380. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 10, 19571

SUBJECT

  • Situation in Cambodia

PARTICIPANTS

  • His Excellency Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Viet-Nam
  • His Excellency Nguyen Huu Chau, Secretary of State at the Presidency and Secretary of State for the Interior
  • His Excellency Tran Van Chuong, Ambassador of Viet-Nam
  • The Honorable Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
  • The Honorable Elbridge Durbrow, American Ambassador to Viet-Nam
  • Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs
  • Mr. Thomas J. Corcoran, Officer in Charge, Viet-Nam Affairs
  • Mr. Charles Sedgwick, Interpreter

President Ngo Dinh Diem said that the Cambodians had seen that things were going well in Viet-Nam so that they were now beginning to imitate the Vietnamese in many ways. However, they were still very much under French influence because they did not have people capable of doing government administrative work such as the drafting of documents, etc., and had to depend on French counsel. These French counselors usually steered clear of economic questions and in these matters the Cambodians were trying to follow the Vietnamese example.

The Cambodians have been started toward neutralism by the Indian representative there. It was fashionable to be neutralist and Sihanouk thought that by following such a policy he could become a [Page 812] ‘big shot’ and the Indians encouraged him. The French in Cambodia also encouraged him shortsightedly in their desire to prevent the spread of American influence from Viet-Nam to Cambodia.

Mr. Robertson said we had recent indications that Sihanouk was somewhat disturbed at communist activities. President Ngo agreed and said Sihanouk did not have control of his frontiers. The head-quarters of communist subversive activities had moved from Hanoi to Phnom Penh and the Soviet Embassy and the Chinese communist economic mission were counting on making use of the 300,000 Chinese in Cambodia for subversive activities, particularly across the frontier into Viet-Nam. Mr. Robertson remarked that one of the leading papers in Phnom Penh had four out of six pages denouncing communist aid as “paper” and calling American aid real aid. President Ngo said that the establishment of postal communications between Hanoi and Cambodia meant that communist infiltration of that country had been stepped up from a trickle to an avalanche.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/5–1057 Confidential. Drafted by Corcoran.