Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

229. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, July 15, 1955—7:26 p.m.

165. Saigon 8 repeated Paris Hanoi 2 Ottawa New Delhi London 1.² U.S. position taken at Geneva by General Smith³ was reiteration statement made by President on June 29⁴ that “in the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the United Nations to ensure that they are conducted fairly.” General Smith further said “with respect to the statement made by the Representative of the State of Viet-Nam,⁵ the U.S. reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in any arrangements which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any departure from this traditional position.”

Regarding Diem’s position, it is our understanding that no pressures are likely to move him from his policy of refusing to acknowledge the Geneva Agreement as binding upon Viet-Nam, or to see advantage as practical matter of acting under it.

If he should discard Geneva formula and not find some satisfactory substitute, we believe Free Viet-Nam will be in highly vulnerable position, due to Communist pressures and lack of sympathy of many Western and Asian allies.

We have made preliminary study of probable UN reaction to a proposal that it accept responsibility for supervising pre-election consultations and elections.⁶

We assume that such a request would be opposed by the UK France India Burma and Indonesia as well as by Communist bloc on the ground that election supervision has already been provided for in Geneva Agreements. UK and French opposition expected to influence Western European votes. If introduced in SC it would fail of adoption. If brought to General Assembly, unlikely required two thirds majority could be obtained in GA for resolution providing for UN supervision. Above estimate on basis strong U.S. support.

If we are correct in our assumption (and we are making further study⁷) there is virtually no prospect for constructive UN action at this stage. Should also be noted GA could probably not consider matter until October at earliest unless special session called. GA special session at this time not desirable for various reasons. Included within possible UN action would be reference to International Court for advisory opinion on extent of Viet-Nam’s obligation under Geneva Accord.

Diem should realize that in view unfavorable prospects UN appeal reference to UN would not remove need for active consideration other solutions.

You should inform Diem of above making certain he understands our support and sympathy and that we are conveying this information to him in an effort to be helpful.

Regarding what advice we can give him under circumstances, we estimate that Geneva formula is unacceptable to Viet-Nam and UN formula is unlikely to eventuate. Therefore remaining course appears to be avoidance any reference to Geneva by name or to UN action.

It should be borne in mind that authority given to ICC by Geneva Accord does not include authority for setting up machinery for either pre-election consultations or elections themselves. Therefore if it were decided to accept tacitly existence of ICC, without acknowledging Geneva Accord, there would be no factor limiting Free Viet-Nam’s insisting on additional measures to ensure free elections. This is a point which should be carefully considered by Diem.

Statement on elections might consist of reference desire Free Viet-Nam see divided territories reunited; acceptability of interzonal elections only under genuinely free conditions; and need to have such free conditions enforced by international action.

You should convey substance above to Diem.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/7–155. Secret. Drafted by Hoey and cleared by IO, UNP, EUR, WE, L, FE, and PSA. Repeated for information to Paris, London, Ottawa, New Delhi, and Hanoi.
2. In this telegram, dated July 1, the Embassy had reported that a recent speech by Diem contained additional indication that the government, “if and when it agreed discuss 1956 elections” would probably insist that the United Nations, and not the ICC, play a role in the supervision of the electoral process. The Embassy asked for the “Department’s thoughts” on the desirability and possibility of the United Nations playing such a role in case Diem should raise the issue. (Ibid.)
3. For text of the concluding statement made by Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith at the last plenary session at Geneva on July 21, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xvi, p. 1500.
4. The reference is to a joint Eisenhower–Churchill statement. For text, see ibid., p. 1260.
5. The reference is to a statement by Tran Van Do at the last plenary session at Geneva, July 21, protesting the conclusion and conditions of the armistice and reserving for the State of Vietnam complete liberty of action. For text, see Cameron, Viet-Nam Crisis, vol. I, pp. 309–310.
6. Memorandum from Bacon to Hoey, July 13, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/7–1355)
7. Memorandum from Robertson to Wainhouse, July 13, and memorandum from Phillips to Robertson, July 27, neither printed. (Ibid., 751G.00/7–1355 and 751G.00/7–2755, respectively)