Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

242. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump) to the Department of the Army¹

Pearl Harbor, August 10, 1955—12:23 p.m.

102223Z. For OSD. DEPTAR (OSD) 292146Z cite DEF 985882.² CINCPAC interim reply contained my 302231Z Jul³ which continues valid and is integral part CINCPAC finalized response to OSD query. Specifically wish to emphasize last para thereof wherein recommendation is made that mission Vietnamese forces include potential capability of deterring aggression and delaying Viet Minh attack.

By his 091330Z cite MG 742 A PASEP,⁴ ChMAAG Indochina replied to all points contained in referenced OSD msg. CINCPAC considers this reply to be fully comprehensive and fully justifies increase in authorized strength of Vietnamese armed forces. CINCPAC fully concurs in ChMAAG reply and strongly recms approval of recommendations contained therein. This reply is in consonance with and complements CINCPAC interim reply.

Lt Gen O’Daniel, perhaps more than any other individual, has a keen understanding and immense appreciation of the situation in Indochina to include an intimate knowledge of the Vietnam will and ability to succeed. I repose the utmost confidence in his judgment and consider that prompt and full support in implementing his recommendations will be in the best US interest. I specifically refer to his closing comments commencing “It is my seriously considered view, etc,”. I endorse this view and urge that this be the overriding consideration in approval action on his recommendations.

Specific comments referring lettered paras referenced OSD msg fol: Paras A, C, D, and E are adequately covered in my interim reply and ChMAAG Indochina’s recommendations. … Following is also pertinent: The Viet Minh are capable of: A. Undermining the stability of the Vietnam Govt and B. of aiding an overt invasion by Viet Minh military forces, through subversion and para military activities, by instigating large scale disturbances, interdictions, sabotage, espionage, and large scale industrial trouble and uprisings. The back bone of the Viet Minh subversive effort was left behind at time of withdrawal of Viet Minh military forces beyond the 17th parallel. For the foreseeable future, it is estimated that Viet Minh will concentrate on subversion, by creating unrest and sabotage efforts to improve its position and accomplish capability A above and to lay the groundwork for aiding an invasion if and when it comes. There is no Communist party or front group operating overtly in South Vietnam, although Viet Minh political activity is widespread in the rural areas in the form of cells, sport groups, farmers associations, etc. The Viet Minh political apparatus in the south will necessarily undergo some reorganization as the situation changes.

In addition, following details advise as to dissident sects in Vietnam and point up forces necessary for their containment: The Hoa Hao forces in Southwest Vietnam under control of Ba Cut number approx 2000. This number could be increased to over 6000 if the forces formerly under control of Soai and Nguyen were integrated. The VNA is at present employing approx 20000 troops against the Hoa Hao. This number is broken down into 6 groupments, 1 regiment and 2 artillery bns. The Binh Xuyen forces number approx 3000 located south of Saigon in the Long Thanh–Baria area. 1800 of these forces are trained military pers. As many as 11 bns of approx 6000 troops of the VNA have been employed against the Binh Xuyen, but at present there is no organized force being employed. A small number of small naval craft of the VNA navy are available in this area. The Cao Dai originally numbered approx 30000 troops, of whom all but 7000 are reported to have integrated in the VNA. The VNA is not opposing the Cao Dai at this time. Approx 10000 Viet Minh are reported scattered throughout all of Vietnam.

Reference para F: Generally speaking, ChMAAG’s comments are correct in saying that the majority of MDAP equipment required for these forces can be provided from excesses. However, it must be recognized that shortages of considerable magnitude will exist in requirements for certain selected line items: Mainly electronics and some individual equipment, some of which are costly items. The dollar total involved, although not insignificant, is relatively minor when considered in relation to the overall cost of MDA programs for the Associated States and in comparison to the DFS and DS costs involved which represent by far the major dollar cost of this force to the US.

The following is also applicable: Additional costs of forces as proposed should be funded without jeopardizing the proposed programs for other countries in the PACOM. Magnitude of the cost not clear, however, as Vietnam operating on budget with deficit largely underwritten by US, it appears that total cost of support of all additional forces must be borne by US. Further, value of MDA material excess to 100,000 man force has been considered as being available to satisfy approved requirements in other countries and entire programming process based on this concept.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5519 Series. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated for information to CNO, JCS, and ChMAAG Vietnam.
2. See footnote 9, Document 239.
3. See footnote 3, supra.
4. Supra.