has been shared equally by the GRC and American intelligence agencies. These frequent flights have been and continue to be a principal source of vital early warning intelligence to the U.S. Forces charged with defending Taiwan.

The Chinese Communists through introduction of improved jet fighter aircraft are determined to stop the Chinese Nationalist Air Force deep reconnaissance activity. As the Communists have improved their capability for high altitude interception, the range and maximum operating ceiling of the available GRC aircraft have become inadequate to accomplish intelligence missions inland from the coast.² The presently programmed squadron of RF–84F aircraft must therefore be supplemented with aircraft having a higher operating ceiling capability if deep penetration reconnaissance missions are to be undertaken.

On the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, therefore, is planning to add a second reconnaissance squadron initially composed of six RF–86F’s which do not have a deep penetration capability and two RB–57 aircraft of the “Heart Throb” configuration which do have deep penetration characteristics. Concurrently, three light bomber squadrons equipped with obsolete aircraft are being deleted from the Chinese Nationalists force objectives.

Please be assured that neither the GRC, nor the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, fail to recognize the requirement for extreme circumspection in the use of such aircraft; General Chiang, because he must carefully select and husband his dependable pilots,³ and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, because of the obvious international complications and threat to his mission which would arise from compromise. The Department of Defense, therefore, requests the concurrence of the Department of State in the assignment of these aircraft in order that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, may fulfill the deep penetration portion of his intelligence mission. Defense Department action to deliver the deep penetration RB–57 planes is being deferred pending receipt of your comments on this matter.⁴

Gordon Gray

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.0022/7–2456. Top Secret.
2. On June 11 Defense Minister Yu Ta Wei raised the question of reconnaissance coverage with Deputy Assistant Secretary Sebald during a visit by Sebald to Taipei. The Minister pointed out that the Chinese Communists were building airfield complexes some 500–700 miles from the coast, and he asked the United States to provide reconnaissance aircraft with increased range so that reliable intelligence could be obtained. (Memorandum of conversation by Sebald, June 11; ibid., 793.563/6–1156)
3. On July 28 Gray sent a memorandum to Dulles to provide additional information in support of the proposal to transfer RB–57 aircraft to the Republic of China. Among the factors assessed in the memorandum was the Chinese reluctance to fly reconnaissance missions. Gray noted that the Republic of China had lost three pilot crews during the previous 15 months due to defection. President Chiang was, therefore, reluctant to order any reconnaissance flights beyond those requested by the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command. (Ibid, 793.0022/7–2856)

4. No reply to this letter has been found in Department of State files. According to notes prepared by Phyllis D. Bernau of a telephone conversation between Secretary Dulles and Allen Dulles on July 20, the Department was prepared to accede to the shipment of the RB–57 planes to Taiwan, but had some reservations concerning their use:

   “AWD returned the call and the Sec. said he had what was said to be an emergency call from Defense re sending aerial reconnaissance planes to Taiwan. Sec. said he thinks it said your people agreed. Sec. said he happened to think what AWD told him earlier and wondered whether it was coordinated. AWD said they were studying the matter but he did not know we made any request. The Sec. said they said you agreed. AWD said it should be coordinated and he will get hold of Cabell. The Sec. thinks the place is all right for local operations though they talked about considerable penetrations and this might be done through our friends there and if you are interested, it may be better to do it that way than the other. AWD will get hold of Cabell. The Sec. said Gray was calling us. We acceded to the shipping of planes and with the understanding their operations would be subject to further consideration.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)