Office of the Historian

387. Telegram From the Ambassador in France (Houghton) to the Department of State1

Paris, May 28, 1957—4 p.m.

6059. 1. We are concerned by implications Saigon’s 35222 to Department indicating that at Vietnamese Government request US considering assignment American advisers to fill vacuum caused by withdrawal French military mission.

2. FonOff and French military apparently convinced Vietnamese request for termination French military mission encouraged, if not actually inspired, by US, despite repeated assurances on governmental level that it remains US policy encourage continued French participation in training Vietnamese air and naval forces.

3. We do not wish to question whether or not it would be desirable from military point of view for US to take over complete responsibility training Vietnamese forces. We do wish to point out, however, that French are suspicious and alert for any move on our part to fill gap caused by their departure. They will be quick to react sharply and bitterly to such a development at this time, regarding it as “proof” US duplicity and intention replace French in Indochina and elsewhere (i.e. North Africa). We believe just such suspicion of US intentions has already colored French attitude toward US policy Laos (Embtel 6027 to Dept3) and will inevitably have effect on whole range of US-French political and military relations. It should not be forgotten, for example, that French military who will react to US move in Vietnam will be same individuals with whom we must deal in Moroccan base negotiations.4

Houghton
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5/5–2857. Secret. Repeated for information to Saigon and Rabat; passed to Defense and CINCPAC.↩
  2. Not printed. (Ibid., 751G.5–MSP/5–2557)↩
  3. In this telegram dated May 25, the Embassy in Paris reported in part that the French experience with Diem, especially his recent termination of French air and naval training missions in Vietnam, was causing France to increase its support for Laotian leaders it considered sympathetic to its interests. (Ibid., 751J.00/5–2557)↩

  4. In telegram 4857 to Paris, June 4, the Department instructed the Embassy in Paris to raise at its own discretion the question of the withdrawal of the French air and naval training missions in Vietnam. The Embassy could inform the Quai d’Orsay and the press (on a nonattributable basis) that the United States had consistently pressed Diem to keep French air and naval training missions. “We would have preferred continued French handling air and naval missions if only for problem MAAG ceiling presents in U.S. assumption these functions.” Nonetheless in view of the French threat in 1956 to withdraw the missions, the United States had been obliged to “consider contigency planning assume functions these missions should they be withdrawn.” Since on May 24 the GVN had requested MAAG Vietnam to assign American advisers to fill the vacuum left by the anticipated withdrawal to French advisers on May 31, the matter was under study. (Ibid., 651.51G/6–157)

    On May 11 Williams reported to CINCPAC that he was told by a Vietnamese official that the French had insisted on withdrawing by May 31 after Diem directed on May 4 that they withdraw as soon as possible on a phased basis and in no case later than 6 months. (MAGCH 5862 from Saigon, 110535Z; Center of Military History, Williams Papers, TWXs 1957 (14))

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